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ABSTRACT

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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is about the long and difficult first meeting of Bulgarians with modernity. In our literature, this period is known as the National Revival (*Vazrajdana*), a powerful impetus to break with the old and turn to new, "European" role models. According to a tradition established by generations of researchers, the story of *Vazrajdana* so far has gone almost exclusively through the struggle for the national liberation, for the autocephalic church, and for the modern Bulgarian education and culture. This could explain why the National Revival has always been perceived as a straightforward, linear process of incorporation into the "new" with its established symbols – the nation, the school, the factories, trains, steamships, fashions, etc.¹ Some may even say - the *Vazrajdana* is a process of reintegration into the European civilization, from which the Ottoman invasion tore Bulgarians apart for nearly five hundred years.

Starting from a seemingly isolated, and perhaps for some readers even a boring case - of textile crafts and their growth into a modern factory industry - I will try to show that the first wave of Bulgarian modernization is not only much more prolonged (it ends somewhere around the First World War, not with the Liberation as believed so far), but at the same time it is very contradictory, bearing many "dark spots", underwater reefs and risks. That is why *Vazrajdana*, "the most Bulgarian time" in what may be an overly-pathetic expression of the famous historian Peter Mutafchiev², will be examined not so much through its glamorous, but also very well-documented manifestations in the political and cultural sphere. Instead, the focal point of this research would be processes such as industrialization and deindustrialization which are far from novel but never really made it to the Bulgarian-language historiography.

Viewed through these lenses, Bulgaria's first encounter with modernity comes at the most inopportune time possible. As a result of the industrial revolution, colonialism and globalization, at the end of the nineteenth century entire continents were actually losing, rather than gaining from their clash with modernization. The beautiful but expensive products of their artisans were literally swept away by mass factory production. From India to Mexico, hundreds of thousands, and perhaps even millions, of weavers, tanners, and blacksmiths lost their livelihoods driven by the relentless forces of Western competition. Throwing away their needle, hammer, or adze, they had no choice but to make a miserable living by plucking the land with their primitive agricultural implements. Degraded to the "periphery" vast areas of Eurasia, Africa and America specialized in the production of agricultural products, gradually becoming a "raw material appendage", to use the Lenin's term, of the powerful mechanized industries of the "industrial core".³ Instead of progress and development, it turns out, modernization brought painful structural transformation (re-agrarization) and loss of status for huge segments of the population of the so-called developing countries today.

¹ For a brilliant historiographical review of the literature, see Даскалов, Р. Как се мисли Българското възраждане. С., „ЛИК“, 2002. 383 с.

² Мутафчиев, П. Дух и завети на Възраждането. – Отец Паисий, VII, 1934, № 10.

³ Williamson, J., *Globalization and the Poor Periphery before 1950* (Cambridge, Mass., 2005).; Williamson, J., 'Globalization and the Great Divergence: Terms of Trade Booms, Volatility, and the Poor Periphery', 1782-1913', *European Review of Economic History*, 12 (2008), pp. 355-391.; Clinginsmith, D., J. Williamson, 'Deindustrialization in 18th and 19th Century India: Mughal Decline, Climate Shocks, and British Industrial Ascent', *Explorations in Economic History*, 45 (2008): 209-234. The theory of deindustrialization, which has gained a powerful surge in popularity over the last decade, has distinct anti-colonial roots (Nehru, J., *The Discovery of India*. (London, 1947) and draws ideas and concepts from Marx and Lenin.

In fact, the deindustrialization school, which has gained considerable popularity over the last decade, dates back to the nineteenth century and was aimed at explaining the decline of proto-industrial (artisanal) cotton textile production in India. For authors such as Dutt and Jawaharlal Nehru⁴, the decline of manual fabricated production was caused by the British colonial rule and the accompanying mass importation of English industrial goods, which converted millions of ruined artisans into subsistence farmers. It is in this initial meaning, defined in the literature as "absolute or relative decline in employment in industry (manual craft or mechanical factory)"⁵ that the term deindustrialization will be used in this study.

The decline of the old, Bulgarian textile crafts is usually explained in similar fashion. The quasi-colonial regime established by the United Kingdom, France and Austria-Hungary through the so-called capitulations, all historians insisted, quickly undermined the foundations of the flourishing Bulgarian *abadji* and *gaytanji* crafts pushed out of the market as a result of the influx of cheap European manufactured goods. What few in the literature so far realize, however, is that unlike India, in Bulgaria initial deindustrialization was followed by the accelerated development of local factory industry, which on the eve of the Balkan Wars even exceeded, albeit with little, the peak achieved by Bulgarian textile handicrafts around 1870. Thus, the Bulgarian deindustrialization was far much more complicated than the theoretical model. Instead of one-way, linear decline, the Bulgarian secondary sector followed a U-shaped trajectory of partial and temporary deindustrialization, followed by a reindustrialization.

The second, reindustrialization phase was entirely driven by the transformation of the old manual handicraft production to the modern mechanical factory-based textile industry. However, due to the scarcity of capital, the high transaction costs and the shrinking markets, the transition between old and new production structures was slow and took a mixed, hybrid form. Almost until the First World War, most of Bulgarian textile factories combined under one roof partial mechanization with a number of still manually performed processes. This hybrid model was both vital enough to ensure a return to the levels of the proto-industrial peak of 1870, and at the same time not dynamic enough to lead to a radical restructuring of the economy and a decisive modernization of society.

Beyond the obvious economic aspects of the topic, the study of the history of Bulgarian textile industry has another important goal. Its transformation from artisan to modern industry also reflects the radical social change that shook fundamentally Bulgarian society during the long nineteenth century between the Napoleonic Wars and the First World War. After centuries of economic stagnation and political hopelessness, a process we are accustomed to call the National Revival was unfolding in Bulgarian lands at an accelerating pace, leading to a comprehensive modernization of society.

Without falling into ideological staggering, I think it is safe to say that the cultural, the religious and the political maturation of Bulgarian nation went hand in hand with profound and comprehensive change in the economic and social life of Bulgarians. The textile industry - in its two main branches – *abadji* (cloth-making and tailoring) and *gaytandji* (braiding) - undoubtedly focuses all of these changes. The high level of their research allows us to restore the fabric of social change as well as to trace the dynamics of economic, cultural and political modernization.

The economic boom of the second and third quarters of the nineteenth century instilled unprecedented dynamism several dozen of mountain settlements. Thanks to the textile boom from a

⁴ Dutt, R., *The Economic History of India*, vol I (London, 1906).; Nehru, J., *The Discovery of India*. (London, 1947).

⁵ Clingensmith, D., J. Williamson, 'Deindustrialization', p. 210.

typical periphery, towns like Karlovo, Kazanlak, Gabrovo, etc., become the centre of economic, but also of the cultural and the political life in Bulgarian lands. And it was these “textile towns” which nourished the national leaders who led the struggle for education, culture, church and political independence.

In the next few hundred pages, through the “dry” history of the textile industry, I will try to recreate in depth the daily lives of the main social groups and the challenges they face in their first encounters with the modern world, once, in the early 1840s with the economic liberalization of the Ottoman Empire and for the second time, in the late 1870s, with the liberation of Bulgaria. The main characters in my story will be domestic producers, craftsmen, manufacturers, farmers, and, as far as they are involved in these processes - intellectuals, bureaucrats, politicians and members of the free-lance professions. Naturally, special attention will be paid to the textile industrialists, the people who in an extremely hostile environment of the 1880s and 1890s successfully laid the foundations of the economic modernity of Bulgaria.

It would be misleading to say, of course, that a study of the textile industry has mainly sociological ambitions. This requires a few words on the upcoming challenges faced by the topic. In the course of this study, the answers to the questions marked so far will be sought through verifiable quantitative analyses of hundreds of fragmented sources of evidence. This necessitated Sisyphean research work to construct long time series with data on the population - general and urban, by regions and by religious-ethnic communities, prices, exchange rates, wages, structure and volume of imports and exports, trade conditions and etc. All of them are presented in detail in the twelve appendices of the text, allowing the readers, especially those tempted by the topic, to reproduce and double-check my calculations and methodology. With the help of the collected data I am able to make a tentative, but I think - quite reliable assessment of the production of wool textiles, cereals and other agricultural products (wool, rose oil, cocoons, etc.), as well as their export. Unfortunately, for the most part, Bulgarian historiography still stubbornly shies away from quantification of the past which dominates the international academic literature for more than half a century. As far as the sources allow, the present study will try to go beyond the many qualitative – often ideologized – narratives and let the figures speak in their dry but relatively impartial language.

Biding together into an overall narrative all the economic and the social aspects of the change is a serious challenge. In it side by side have to coexist fashion and wages, price of wool and standard of living, calorie intake and transport costs per ton/kilometre etc. At the risk of being too informative, I will try to gather “under one roof” everything we know on the subject, tracing the existing hypotheses and clarifying a number of factual details and their possible inaccuracies. I believe that such a polyphonic narrative with several complementary registers could shed more light on questions that have been previously raised and left open questions⁶ like the: prolonged economic stagnation after 1878, the failed urbanization and the lack of structural transformation of Bulgarian economy. As we will see in the course of this dissertation, these processes are not due to any immanent conservatism and ignorance of the rural population, but rather a result of its sober assessment of meagre opportunities offered by the Bulgarian post-1878 town. Furthermore, the unattractiveness of the urbanization was a function of (1) the Long Depression that shook the world and led to a general decline in the standard of living, as well as to (2) the accelerated opening of our country abroad.

⁶ Иванов, М. Брутният вътрешен продукт на България. 1870–1945 г. С., „Сиела”, 2012. 559 с. In a sense, the present study may appear as a second, analytical part of my book on GDP.

CHAPTER ONE. THE BULGARIAN TEXTILE BOOM FROM THE 1820s TO THE MID-1870s

The Textile Boom (1826-1873) and Ottoman State Procurement

By the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the Bulgarian lands were already one of the most important industrial areas of the Ottoman Empire. The introduction of a regular army in 1826 and the policy of centralized supply of uniforms infused a life-giving stream into the centuries-old Bulgarian textile handicraft and domestic production.⁷ Naturally, the first state procurement orders for military clothing went to the old proto-industrial centres such as Plovdiv and Sliven, which enjoyed a well-deserved reputation in the production of woollens.⁸ Orders of this scale were beyond the capabilities of traditional craft guilds and required additional labour. From tailors who tailored customer home-made cloth, the most enterprising *abadji* quickly became organizers of smaller or larger putting-out companies.⁹ The profitability of the business and, mainly - the volume of government orders required the inclusion of craftsmen and a dozen smaller settlements at the foot of the surrounding mountains (the Balkans and the Rhodope) - Samokov, Pirdop, Koprivshitsa, Panagyurishte, Kalofer, Sopot, Karlovo, Kotel, Zheravna, Perushtitsa, Gabrovo, Tryavna and partly - Elena, Dryanovo and Troyan.

Kara-abadji and Manufacturers

In Eastern Thrace and its foothills, as far as can be judged from the few surviving documents, the production capacity of towns such as Karlovo, Kalofer and Koprivshitsa was quickly filled due to their small population. This required labour-intensive wool spinning and fabric weaving processes to be “outsourced” to the Central Rhodope and the Kotel region, which, due to their remoteness and lack of alternative employment opportunities, offered their labour at a much lower rate. Certainly for the rapid transfer of wool production to the Rhodope, the emergence of the lucrative braid craft also played a role. With the mechanization of the process at the beginning of the nineteenth century, *gaytan*-making displaced the *aba*-weaving in Karlovo, Kalofer, Sopot, Pirdop, Gabrovo and Kazanlak, pushing it along the periphery of the southern textile region to Panagyurishte, Koprivshitsa, Samokov, Kotel and Central Rhodope.¹⁰

An important reason for the migration of production from the plains and foothills to the mountains was also the ability of the administration and the local elites to impose in these remote areas for a longer period of time extra-economic coercive measures, which guarantee a significant profit from the

⁷ Staneff, S., *Das Gewerbewesen und die Gewerbepolitik in Bulgarien* (Rustschuk, 1901), p. 11.

⁸ For Plovdiv cf. Гаджанов, Д. Пътуване на Евлия Челеби през средата на XVII век. – Периодическо списание на Българското книжовно дружество, XXI, 1909, № 70, св. 9-10, с. 689-691. For the traditional Sliven textile crafts, see Табаков, С. Опит за история на град Сливен. Т. 1. С., „Издателство на ОФ“, 1986, с. 385-387 (първо издание 1911-1929 г.), as well as: Русев, И. Фирми и манифактури в Сливенско-Котленския район през Възраждането. В. Търново, „Фабер“, 1996, с. 41, 43.

⁹ Brilliantly, based on the preserved documents of the Gümüşgerdan family from Plovdiv, the process was followed by Либератос, А. Възрожденският Пловдив. Трансформация, хегемония, национализъм. С., „Гутенберг“, 2019, с. 318-385.

¹⁰ Todorov suggests that the *kardjali* bandit raids disrupted the production of *aba* in the less protected settlements such as Karlovo, Kazanlak and Kalofer, as a result of which they switched to making yarn and knitting braid. Тодоров, Н. Балканският, град, с. 219. Without denying the possible role of the decade-long uncertainty in the empire from the end of the eighteenth to the second quarter of the nineteenth century, a number of other factors probably also played a role in replacing the *aba* with a *gaytan*.

military supplies. K. Kanev describes very vividly the heavy burden of so-called *nizam angari* (also known as *nizam habas*) for the population of the village of Momchilovtsi in the Central Rhodope.¹¹ Similar stories were told about the neighbouring Slaveyno village, where the production of coarse cloth for the army was also accompanied by a lot of violence.¹²

In the mid-1830s, Atanas Gümüşgerdan took over military supplies. With two successful marriages of his daughters, he became related to the head of the *abadji* guild in Constantinople, Toma Stefan (Thomas Stefanu), as well as to the *ustabasi* of the guild in small Rhodope town of Ahachelebi.¹³ This, according to N. Todorov, made him the head of "the largest putting-out network on the Balkan Peninsula in the nineteenth century." In the late 1830s, nearly 500 people from several dozen Rhodope villages were harnessed to his network.¹⁴ The harsh coercive methods used by Atanas and especially by his son Mihalaki Gyumyushgerdan against the Rhodope population were the reason for an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate him in 1856, in which his brother died instead of Mihalaki. Nearly a decade later, in 1865, over 2,000 mountaineers revolted and drove out the agents of the Gümüşgerdan. The unrest, according to some, put an end to the *nizams angari*, but according to other authors, the brutal exploitation continued long after this "first Rhodope strike".¹⁵

There are fragmentary reports of dissatisfaction and protests against the system of compulsory state procurement in the 1830s from the Kotel region as well.¹⁶ Here, during the 1830s and especially in the 1840s similar methods of organization of *aba*-production appeared, but the coercive methods were abandoned much earlier than in the Rhodope. In the Sliven-Kotel region, moreover, the process seems to be more decentralized and Ivan Rusev managed to establish 9 putting-out Sliven companies, two in Kotel and two in Zheravna.¹⁷

The First Manufacturers

¹¹ Канев, К. Миналото на село Момчиловци, Смолянско. Принос към историята на Средните Родопи. С., „Издателство на ОФ“, 1975, с. 512-514, 519, 522.

¹² Карапетков, П. Славейно: Принос към историята на Средните Родопи. С., ИК „Ив. Вазов“, 1991, с. 414-416.

¹³ Ibid, с. 343-344 и сл.

¹⁴ Тодоров, Н. Балканският гард, с. 225, 229, 234-235.

¹⁵ Косев, К. За капиталистическото развитие, с. 41.; Примовски, А. Бит и култура, с. 372, 374-376.; Карапетков, П. Славейно, с. 415-416.; Тодоров, Н. Балканският град, с. 250.; Либератос, А. Възрожденският Пловдив, с. 203-204.

¹⁶ Документи за българската история, Т. 3, с. 173.; Цончев, П. Страници из историята на Котел от края на XVIII и първата половина на XIX в. – сб. Георги С. Раковски. Възгледи, дейност и живот. Т. 1, С., „Издателство на БАН“, 1964, с. 295-296.; Тонев, В. Котел през Възраждането. С., „Grafic AMAT“, 1993, с. 46. In his study of what he calls the "order-monopoly system", L. Berov does not include the obligatory state procurement of clothing for the army. His research shows that since the late 1830s, the system has been disorganized as a result of the free trade agreements signed by the Ottoman Empire with the Great Powers. It was officially abolished, according to Berov, in 1842. However, as can be seen from N. Todorov's research on Gyumyushgerdan, the Plovdiv *abadji* managed to preserve the harsh methods of coercion in the Rhodope until at least the mid-1860s, replacing the state but using her tacit support. Беров, Л. Ролята на задължителните държавни доставки във вътрешната и външната търговия на българските земи през XVI-XIX в. – сб. Из историята на търговията в българските земи през XV-XIX в. С., „Издателство на БАН“, 1978, с. 149-150.

¹⁷ Русев, И. Фирми и манифактури, с. 40-199. For some of these companies, however, the line between putting-out production and simple trade with woollens is thin and not entirely clear. See for example, the company "Ivan Minov & Rayko Nedyalkov" from Kotel. Ibid, с. 148.

Only few of the kara-abadji, and even fewer of the woollen merchants, took the risk of overrunning the traditional putting-out system and starting a modern factory production. Undoubtedly, this is a clear sign of insecurity in the Ottoman Empire and the clear reluctance of those with free funds to immobilize them in activities from which they would then be difficult to withdraw.¹⁸ Trade, and especially usury, guaranteed high profits of 20-30 percent¹⁹ which also acted discouraged large investments in factories.²⁰

Thanks to the enthusiasm and efforts of people like Georgi Kozarov, Simeon Tabakov and Georgi T. Danailov, the information we have today about the first Bulgarian factories is not insufficient, especially if we compare it with what is available for most textile mills founded after 1878. Two findings stand out. First, all factories founded before 1878 were directly or indirectly (through government procurement) connected to the authorities and/or representatives of the local ruling Ottoman elite. N. Todorov explains this with "the lack of security" and "the incompatibility of Ottoman rule with the capitalist system."²¹ And secondly, although we are talking about factories, with the exception of the Sliven and the Dermendere mill (but only after 1860s), we are actually see a hybridity in the organization and execution of the production process. Only individual activities (carding and spinning) were centralized and mechanized, while all others were carried out by hand by children, women or low-paid representatives of minorities (Roma at the Sliven State Factory). This line of combining pre-industrial with typical industrial forms will be maintained until almost 1900 and will be finally overcome only after the end of the textile recession.

Domestic Producers

Although they have attracted a great deal of research interest, both factories and putting-out system were quite limited in number. It seems that since the first decades of the nineteenth century the main producer of *aba* in the Bulgarian lands has been the domestic industry - tens of thousands of women, and in some places men (e.g. in Kotel and Panagyurishte) from dawn to dusk turn their backs on the

¹⁸ Palairot claims that the Ottoman Empire provided a higher level of security and prosperity to its subjects than Serbia or Austria-Hungary. Palairot, M. *Balkan Economies*, p. 41, 135. Bulgarian historiography is unanimously of the opposite opinion. It usually cites the example of Dobri Zhelyazkov, and later the Hadjimanolov brothers, who were forced to seek the support of the sultan or of influential local leaders to carry out their factory projects. Moreover, N. Todorov insisted that, although a private enterprise, the factory in Dermendere "was opened only after the provision of a number of guarantees to the Gyumyushgerdans and in particular after their company took over state supplies." Тодоров, Н. По някои въпроси за икономическото развитие и зараждането на капитализма в българските земи под турско владичество. – ИПр, XVII, 1961, № 6, с. 102-103. In his already classic study of the Bulgarian Revival, Hristo Gandev explained the small number of factories before the Liberation with the slow "accumulation of capital" through craftsmanship. The historian gave the example of the founder of the first Gabrovo factory, who showed that "Kalpazanov's craftsmanship and the three initial *charks* were not enough to turn his enterprise into an industrial, capitalist one. More and more trade capital was needed, despite the great profits that production itself gave." Гандев, Хр. Проблеми на Българското възраждане. С., „Наука и изкуство“, 1976, с. 435.

¹⁹ Тодоров, Н. Балканският град, с. 284.; Русев, И. Фирми и манифактури, с. 60-61, 155, 158-159.

²⁰ In one of his studies, L. Berov claims that while the capital invested in an average promoted industrial enterprise in 1900 was about 200,000 Levs, even the two largest companies before the Liberation (Tapchileshtov and Evlogiy Georgiev) had resp. 250 thousand and 2.56 million Levs. The Bulgarians with over 1 million *kurus* in the 1870s were only three. Икономика на България до социалистическата революция, с. 337.

²¹ Тодоров, Н. Балканският град, с. 294. Briefly telling the story of the Hadjimanolov brothers Iv. Rusev also insisted that attracting Hassan Kanayazade was "to secure this private venture from the authorities", as "building a factory in the conditions of the lawless Ottoman Empire is an expensive and quite risky undertaking." Русев, Ив. Фирми и манифактури, с. 100-101.

distaff, the spinning-wheel and the loom. Although rough, calculations in this dissertation show that centralized procurement of cloth were probably less than a fifth of the total production. Almost all of the remaining output up to the 1.25 million square meters of cloth in ca. 1870 was most likely made by rural families.

From time immemorial, Bulgarians, like many other nations, produced their own clothing. With minor changes, this practice persisted almost until the eve of World War II. For that reason many claimed that "before the liberation, each house was a small factory."²² With government procurement after the mid-1820s, this knowledge and experience of the foothill population suddenly found its market niche and went beyond the field of textile self-sufficiency. With the opportunity for additional cash income, during the long winter months catering of own clothing needs give way to spinning and weaving for the market. As we have seen, at least in the beginning, the coercion used by enterprising but greedy traders and *abadji* also played a role in the mobilization of the existing self-sufficient capacity.

The technique of processing wool and turning it into cloth is well known and there are no significant differences in different regions of the country. However, due to the importance of many of the specific processes and their characteristics (fleece weight, fiber length, average daily spinning and weaving productivity, etc.) for the estimates of woollen output they are traced in detail in this paragraph.

The Craftsmen

We are used to thinking of *abadji* craftsmen as producers of cloth, which they afterwards cut and sew in clothes to order. Such, it turns out, they almost never were. Speaking about the eighteenth century, Tsonchev claims that the Gabrovo *abadji* "tailored cloth that is given by the client". This is also confirmed by N. Teneva about the first *abadji* in the Central Rhodope, who "travelled the neighbouring villages and hamlets and sewed men's clothes with the client's cloth".²³ Almost everywhere the *abadji* only sew with ready-made cloth, which they themselves have ordered or bought from the domestic industry manufacturers. In cases where they took over the organization of production - from the delivery of wool for spinning to the fulling and dyeing of the finished goods, they almost abandon the foxglove and the needle and had become entirely textile traders. In the Sliven region such master craftsmen became known as *kara-abadji*, but in other places they keep the old name of their profession (*abadji*). Those who developed own putting-out systems were only several dozen entrepreneurs, perhaps not more than one hundred people across the country. In the general case, the *abadji* cut and sew most of the cloth they bought or ordered to the domestic producers. Then, in August or September, they travelled to distant places - Constantinople, Aegean Thrace, the Greek islands, Asia Minor and even Egypt where they sold their finished goods - in rented shops or at regional fairs, often taking orders for clothing from customers, which they prepare on site.²⁴ At the end of the winter, *abadji* returned to their home-towns or villages for Easter. This is followed by a new cycle of ordering or buying cloth, cutting and sewing and another trip abroad.²⁵ In Kotel this separation from

²² Табаков, С. История на Сливен, Т. 3, с. 49. The quote is about Sliven, but there are similar observations for almost all other mountain villages and towns.

²³ Ibid, с. 95-96.; Тенева, Н. Абаджийският занаят в Средните Родопи, с. 16.

²⁴ Staneff, S., *Das Gewerbewesen*, p. 12.

²⁵ The *abadji* annual rhythm is most vividly conveyed in Ослеков, Л. Копривщица, с. 512-516. Cf. also: Маджаров, М. Спомени, с. 69-70.; Тодоров, Н. За някои промени в цеховата организация, с. 52.

home is called "on the landing stage" and continued from St. Mother of God (August, 15th) until the Nativity of Christ (mid-April).²⁶

We have only the roughest idea of the average amount of cloth that the *abadji* had tailored in clothes. In the Rhodope, according to local history research, larger artisans managed to order, cut, sew and sell 200, 300, and some even 500 rolls of *aba* (between 1,000 and 2,500 square meters).²⁷ An average-size craftsman, what most *abadji* were, used no more than 60, 100, 150 rolls (300-750 sq. m.) per year, while the petty artisans were satisfied with only 30-50 rolls (150-200 sq. m.).²⁸ Knowing from the "experimental ethnography"²⁹ that the average traditional costume was about 5.20 square meters and that in the process of cutting about 10 percent³⁰ were lost, we can estimate that large *abadji* were able to cloth 200-500 people, 50-100 - medium, and small artisans - only 30-50 customers.³¹ Given that sewing of a suit in Constanța in 1861 cost about 50 *kurus*³² the annual income of the master *abadji* was respectively 1,000, 2,000 and 8,500 *kurus* for each of the three craftsmen groups. Between a quarter and a half of these sums must have been deducted to pay the journeyman and apprentices working for the master craftsmen. Although very rough, the estimates presented here are completely comparable to the existing information in the literature, based on the 3-percent-income-tax (*temetuat*), which indicates 500-1,000 *kurus* annual income of the majority of *abadji*.³³ The famous

²⁶ Русев, И. Фирми и манифактури, с. 145. The *abadji* cycle is almost the same in the Rhodope: Неделев, Бележки из Сренде-Родопското население, с. 32.

²⁷ Data on the length of the roll of *aba* in the Rhodope vary in a relatively narrow range from 15-16 to 21-22 *arshins*: Карапетков, П. Славейно, с. 394-395.; Марева, Т. Спомените на бивш абаджия, с. 551.; Тодоров, Н. Балканският град, с. 231-232.; Ташев, Г. Петково, с. 40.; Тенева, Н. Абаджийският занаят в Средните Родопи, с. 17.; Тенева, Н. Родопски занаяти, с. 127.; Неделев. Бележки из Сренде-Родопското население, с. 31.; Тодоров, Н. Балканският град, с. 231.; Тодоров, Н. За някои промени в цеховата организация, с. 58-59.

²⁸ Карапетков, П. Славейно, с. 416, 421.; Ташев, Г. Петково, с. 40.; Тенева, Н. Абаджийският занаят в Средните Родопи, с. 18.

²⁹ For "experimental ethnography" see Annex 7.

³⁰ Indication of the loss of clothe at the seam, and only indirectly, is available by Цончев, П. Нашата текстилна индустрия (из нов път). – Банков преглед, III, 1910, № 4, с. 46. According to him, when cutting 4.5 million kg of fabrics the rags, "cannot be less than 400,000 kg", or 8.8 percent.

³¹ The data collected through the "experimental ethnography" are significantly higher than the approximate estimate of N. Todorov, who claims that "in the best case, no more than 2 sets of clothes could be sewn from one roll" of *aba*. Тодоров, Н. Балканският град, с. 232. However, as we have seen, one roll has an average of about 5 square meters of cloth, as much as, according to the data from "experimental ethnography", the average square footage of the traditional costume.

³² Mihoff, N. *Contribution*, 1950, pp. 440. The price of 50 *kurus* also includes the price of the cloth, which is at least half, and maybe more of the sum. The above approximate income is calculated at 25 *kurus* costs for sewing and as much - for material (*aba*). Almost as much, 23 *kurus*, is the cost of a tailor, paid by the Rhodope shepherds according to Дечев, В. Среднородопско овчарство. – Сборник за народни умотворения, наука и книжнина (сбНУНК), XIX, 1903, № 1, с. 11-12. Kanev also believes that for "one set of clothes" the tailor takes 20 *kurus*. Канев, К. Момчиловци, с. 507. However, P. Tsonchev reports a significantly higher price of 1-1 ½ Turkish lira (approx. 140 *kurus*) only for sewing. Цончев, П. Шивашкият занаят в Габрово. – спБЖД, XIV, 1910, № 5, с. 350. The huge difference between the two sets of information can only be explained by the type of costumes. While in the first case (Constanța, Rhodope) it is explicitly emphasized that it is a "standard costume", in the second the clothes should have had rich decorations of braid, which were more difficult and time consuming to add. If we still use Tsonchev's instructions, then the annual income of the *abadji* would jump too high - between 4 and 70 thousand *kurus*, something that obviously could not be true.

³³ Опис на османотурски документи за занаяти и търговия (XVI-XIX в.). С., 1993, с. 305, 323, 351, 383.; Тодоров, Н. Балканският град, с. 354. It is also evident that the income declared to the tax authorities is understandably more or less below the real one.

Bulgarian sociologist Ivan Hadjiiski rightly pointed out that "the law of small numbers reigned" the revenue side of craftsmen balance-sheet.³⁴

This, and not so much the "deep crisis" in which crafts supposedly entered in the late 1860s, or the difficulty to cook for many apprentices, can be the real reason for the small number of journeymen and apprentices that a master was able to maintain.³⁵ Although in the literature from time to time there are romantic statements about craftsmen with 10-12 assistants³⁶, the average number of employees was two (a journeyman and an apprentice or two apprentices who do not receive or receive only a small salary).³⁷ Bulgarian Marxist historiography usually states: "Apprenticeship under the pretext of learning a trade was in fact one hundred percent exploitation of wage labour."³⁸ From a production point of view, however, apprentices had very little added value for their masters. They were used mainly as domestic servants without contributing much to the craftsman's business. During the first two of the usually three-year apprenticeship period, 10-to-12-year-olds receive only shelter and food. Their lives was filled with deprivation, humiliation, and often – physical violence. It was not until the third year, when young boys reached the status of a "little journeyman" (*kalfichka*), and received a modest salary, which according to some descriptions was 40 *kurush* a year plus two pairs of *emini* (slippers) for about the same amount.³⁹ For the master-*abadji*, apprenticeship probably only mattered as a future investment. After three or four years, when the young man was promoted into a journeyman and began to participate in the production, he finally ceased to be just an extra throat to feed, as M. Madjarov claims in his memoirs⁴⁰. It was only now when the youngster was able to provide real assistance in increasing the *aba*-production. However, the work of the journeyman is already paid, and, as we will see, not much lower than that of the master himself.

The Gaytandi

Another evidence of the growing demand outside the state segment for military uniforms is the exceptional success of the braid, a fashionable, even luxury product that quickly focused consumers' desires of young and old, rich and poor. Because "what are clothes without a braid"?

³⁴ Хаджийски, И. Съчинения. С., „Български писател“, 1974, Т. 1, с. 105.

³⁵ For this argument of N. Todorov, see and his already quoted article „Из историята на карловското абаджийство“, с. 151. M. Madjarov claims that cooking three times a day was a huge responsibility for artisan wives, which is why the masters preferred to give work piecemeal outside, rather than take with them many apprentices and journeymen. Маджаров, М. На Божии гроб преди шестдесет години и днес. Спомени, пътни бележки и впечатления. С., „С. М. Стайков“, 1929, с. 7-8.

³⁶ Арнаудов, М. Из миналото на Котел. Заселване, бележити личности, стопански живот, фолклор. – Годишник на Софийския университет, Историко-Филологически факултет. Т. 27. С., „Графика“, 1931, с. 58. Although indirectly, the same statement about many journeymen and apprentices in one master, see Цонев, С. Към въпроса за еснафските организации, с. 16.

³⁷ N. Todorov came to a similar conclusion: "The bulk of the *abadji* in Bulgaria worked without assistants or from time to time with one or two apprentices." Тодоров, Н. За някои промени в цеховата организация, с. 70.

³⁸ Косев, К. За капиталистическото развитие, с. 52.; In a more lenient form, the claim can also be found in: Тодоров, Н. За някои промени в цеховата организация, с. 66.

³⁹ The only other information about the shoes' price is from 1860 for Eski Dzhumaya (now Targovishte), where a pair sells for 22.92 *kurus*. Michoff, N., *Beiträge*, 1953, pp. 144-146, 150-152. For Kalofer, however, N. Nachov does not indicate that the apprentices received a salary. Начов, Н. Калофер в миналото, с. 47. K. Kosev claims that "the apprentices were obliged to work for 3 years without pay, only for food." Косев, К. За капиталистическото развитие, с. 73.

⁴⁰ Маджаров, М. На Божии гроб, с. 7-8.

Due to the exceptional complexity of manual knitting of braid, its production was quickly mechanized. As the first relatively more complex machine, which was implemented and mass-produced in Bulgaria⁴¹, the history of the technological transfer of the knitting machine (*chark*) is extremely interesting and requires to be told in detail.

Causes of the Textile Boom

If in the beginning the state procurement for the army played an important impetus for beginning of the textile boom, then from the 1840s the continuing growth of production increasingly began to rely on market demand of the population. Three key factors drove the growing consumption of cloth, braids and other woollens (socks, blankets, rugs): the urbanization, the Tanzimat reforms, and the demographic boom.

First, during the long period of political instability known in our literature as the "*kardjali* time," the ability of the central government to provide control over and security in the provinces of the Ottoman Empire was drastically eroded. During these turbulent and uncertain decades, villages and smaller towns were unable to guarantee the property and the lives of their inhabitants.⁴² Many settlements such as Arbanassi, Stanimaka, Panagyurishte, Koprivshtitsa, Kalofer, etc. were looted by raging bandits or *ayan* armies. Only well-fortified, populous and larger cities managed to repel the raids of the brigandines. Fleeing from the unrest, many Bulgarians seek protection in larger market centres. It should be noted the exact opposite was the practice in previous centuries. Taking advantage of their relative security and more favourable climate, the local population has preferred smaller, "more invisible" and more isolated places, mainly in the mountains and the foothills. It is impossible to make accurate estimates, but it seems quite likely that in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the urban population increased from just under 10 to over 15 percent.⁴³ Even in the roughest terms, this added at least 85-100 thousand new customers a year by around 1826. After the breakup of regional separatism and the restoration of order in the provinces of the empire, these already grown cities became important consumer centres that pushed up the textile demand. To this we must add the proximity of the Ottoman capital, which together with Edirne and Salonika has always attracted significant supplies of food, clothing and other goods from neighbouring Bulgarian territories.

Second, the economic reforms and trade liberalization undertaken in the late 1830s had important demographic and economic consequences. In 1842, the trade agreements with the European countries from 1837-1838, were finally implemented in full. They lifted the centuries-old bans on grain exports, as well as abolished all state monopolies.⁴⁴ The reform had an immediate effect on agricultural

⁴¹ Терзиева, К. За казанлъшкия произход на гайтаневия чарк. – Казанлък в миналото и днес. Т. 4, Казанлък, Исторически музей „Искра“, 1994, с. 218.

⁴² Мутафчиева, В. Избрани съчинения. Т. 2. Кърджалийско време. Пловдив, „Жанет 43“, 2008. 428 с.

⁴³ In this case, the urban population is defined as the inhabitants of settlements with more than 5,000 people. According to J. Lampe and M. Jackson in the middle of the nineteenth century the level of urbanization in the Bulgarian lands was 20 percent. In the light of the rich demographic literature cited above, this assessment seems exaggerated. Lampe, J., M. Jackson, *Balkan Economic History, 1550-1950: From Imperial Borderlands to Developing Nations* (Bloomington, 1982), p. 140.

⁴⁴ Беров, Л. Към въпроса за аграрните отношения у нас по време на Освобождението. – Трудове ВИИ, III, 1956, № 2, с. 71-73.; Беров, Л. Ролята на задължителните държавни доставки, с. 149-150.; İnalçık, H., D. Quataert (eds.), *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 825-826.

production. Foreign observers were impressed by the textbook effect of trade liberalization on agriculture.⁴⁵ The most reliable available data, reflected in the consular reports of that time, show a 25.1 percent annual growth in grain exports in the 1840s (most of the increase was realized in the first 1-2 years). Large tracts of land that have been deserted for centuries due to wrong, non-market incentives (fixed prices at levels well below market, mandatory government supplies and a ban on exports) have been put into cultivation for the first time.

Third, reforms and trade liberalization have led not only to a rapid increase in exports (and production), but also to an unprecedented demographic boom. The available data are quite contradictory, but it seems that the population in the Bulgarian lands probably began to grow immediately after the central government finally managed to restore relative order and tranquillity in the empire in early 1820s. It can be assumed that in the beginning the increased birth rate was dictated by the natural desire to compensate for the delayed pregnancies during the troubled *kardjali* times. However, the process continued with a growing speed after the abolition of export bans and the subsequent boom in the production and export of grain and other crops. The role of measures taken in the middle of the nineteenth century to combat plague and cholera epidemics was also important. Together with improved nutrition and relatively healthier living conditions, this has led to a reduction in mortality, including infant mortality.⁴⁶ Taken together, all of these factors contributed to the increased birth rate. After a period of long uncertainty the birth rates did not subside a few years later, as is usually happened in other similar cases (after wars, cataclysms or mass epidemics). Instead, the population continued to grow at an impressive rate in the coming decades.

Ottoman statistics do not provide solid data to document these demographic processes more accurately. Therefore, I use the comparison between the number of elderly men (*nüfuz*) given by Todorov for 1831 and approx. 1870, indicating an average annual increase of 1.69 percent within the territories roughly falling within today's Bulgarian borders, compared with 1.44 percent after 1878.⁴⁷ What can be said with relative certainty on the basis of these approximate data is that in less than 50 years the population has doubled. The cash income from the export of grain and other agricultural goods brought, if not prosperity, at least some improvement in the standard of living in Bulgarian lands. Compared to the beginning of the nineteenth century, on the eve of the Liberation the Bulgarians were not only more numerous, but also relatively wealthier compared to the levels of the end of the eighteenth and the first decades of the nineteenth century. This stimulated their consumption of agricultural and industrial goods, woollens included.

Industrialization in a Time of Deindustrialization. Alternative Explanations

How can we explain the Bulgarian textile boom at a time when, in the rest of the world, traditional proto-industrial production was declining and the “periphery” experienced a deep deindustrialization? M. Palairé believes that the reasons for the undeniable success of Bulgarian *gaytan* and *aba* lie in (1) the “iron collar of the *chiftliks*” and (2) in the rich and influential owners of huge flocks of sheep. The two factors, according to the British researcher, hindered the migration of the population from the

⁴⁵ Michoff, N., *Beiträge zur Handelsgeschichte Bulgariens (Offizielle Dokumente und Konsularberichte, v. 2. Österreicheische Konsularberichte (Sofia, 1943), pp. 50, 71, 80, 89-90, 116; Michoff, Contribution (1950), pp. 173-174, 188-189.*

⁴⁶ Манолова-Николова, Н. Чумавите времена (1700-1850). С., „ИФ-94“, 2004. 315 с.

⁴⁷ Тодоров, Н. Балканският град, с. 296, 307.

textile regions to the lowlands, where they could have engaged in agriculture, driven by increased export opportunities after 1842. In this way, an "artificial labour surplus" was created in the foothills (Koprivshtitsa, Samokov, Kotel, Panagyurishte, Gabrovo, etc.), provided the local textile crafts with sufficient pool of cheap labour.⁴⁸

Both hypotheses can be rejected relatively easily. In the literature it has long been established that the *chiftliks* occupy an insignificant part of the arable land.⁴⁹ The vast majority of the land was cultivated extensively, leaving between ½ and 1/3 of it fallow each year to restore its fertility.⁵⁰ Despite the demographic boom, population density remained much lower - about 31 people per square kilometre in 1870 compared to about 75 people in Central and Western Europe. That is why, even in the late 1880s, careful researchers continued to claim that Bulgarian fields resembled America and that anyone could easily find enough "free" land. It should not be forgotten that after the liberalization of the grain trade, the *chiftlik*-owners had a serious motive to attract workers from the foothills, where the population density was significantly higher, in order to fully cultivate their land. The latter is also acknowledged by Palaret himself. That is why he focuses mainly on "powerful and influential pastoralists' vested interests". According to Palaret, these were "rich Christian quasi-nobles" (*chorbadji*), as well as Mokan and Yuruks (the latter two - semi-nomadic Christian and Muslim tribes). Palaret believes these grazers were influential enough to prevent the migration from the mountains, preserving the plains for their herds.⁵¹ In fact, however, these grazers were too few (the Mocans, only 4,000 in the middle of the nineteenth century, and foreign, Austrian subjects) and politically weak to impose any "restriction on land cultivation."⁵² On the contrary, it is a well-known fact that the Kotel *chorbadji*, famous for their wealth and huge flocks, numbering tens of thousands of sheep, were forced to abandon the winter grazing in the "Lower Field" near Burgas, which began to be cultivated more

⁴⁸ Palaret, M. 'Decline', pp. 335-342. It should be noted that the claim about the "iron collar of the *chiftliks*" is not very popular in the literature. In his study on the Bulgarian economy Lampe, J., *The Bulgarian Economy in the Twentieth Century* (London, 1986), p. 21 offers a more plausible explanation for the so-called "deserted lowlands". According to Lampe, the exploitation in the *chiftliks* forced the local peasants to flee to the "less accessible mountains". However, it must be said that leaving the fertile plains and fleeing to the mountains was a phenomenon that has existed for at least several centuries before the appearance of the *chiftliks* and was not caused by them.

⁴⁹ Беров, Л. Към въпроса за аграрните отношения, с. 67-102.; Беров, Л. Аграрното движение в Източна Румелия по време на Освобождението. – ИПр, XII, 1956, № 1, с. 3-35.; Беров, Л. Промени в разпределението на поземлената собственост в Северна България през първите две десетилетия след Освобождението. – ИИИ, 1984, Т. 27, с. 224-272.; Димитров, С. Чифлишкото стопанство през 50-те-70-те години на XIX век. – ИПр, XI, 1955, № 2, с. 3-34.; Разбойников, Ат. Чифлици и чифлигари в Тракия преди и след 1878 г. – ИИИ, 1960, Т. 9, с. 143-181.; Тодоров, Н. Нови данни за аграрните отношения у нас през 60-те години на XIX в. – ИПр, XIV, 1958, № 5, с. 102-113.; Тодоров, Н. По някои въпроси за икономическото развитие и зараждането на капитализма в българските земи под турско владичество. – ИПр, XVII, 1961, № 6, с. 87-105.; Христов, Хр. Прилагане на капиталистически начин на производство в българското селско стопанство през 60-те и 70-те години на XIX в. – ИПр, XX, 1964, № 1, с. 78-86.

⁵⁰ Мошнин, Н. А. При-Дунайская Болгарія (Дунайскій вилайет). Статистико-економическій очерк. – Славянскій сборник, № 2, СПб, Издание Петербургскаго отдела Славянскаго комитета, 1877, с. 372.

⁵¹ Palaret, M. 'Decline', pp. 335-338.

⁵² Тонев, В. Добруджа през Възраждането (културен живот, църковно-национални борби, революционни движения). Варна, „Държавно издателство“, 1973, с. 19.; Миятев, П. Документи за използване на добруджанските пасища от трансилвански овчари (мокани). – ИИИ, 1964, Т. 14-15, с. 443-454.

intensively during 1840s. Instead, Kotel *chorbadji* moved their herds to Dobrudja, almost depopulated after a series of Russo-Turkish wars.⁵³

It seems that the reasons for the seemingly inexplicable textile boom and the "artificial surplus of labour" in the foothills must be sought elsewhere. Firstly, it should not be forgotten that grain exports were possible mainly in areas with easier access to ports. The cultivation of cereals for export was progressing relatively slowly in the interior due to, as one foreign observer described it, the "deplorable state of road infrastructure".⁵⁴ Even the main arteries were passable mainly during the dry summer season. The carts loaded with wheat and corn for export were pulled by a pair of oxen. They were slow, small and with a very primitive construction.

Domestic transport was not just slow and primitive, but also very expensive.⁵⁵ The appearance of the railways in the 1860s and 1870s in Bulgaria did not lead to significant changes. The tariffs of the new railway companies were so high that the peasants usually preferred to spend a week on the uneven and unsafe roads than to pay 3 to 4 daily wages (10-14 *kurus*) to the railroad companies.⁵⁶ With the exception of the Maritsa River, the Bulgarian lands did not have inland navigable rivers. According to the calculations of foreign consuls, the transportation of wheat from the region of Plovdiv to the ports of the Aegean Sea (about 330 km) cost four times more than between Paris and Marseille (770 km). Per kilometre the difference is almost 10 times!⁵⁷

Poor inland transport kept prices in the countryside significantly lower than these in Danube and Black Sea ports. A detailed study by the Italian consul in Ruse revealed that in 1871 the peasants living far from the Danube received only half the price paid at the export stations. Of course, the difference between the two depended to a large extent on the distance the producer had to travel in order to deliver his food surplus to the market. My rough calculations show that farmers living about 100 kilometres inland pay about a third of the market price as transport costs.⁵⁸

Poor prospects for export to areas a hundred or more kilometres from ports make their grain cultivation less attractive and discouraged the peasants from the mountains to migrate to the otherwise fertile plains, which however were cut from the export markets. Particularly unattractive for settlement must have been the westernmost fringes of the Eastern Thracian lowlands, in the foothills of which most industrial towns flourished (Kalofer, Sopot, Karlovo, Panagyurishte, Koprivshitsa, Pirdop). The railways reached this part of Thrace only in the mid-1870s, just a few years before the Liberation. The situation in Northern Bulgaria (Danube *vilayet*) was significantly better. This was not

⁵³ Дуков, Л. Развитие и организация на котленското овцевъдство в Добруджа. – Известия на Етнографския институт и музей, XXII, 1974, № 15, с. 53; Константинов, Д. Жеравна в миналото и до днешно време. Историко-битов преглед. Жеравна, Читалище „Единство“, 1948, с. 65.

⁵⁴ Michoff, N., *Contribution*, 1941, p. 10.

⁵⁵ Беров, Л. Равнището, с. 34-38.; Berov, L., 'Transport Costs and Their Role in Trade in the Balkan Lands in the 16th-19th Centuries', *Bulgarian Historical Review*, 3 (1975), 4, pp. 74-98.

⁵⁶ Михов, Принос, с. 448.

⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 331.

⁵⁸ These calculations are reassuringly close to the contemporary estimates, according to which transport costs accounted for 30 to 40 percent of the selling price. Michoff, N., *Contribution*, 1950, p. 176; Михов, Н. Принос, с. 307). For the earlier seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Lampe and Jackson claimed that transporting 100 miles (62 km) by land made goods 50 to 100 percent more expensive. Lampe, J., M. Jackson, *Balkan Economic History*, p. 28.

the result of better road infrastructure, but rather of its geographical features. Surrounded by the Danube to the north and the Black Sea to the east, almost all parts of the hilly plain were within a reasonable distance of about or just over 100 km from the international trade routes. Thus, it can be expected that the inhabitants of the northern slopes of Stara Planina had a much greater incentive to migrate to the plains than their neighbours living south of the Balkan mountains range. Better export prospects and shorter distances to trade markets were likely to be the reason for the higher population density in the north and created an "artificial surplus of labour" in the south, to use the term coined by Palairret.⁵⁹

Second, a closer look at regional demographics will reveal that Palairret seriously overestimates the need for textile labour. His estimate of the number of employees, 72,500⁶⁰, seems plausible and does not differ significantly from what I believe were needed to produce *aba*, *shayak* and *gaytan* (approx. 90,000).⁶¹ Palairret, however, seems to omit that the mountain population inhabiting the Balkans and the Rhodope, ca. 1870 was approximately 450,000⁶² and large enough to meet both the needs of the *abadji* and the growing migration to the Danube, Dobrudja and Romania.⁶³

Geography and infrastructure probably explain the location of the textile proto-industry in the modern Bulgarian borders. However, in the wider Balkan context, skills, traditions, the level of urbanization, population density and foreign competition also play an important role in determining why textile production survived and thrived in Thrace and the Rhodope at a time when it failed to develop (Bosnia, Albania, Serbia) or was completely destroyed under pressure from European imports (Salonika, Edirne Thessaly). Over the centuries, textiles have been produced in several major cities in European Turkey (Constantinople, Salonika, Edirne, Plovdiv, Sliven, Pazardzhik, Ruse, Shumen and several smaller towns such as Kotel, Karlovo, etc.) by artisans, organized in guilds.⁶⁴ After the disbandment of the janissary corps and the creation of a modern Ottoman army in 1826, centralized uniform orders were directed to settlements with existing skills and traditions in wool production. However, as a recent study by Lapavitsas and Cakiroglu shows, at the time, Salonika's thriving textile industry had already been destroyed by Western competition.⁶⁵ Plovdiv and Sliven, instead, managed to take advantage of their relatively isolated location, 200-300 km inland from the main ports.

Sailing against the Tide

The international literature has long held the view that only a handful of "poor periphery"⁶⁶ countries have managed to avoid the deindustrialization caused by Western competition. Rapid industrialization,

⁵⁹ Respectively, 37.6 and 30.3 people per square kilometre, north and south of Stara Planina.

⁶⁰ Palairret, M. 'Decline', pp. 351.

⁶¹ The estimate presented in more detail in the next chapter and Annex 8 for the workforce needed by the textile industries is close to that given by Lampe for 100,000 people. Lampe, J. *Bulgarian Economy*, p. 22.

⁶² Calculated from Теплов, В. Материали для статистики Болгарии, Оракии и Македонии. СПб, „А. Траншеля“, 1877. 290 с.

⁶³ Велики, К., В. Трайков. Българската емиграция във Влахия след Руско-турската война 1828-1829 г. (сборник от документи). С., „Издаелство на БАН“, 1980. 452 с.; Трайков, В., Жечев, Н. Българската емиграция в Румъния. XVI век – 1878 година и участието ѝ в стопанския, обществено-политическия и културния живот на румънския народ. С., „Наука и изкуство“, 1986. 386 с.

⁶⁴ Тодоров, Н. Балканският град, с. 199-206.; Lampe, J., M. Jackson, *Balkan Economic History*, p. 26.

⁶⁵ Lapavitsas, K., P. Cakiroglu, *Capitalism in the Ottoman Balkans: Industrialization and Modernity in Macedonia* (London, 2019), p. 30.

⁶⁶ A term coined by Williamson, J., *Globalization and the Poor Periphery before 1950* (Cambridge, Mass., 2005).

first in Britain and then in the rest of Western Europe and the United States, sharply reduced international industrial goods' prices and increased the demand for raw materials. The centuries-old artisanal production (proto-industry) in what is known today as developing countries (e.g. India, the Ottoman Empire, etc.) did not withstand the pressure of cheap industrial products and declined rapidly. Instead, driven by rising prices, the "periphery" specialized in the production of agricultural products, gradually becoming a "raw material appendage" (to use Lenin's term) of powerful "industrial core countries." The changing terms of trade⁶⁷ - rising prices of raw materials and falling industrial prices, gave a powerful impetus to the development of industrial production in the "centre" and the agrarianization of the "periphery".

The unusual chronology of the Bulgarian textile boom (at a time of general deindustrialization in the "poor periphery") needs a special explanation. In some strange and almost undiscussed way in the literature, Bulgarian proto-industry has managed not only to preserve itself from the destructive forces of the First Globalization, but also to achieve impressive growth. Quite the opposite of what was happening in India, China, Egypt or the Anatolian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. To make the picture even more complicated, Bulgarian textile production fell into a long recession around the mid-1870s, when in the rest of the "poor periphery" the ratio between import and export prices was finally changing in favour of the secondary sector and the forces of deindustrialization visibly weaken.⁶⁸ Unravelling this striking asynchrony of the developments of Bulgarian textile sector necessitates the calculation of the Bulgarian net barter terms of trade (Fisher's index) from 1840 onwards until 1912.

Unlike other parts of the Ottoman Empire (Anatolia, Egypt, Greece), due to its geography, remoteness and high domestic transport costs, Bulgaria had relatively weaker links with the world market, which to some extent offset the devastating effect of the booming terms of trade. Commercial flows between the Bulgarian lands and the rest of the world (including the other parts of the empire), which I managed to reconstruct here, clearly point in this direction.⁶⁹ Between 1857 and 1876, Bulgarian exports (at constant 1911 prices) achieved an annual growth of 1.1 percent compared to 1.9 percent between 1886 and 1911. The main part of this increase was achieved in the first few years (1840-1842), followed by a decline in both imports and exports in the 1850s. With the end of the Crimean War, trade returned to its levels of the previous decade, shrinking slightly in the early 1870s. This trade situation is quite different from that in the core regions of the empire (Asia Minor, Constantinople), where, according to Pamuk and Williamson, "trade grew faster before 1870 than after it."⁷⁰

The structure of exports also features prominently in the asynchrony of the Bulgarian textile rise and fall. The fact that Bulgarians exported not only agricultural goods but also textiles may probably explain their serious differences with the Anatolian provinces of the empire. Early specialization in wool textile rather than cotton production was probably key to Bulgarian textile boom before 1875. Data show

⁶⁷ Terms of trade describes the ratio between the import and export prices of goods traded by a country. Increasing exports at the expense of import prices has a strong impact on the economy to redirect more resources to export industries (the so-called Dutch disease) and, in the case of most agricultural countries, this leads to deindustrialisation.

⁶⁸ Pamuk, S., J. Williamson, 'Ottoman De-industrialization'.

⁶⁹ Ivan Sakazov's intuitive impressions are similar: "even until the middle of the nineteenth century, Turkey traded too little with European countries, mainly due to bad roads and great uncertainty in international trade." Сахъзов, Ив. Развитие на градския живот, с. 688.

⁷⁰ Pamuk, S., J. Williamson, 'Ottoman De-Industrialization' p. 162.

that between 1820 and 1870, cotton fabrics became cheaper by more than 70 percent, compared to about 50 percent decrease for worsted fabrics in approximately the same period (1816-1856). In the Ottoman Empire, however, the prices of imported woollens seemed to fall by only 18 percent, while ordinary cotton and American fabrics fell by almost 90 percent.⁷¹

Compared to much more integrated areas of the hinterland of Salonika, Izmir or Constantinople, the Bulgarian lands had significantly weaker links with the world market. Bulgarian *abadji* mainly catered the demand of isolated and remote areas (inland Asia Minor, Northern Macedonia, Kosovo, Bosnia), where they manage to gain enough experience, knowledge and capital, which allowed them to successfully compete with the more fine and but also more expensive European fabrics even in the imperial capital. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 abruptly opened Bulgaria to the rest of the world, but unfortunately it happened in the midst of the prolonged agricultural depression (1873-1896).

⁷¹ Cotton prices from: Mitchel, B., H. Jones, *Second Abstract of British Historical Statistics* (Cambridge, 1971), p. 195, worsted prices from: James, J., *History of Worsted Manufacture in England from the Earlier Times* (London, 1857), p. 378, 539. The prices of imported European cotton fabrics are collected from the various volumes of Michoff and presented in detail in Annex 4.

CHAPTER TWO. FROM RECESSION TO GROWTH (Mid-1870s - 1912)

Mapping the Textile Recession: Prices and Wages cv. "Unheard of Poverty"

Bulgarian historiography fundamentally disagree on the exact time when the artisan production reached its zenith and begins to decline. Most researchers believe that with growing foreign competition "after the Crimean War" (1853-1856), the proto-industry entered a crisis.⁷² Moreover, it was in this economic recession that Hr. Gandev sought the main reasons for the growing national liberation movement that led to the April Uprising of 1876.⁷³ For his part, L. Berov and N. Todorov were a more cautious and after the Crimean War saw only a "general stagnation" of crafts.⁷⁴ Michael Palairet, however, seeks the beginning of the decline only after the liberation of 1878.⁷⁵ Palairet believes that as a result of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and the subsequent emigration of a significant part of the Turkish population, the fertile plains that were so far chained with the "iron collar of *chiftliks*" opened up for settlement. The Bulgarians from the foothills quickly took advantage of the opportunities and abandoned the old proto-industrial centres. The migration to the Danube and Maritsa valleys has caused an increase in the cost of labour and raw materials (wool), as fewer shepherds, weavers and spinners remain in the mountain areas. The above changes arrested the further growth of Bulgarian textile industry.⁷⁶

The new trade data collected here do not support the prevailing assessments of increasing competition after the Crimean War, which led to a decline in traditional crafts. We can, however, expect a deterioration in the economic situation and the beginning of a recession in textile production during the deep Eastern crisis, which caused the Ottoman repudiation on its foreign debt, the currency devaluation, the uprisings in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria, and the ensuing Serbo-Turkish and Russian-Turkish war.

Instead of a "big bang", after the Crimean War (according to Bulgarian historiography) or after the Russo-Turkish War (Palairet), we see a series of ups and downs in different textile subsectors with own chronologies (first decline in cotton production, and then of the reeled silk output). However, it must be borne in mind that the recession that began in the early 1870s had a different degree and scope than the previous ones. Firstly, it ravaged several textile sub-sectors simultaneously, including the most dynamic if them: *gaytan*-making. Secondly, it had a deep, structural character, as it put an end to the domestic and (to a large extent) to the handicraft production of woollens. This process went hand in hand with a significant reduction in the number of employees in the textile sector. Machines of the new Bulgarian textile mills displaced tens of thousands of spinners and weavers, and led to a painful deterioration of the standard of living artisans and domestic producers. Finally, as we shall soon see, the post-liberation recession was accompanied by a general decline in consumption caused by prolonged economic stagnation (the Long Depression (1873-1896) and the *fin de siècle* crisis (1897-1902)).

⁷² Натан, Ж. Стопанска история. С., „Наука и изкуство“, 1955. 570 с.; Хинков, Хр. Ст. Занаятчийството в България (минало, настояще и средства за подпомагането му). С., Печатница „Франклин“, 1926, с. 36; Косев, К. За капиталистическото развитие, с. 22-23.; Staneff, S., *Das Gewerbewesen*, p. 21.

⁷³ Гандев, Хр. Априлското въстание, с. 22.

⁷⁴ Беров, Л. Равнището, с. 29-30.; Тодоров, Н. Балканският град, с. 208-209.

⁷⁵ Palairet, M., 'Decline', p. 342.

⁷⁶ Ibid, pp. 344-348, 353-354.

At first glance, Palairet's claims seems convincing. However, their empirical examination with the new data gathered here shows that the rise in prices and wages around and after the liberation was a short-lived phenomenon caused by the economic turmoil resulting from the war. By 1884, the destructive effects of the war had been overcome, "Russian gold" immobilized in purchases of former Turkish lands, and harvests had returned to normal volumes.⁷⁷ Around the mid-1880s, both wool prices and textile wages adjusted downward, returning to their pre-1878 levels. For the next two decades until 1904, they remained low, following world trends during the Long Depression (1873-1896).

Contemporaries also disagree with Palairet's hypothesis of wage increases in the old textile centres immediately after the Liberation. Stoil Stanev, for example, insisted that those who have remained in Koprivshitsa, Kalofer or Panagyurishte were forced to settle for much lower wages due to the devastation that occurred in the former *gaytanji* centres after the April Uprising and the war.⁷⁸ The socialist press of the late nineteenth century also vigorously rejected any allegation of a sharp rise in wages after 1878.

The "unheard of poverty" in the cities, which is so vividly described in the articles in the socialist press, partly explains why, despite falling grain prices, farmers do not flock into the cities, clinging to their small fields. My research shows that the standard of living in cities was even lower than in rural areas. According to a centuries-old tradition, the Bulgarian peasant survived by producing his own food, drinks, fuels and clothing. The opportunities for artisans, workers and the majority of low-paid officials to fight poverty through self-sufficiency were much more limited. In 1907 for example, peasants consumed an average of 3,750 calories a day, compared with only 2,560 for working-class families, in 1925.⁷⁹ In addition to eating less, factory workers spent significantly more time at work as compared with their rural brethren. An industrial survey from 1909 showed that the annual workload in industry was 3,300 hours.⁸⁰ The already cited study of Popov and Penchev for the village of Kasilak establish an annual employment of 2,350 hours.⁸¹ Farmers not only worked nearly a month less per year, but also the length of their working day was an hour shorter.⁸² The few conscientious labour and hygiene

⁷⁷ Илиев, Ат. Старо-Загорский окръг в народо-икономическо отношение. Ст. Загора, Печатница „Знание“, 1885, с. 32. The same observation for the return of prices to their previous levels in 1883 makes Иречек, К. Княжество България, с. 178-179. The price trend reversed in 1884 also according to Икономика на България до социалистическата революция, с. 378.

⁷⁸ Staneff, S., *Das Gewerbewesen*, p. 63.

⁷⁹ Calculated from: Домакински бюджети, Книга II, с. 234 и Попов, К. Г., П. Пенчев, Село Каси-лак, с. 102-313.

⁸⁰ Анкета на насърдаваната индустрия през 1909, с. 32-40.

⁸¹ Попов, К. Г., П. Пенчев, Село Каси-лак, с. 102-313.

⁸² Citing a report by the Belgian consul in Sofia in 1880, Palairet emphasized that the various holidays that the peasants observed annually reached 150 days, during which "nothing was done." Palairet, M., *Balkan Economies*, p. 178. A study by the Sofia Chamber of Commerce and Industry from 1910 shows that the total number of holidays (official, church and Sunday) was still on average of 134 days. Moreover, in Sofia, Vratsa and Berkovitsa regions "our population celebrates 3/5 of the year." At the same time, factory workers can expect 70-80 days off. Златаров, Ив. Намаление празничните дни. – Народно стопанство, VI, 1910, № 14, с. 3-4. Excluding Sundays, according to the collective labour agreement of 1907, textile workers in Sliven use only ten free days - four days for Christmas and Easter, New Year and Labor Day, which is celebrated in the old style on April 18. Съюзен бюлетин на българските текстилни работници (Сливен), I, 1908, № 2, с. 1-3. The workers' press is full of complaints that often even these agreed holidays were not observed. М. К. [М. Кантарджиев]. Нашите фабрики. – Работнишко дело, III, 20 февруари 1905, № 4. Цит. по: Работническото движение, Т. 1, с. 337.; Вл. Д-в. - Работнически вестник, VII, № 42, 1 януари 1904 цит. по Работническото движение, Т. 2, с. 351.;

factory inspectors have left us candid descriptions of the unhappy conditions in which Bulgarian workers had to work and live.⁸³ Even more poignant is the information that often fills the columns of the socialist press.⁸⁴ Far from being affluent, the life of the peasants was still relatively healthier, and the food – more plentiful and nutritious. Thus, in summary, neither the conditions in the rural areas have pushed peasants towards the cities, nor the standard of living in industrial centres was attractive enough to encourage peasants to leave their poor but secure existence. For almost half a century, the Bulgarian economy has remained trapped in this vicious circle, dooming it to long stagnation and failed structural transformation.

The Domino Effect: Turkish Emigration

Although without the expected effect from Palairet (permanent increase in prices and wages), Turkish emigration has an important impact on textile production through two other channels. First, according to the Berlin Peace Treaty of 1878, the Bulgarians were obliged to pay, albeit at distressed prices, the Turkish lands which they seized during the war and its immediate aftermath. Opinions in the literature on these transfers differ significantly with estimates ranging from 40 to 80 million Levs.⁸⁵ Regardless of which of the two figures we would prefer, it is clear that the payment of Turkish lands absorbed between 100 to 200 percent of all savings in the country in 1890.⁸⁶ The immobilized funds are really huge, especially against the background of the total amount invested in 1909 in the textile industry (12.6 million, of which only 7.6 million in machinery and the rest in factory buildings).⁸⁷ For the most part, instead of investments in modern factories, the capital accumulated during the *Vazrajdanе* and

Текстилни. Организация и борби на текстилните работници в България. 1878-1944. С., „Профиздат“, 1970, с. 55.; Текстилната промишленост в България. Минало, настояще, бъдеще. С., ДИ „Техника“, 1982, с. 60-61.

⁸³ Кутинчев, Ст. Условието и защитата труда в България. Инспекции и анкети. Рапорти представени на министъра на търговията, промишлеността и труда през 1910-1915 година. С., „Държавна печатница“, 1919. 864 с.; Цончев, П. Опит за санитарно-стопанско изследване на текстилните фабрики в Габровска околия. – спБИД, X, 1906, № 2-3, с. 89-139. Вж. повече на с. 105-109 в трета глава.

⁸⁴ Cf. for example: Сливенските фабрики. – Работнически вестник, I, № 28, 14 март 1898. Цит. по: Работническото движение, Т. 1, с. 137. According to the well-known Bulgarian sociologist and economist Iliya Yanulov who visited the Persian carpet factory in Panagyurishte belonging to the Armenian entrepreneur Bogosian later wrote: "The home life of the workers in the carpet factory prepares them for illness and death. My research showed that about 60 percent of them do not eat breakfast in the morning, which is why they are exhausted in the second hour... The students' [workers who were employed as assistants and journeymen and received only meager wages] home life is even sadder. In a dark room lives a whole family with babies - this is a kitchen, a laundry, a bedroom, a living room, a dining room, a study room... Food is bad and insufficient; the children are pale and thin. Meat is almost never imported at home; ordinary food is a little pork preserved in a barrel for the whole year; and this is again a happy exception!" Янулов, И. Килимената индустрия в Панагюрище и нейните условия на труда. – спБИД, IX, 1905, № 7, с. 437. P. Tsonchev adds: "Regarding the food of the Gаброво worker, we conclude that it is extremely insufficient in quantitative and qualitative terms for this intensive and long work that he/she performs every day." Цончев, П. Из стопанското минало на Габрово, с. 561.

⁸⁵ Икономика на България до социалистическата революция, с. 286-287.; Начович, Г. Няколко страници по земледелието в България и странство. С., Печатница Ив. П. Даскалов & С-ие, 1902, с. VI.; Аврамов, Р. Комуналният капитализъм, с. 83.

⁸⁶ Иванов, Брутният вътрешен продукт, с. 418-421. These calculations are based on deposits in the late 1880s. Estimates of the savings at the time of the purchase of the Turkish lands (1878-1881) are unfortunately impossible due to lack of data.

⁸⁷ Анкета на насърдаваната индустрия през 1909, с. 10-26, 69-79.

the Russo-Turkish War was redirected to agriculture, depriving many enterprising artisans of the opportunity to modernize their production.⁸⁸

The second and probably more important effect of the Turkish emigration for Bulgarian textile production was the sharp and significant decrease in the demand for industrial goods. It has already been said that the Turks, along with the urban population, were among the main customers of clothes on the market.⁸⁹ With the scarcity of information, all demographic estimates are uncertain and politically sensitive. What we can say, however, with a great deal of certainty, is that between roughly 1875 and 1880 the total population loss of Bulgarian lands was at least 300,000 people. From the point of view of the textile industry, the above estimates mean a significant loss of consumers. Moreover, it is likely that it was mostly the wealthy Turks who fled the country while the economically weaker Muslim communities (Roma, Bulgarian Muslims and, in part, Turks) remained.⁹⁰

To the loss of solvent (Turkish) demand must be added the general decline in the purchasing power of all ethnic groups, a consequence of the prolonged recession in which the economy fell in the mid-1870s. The Long Depression (1873-1896) put an end to the relative prosperity of previous decades. The crisis was accompanied by a significant decline in agricultural prices (about 2 times in Bulgaria and 170 percent on the world market). This sharply reduced the monetary income of the peasants, which was compensated only partially and just for a very short time by the reduced tax capacity of the young Bulgarian state. The price deflation and the mounting usurious debts soon brought poverty for broad sections of Bulgarian post-liberation society. To meet interest rates and taxes during the Long Depression, peasants were forced to increase production and sharply reduce consumption.

Although quite fragmented, consumption data show that the daily intake of the "average rural family" in 1884 in the mountain village of Bunovo was only 3,040 calories per person.⁹¹ More than 20 years later, collected by K.G. Popov and P. Penchev ten agricultural books from the village of Kasilak, Radomir region, located in a similar economic situation, testify to a significant increase in daily intake, reaching 3,750 calories per person.⁹² These figures can be better understood in the light of later sociological surveys of the Bulgarian countryside, which found that an "adult peasant" needs at least 3,400 calories daily (1,600 to maintain the basic functions of his body and another 1,800 calories to compensate the hard physical labour).⁹³ The 1884 estimate is clearly below this minimum. To some, this may seem like a "retreat to self-sufficiency"⁹⁴ but careful calculations of the share of the subsistent population in clothing show only a slight increase from 63 percent in 1870 to 66 percent in 1900.⁹⁵

⁸⁸ Подобно мнение споделя З. Стоянов, според когото при лихварските заеми се „взема ценността (парите и пр.) от ръце способни [лихварите] и се дава в ръце неспособни [селяните] да я турнат в производството“. Стоянов, З. Земледелческият ни кредит, с. 581.

⁸⁹ Мишайков, Д. Бележки, с. 529.; Сакъзов, Ив. Развитие на градския живот, с. 691.; Аджера, Ал. [Ал. Цанков], Домашната индустрия, с. 472.; Цончев, П. Из стопанското минало на Габрово, с. 95-96.; Staneff, S., *Das Gewerbewesen* p. 11.

⁹⁰ Тошев, Д. Принос за изучаване индустриалната политика, с. 11.

⁹¹ Сборник на Златишката околия, с. 33-35.

⁹² Попов, К. Г., П. Пенчев, Село Каси-лак, с. 102-313.

⁹³ Мочева, Хр. Храната на българския селянин. С., „Държавна печатница“, 1946, с. 85-86; Мочева, Хр. Селското земеделско домакинство. С., „Държавна печатница“, 1938, с. 38-40.

⁹⁴ Palairat, M. *Balkan Economies*, pp. 188, 201.

⁹⁵ In fact, the self-sufficiency rate began to increase only after 1896 and could be explained by the acute economic and financial crisis at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (the *fin de siècle* crisis).

Textile Employment

The main result of the deindustrialisation of the 'periphery' was a significant reduction in employment in the secondary sector.⁹⁶ The new factories brought economies of scale that the old manual methods were unable to compete with. My rough calculations show that by 1870 the textile proto-industry employed about 100,000 people. By the mid-1890s, when Bulgarian factories had already successfully established themselves on the market, labour in the textile industry fell by two thirds to just 35,000. In the first decade of the twentieth century, after the end of the long recession, employment increased by nearly 40 percent as a result of the duty-free trade agreement with the Ottoman Empire and the slight increase in the living standard of the Bulgarians. Thus, on the eve of the Balkan Wars, employment in the textile sector bounced back to about 57,000, 42 percent of those used by our proto-industry ca. 1870.

After the liberation significant changes in the structure of employment developed. The relative weight of the domestic industry dropped from over 50 to below 10 percent. After the initial decline of artisans in the first two post-liberation decades⁹⁷, from around 1900 their numbers began to rise again, although they never reached their levels of 1870.⁹⁸ As we have seen, this was possible only because many craftsmen partially offset their declining incomes with by-employment in agriculture (growing vines, roses, vegetables, etc.)⁹⁹, in construction or in commerce. Factory workers are expected to increase more than tenfold, but from a very low base. Thus, even on the eve of the Balkan Wars, their share was only 8 percent from all people employed in the textile sector.

It has already been established in the English-language literature to define deindustrialization as shrinking labour input. But given reindustrialization that was on the way after 1902, reduced textile employment in Bulgaria seems more a sign of technological modernization, rather than just of deindustrialization. On the eve of the Balkan Wars, 42 percent fewer workers produced 30 percent more at constant prices. Moreover, output per employed increased considerably by almost 2.5 times. The annual growth rate was 2.17 percent, which clearly indicated a serious jump in productivity. Such success, against the background of the almost ubiquitous deindustrialisation of the "poor periphery", was possible thanks to the enterprising spirit, combined after 1900 with the gradually improving economic situation and slightly rising standard of living, as well as the political breakthrough to achieve duty-free exports to the key Ottoman market between 1899 and 1910.

⁹⁶ Palairat, M., *Balkan Economies*, pp. 54, 193, 200-201.

⁹⁷ Without citing their sources, the authors of the survey: Развитие на индустрията в България, с. 41 mention that only in the Principality of Bulgaria the total number of craftsmen decreased from 64 to 32.9 thousand people.

⁹⁸ This trend has been noticed by other authors before. Citing data from the Department of Direct Taxes at the Ministry of Finance according to Hr. Hinkov patented craftsmen in 1902 were 40,541, in 1906 - 44,088, and in 1912 - 61,815 people. These data do not include the craftsmen in the Rhodope, which in the majority remain outside the Bulgarian borders and the artisan crisis seems to be weaker. See: Примовски, А. Бит и култура, с. 376. However, the Rhodope were not entirely saved from the *abadji* crisis after the Russo-Turkish war as we can see from: Неделев. Бележки из Средне-Родопското население, с. 33.; Шишков, С. Устово, с. 42.

⁹⁹ Иречек, К. Княжество България, с. 197.

CHAPTER THREE. AGENTS OF REINDUSTRIALIZATION: FACTORIES, MANUFACTURERS, DOMESTIC INDUSTRY (1878-1912)

Wool-textile Factories. 1879-1912

The corporate history of the first textile factories after the Liberation is not completely known. Thanks to people like Petar Tsonchev, the data we have for the Gabrovo mills are relatively good.¹⁰⁰ There, the number of enterprises is relatively small, which also contributes to their better coverage. With its fifteen factories and the scarcer local enthusiasm to chronicle their first steps, even a simple inventory of Sliven textile factories faces serious problems.¹⁰¹ The least information is available about the remaining textile centres - Karlovo, Kazanlak, Samokov and especially - Tryavna. All this required me to gather, piece together and present here all surviving information of the first textile factories. The factory "biographies" of 150 enterprises are presented in Annex 9 and for each enterprise the year of establishment, the type of activity, the fixed capital, the machinery, the number of employees, the volume of production and the brief history are given.¹⁰²

The Bulgarian textile industry went through two distinct periods. In the first, until the end of the textile crisis ca. 1902, only the most labour-intensive processes were mechanized – the spinning, the carding, the combing. Weaving continued to be done mainly at the homes of the workers or in factories, using advanced wooden looms with flying shuttle. The work at home and the piecework practiced by almost all factories have been the result of irregularity of orders and the seasonality of the work process. From the beginning of the twentieth century, textile enterprises began to modernize and fully mechanize their production.¹⁰³ Furthermore, they gradually switched from water to steam and electricity traction. Imported machines allowed them to master the production of finer, fashionable fabrics. Thus, the years from the Liberation to the Balkan Wars were a period of transition from pre-modern *Vazrajdane* tastes and methods to more fashionable fabrics and more technically advanced productions, which entered more fully during the interwar period.

However similar the factories may be in the beginning with the *Vazrajdane* putting-out systems, over time the difference between them began to widen. More and more of the processes begun to be centralized and mechanized. This required knowledge that old *abadji* and *gaytandji* craftsmen often lacked and had to learn on the go. They also lack the necessary systematic thinking and depth. Stoil Stanev was astonished to find that the first industrialists were not able to give exact figures for their consumption on wool, because "they themselves have no real idea" about it.¹⁰⁴ As they got older, even the most enterprising entrepreneurs become more conservative and with fading initiative.¹⁰⁵ The insufficient technical and organizational experience of some manufacturers, as well as the limited

¹⁰⁰ Цончев, П. Из стопанското минало на Габрово, с. 517-537.; Книга на габровската индустрия, с. 37-148.

¹⁰¹ The contribution of Elena Dimitrova who studied the commercial register is extremely useful: Димитрова, Е. Събирателни дружества за вълнотекстилно производство и търговия в Сливен (1882-1912 г.). – Известия на музеите от Югоизточна България, XXI, 2004/2005, с. 229-237.

¹⁰² Annex 9 also includes several textile factories established before the Liberation.

¹⁰³ In his otherwise quite critical article signed just with the D.B. initials witnessed these significant changes: "Our wool industry is *now* [italics added] beginning, as they say, a second period of its existence - improving production and mobilizing factories with improved machines." Д. Б. Текстилната ни индустрия. – Народно стопанство, I, 1904, № 12, с. 11.

¹⁰⁴ Staneff, S., *Das Gewerbewesen*, p. 125.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, p. 120.

resources at their disposal¹⁰⁶, had led to many errors in the production and execution of orders, as well as to annoying delays in deliveries. The same reasons, it is claimed in the literature, lied behind the bankruptcies of the three Tryavna factories.¹⁰⁷

It was only at the beginning of the twentieth century that the factory management began to pass into the hands of the second generation - Dobri and Dimitar Kalpazanovi, Gancho Popov, Racho and Nikola Hr. Bobchevs, Georgi T. Rasheev, Alexander Zaimov, Stefan, Kiro and Apostol G. Stefanovs, Stefan T. Kyuvliev, Dimitar, Georgi and Andon Ruschevs, eng. Gencho Staynov, Hristo Batsurov and others. Drawing on the affluence of their parents, they came to the factory floor with a university degrees, specialization in foreign textile mills and much broader knowledge of modern methods of production and organization.¹⁰⁸

An intermediate link between the management and the worker force were the technicians (colloquially called masters or supervisors), usually three or four older and experienced professionals, and often closer or distant relatives of the factory owners. There is no uniform practice for the ratio between technicians and workers, and in different factories it varies from 1:20 to 1:62.¹⁰⁹ Larger and better equipped companies usually had more masters, many of whom were foreigners (Czechs, Germans, Russians and, less frequently, English). As we will see later, the remuneration of foreign specialists was significantly higher than that of ordinary spinners or weavers. Therefore, according to the 1904 census, the foreign specialists were only 21 out of a total of 270 administrative and higher technical staff.¹¹⁰

How profitable for the owners, most of who were former *abadji* and *gaytandji*, was the risky venture to establish an own factory? The available financial statements speaks of a well-profitable business with a return on invested capital of 14.2 percent during the recession and 11.4 percent during the reinustrialization phase (1902-1912). The slight decline in profitability probably stems from the gradual

¹⁰⁶ Again, P. Tsonchev explains that "being small enterprises not all textile establishments can ever have a variety of raw materials (especially different kinds of wool) to perform each order accurately and properly." Цончев, П. Навейни мисли, с. 460.

¹⁰⁷ Мишайков, Д. Очерк, с. 479.

¹⁰⁸ Dimitar Kalpazanov, son of Ivan Kalpazanov, for example, graduated a Coommercial School, first in Switzerland and then in Germany. Gancho D. Popov, step son of the manufacturer, merchant and banker Doncho Popov – stadied in the Constantinople French Commercial School, Racho Bobchev, son of the founder of Gabrovo "Alexander" mill Hristo Bobchev – graduated the Antwerp Commercial Academy, his brother Nikola - the Textile School in Knyazhevo and engineering in Germany. G. T. Rasheev, son of the *gaytandji* and large shareholder in "Uspeh" Gabrovo factory Tonko Rasheev – studied industrial dying, weaving and finishing in Germany, Alexander Zaimov - medicine in Russia. Stefan G. Stefanov, the sons of the Sliven industrialist Georgi Stefanov graduated in law and economics in Germany while his brother Kiro received a diploma from the Svishtov Commercial School. Stefan, the son of the manufacturer Todor Kyuvliev, graduated from a French Commercial School. Andon Ruschev, son of Ruscho Andonov from Andonov & Mihailov, studied at the Knyazhevo Textile School and then at the Higher Technical School in Chemnitz. Later, he specialized as a chemist in the large concern Agfa. His brother Georgi graduated from a Sofia Commercial School. The third son of Ruscho Andonov, Dimitar, studied mechanical engineering at the Berlin Polytechnic and specialized in the textile industry in Aachen.

¹⁰⁹ ДА Сливен, ф. 23к, оп. 1, а. е. 67, л. 1-156.; Каранешев, Г. Ленената фабрика на Георги Т. Рашеев в Габрово. – Индустрия и търговия, I, № 67, 6 юли 1912, с. 1-2.; Габровската индустрия (от нашите анкети). Видни търговски и индустриални фирми в Габрово. – Варненски търговски вестник, I, № 71, 15 септември 1907, с. 2.; Текстилен работник (Сливен), IV, № 1, 19 февруари 1911, с. 2-3.; Български търговски вестник, III, № 25, 13 април 1895, с. 2.; М. К. [М. Кантарджиев]. Нашите фабрики, с. 363.

¹¹⁰ Преброяване на индустриите насърдчавани от държавата (31 декември 1904). С., Дирекция на статистиката, 1906, с. 12-13, 64-65.

normalization of the environment, the increasing internal and foreign competition and the fact that for the most part, the data for the years after 1908 are in public and not in internal company reports¹¹¹. At the same time, compared to the Revival period, when the Sliven *kara-abaji* putting-out systems brought in an average of 26.3 percent between 1855 and 1865 and 23.6 percent from the mid-1860s to the Russo-Turkish War¹¹², factory profits seemed not large enough.

Non-wool Textile Industries

My fresh estimates of the textile production (presented in Annex 1) point to the internal reorganization in the sector started at the end of the nineteenth century and to the growing contribution of cotton, hemp and silk textile enterprises. On the eve of the Balkan Wars, their share already reached a quarter of the total production in the entire textile sector.

The upward development of non-wool textile industries was clearly related to the global shift of tastes from woollens and worsteds to cotton products. Even the extremely conservative Bulgarian society failed to resist the foreign fashion trends, especially since cotton fabrics come at prices significantly cheaper than wool and linen products.¹¹³ G. T. Danailov's research shows that as early as the first half of the nineteenth century, underwear was already made from imported cotton, instead of hemp and flax, which used so far. Within a few decades, the transition, which began first from the Danube and Black Sea ports, reached most of the Bulgarian lands, and around 1860 cotton shirts were imposed even in the backward Central Rhodope. Latest, ca. 1900, the change was felt in the more geographically isolated mountainous regions of Western Bulgaria as well.¹¹⁴ In outerwear, traditionally made of woollen materials, the transition is not so well documented. It probably began in the second quarter of the nineteenth century and accelerated significantly after 1900.¹¹⁵ Even until the Wars, wool remained the preferred material for clothing and it can be assumed that cotton finally pushed out woollens in the middle of the twentieth century.

Aware of these global trends, which, albeit slowly, were reflected in Bulgaria, a number of textile manufacturers initiated projects to build cotton spinning or cotton weaving enterprises. Efforts in this direction were made by the owner of the Kotel carpet company Hr. Balabanov¹¹⁶, the large Kazanlak rose producer and owner of a textile factory Petko Orozov¹¹⁷ and the Sliven industrialist Dr. Asen Sariivanov¹¹⁸. However, only the latter managed to bring to a successful end his endeavour.¹¹⁹

¹¹¹ Hence, a window-dressing can be reasonably assumed.

¹¹² Русев, Ив. Фирми и манифактури, с. 65.

¹¹³ Ратук, С., *Ottoman Empire*, p. 213.

¹¹⁴ Данаилов, Г. Ленът, конопът и тяхната индустрия в България – Периодическо списание на Българското книжовно дружество, XVI, 1904, № 65, св. 1-2, с. 2-6.

¹¹⁵ In the words of Mishaikov: "What is called an *antheriya* in our country is made of cotton fabric; but earlier the same kind of garment was made of *aba* [here: synonym of wool]; the women's *sukman* made of wool has been replaced by a cotton dress, the linen shirt disappears and is replaced by a cotton one." Мишайков, Д. Бележки, с. 548-549. Cf. also: Мишайков, Д. Очерк, с. 466-467.; Български търговски вестник, XIX, № 246, 2 ноември 1911, с. 3.

¹¹⁶ Таскова, В. Традиционни занаяти в Котел, с. 49.

¹¹⁷ Варненски търговски вестник, I, № 96, 13 декември 1907, с. 2.

¹¹⁸ Търговски фар, II, № 193, 27 ноември 1910, с. 2.

¹¹⁹ Unsuccessful attempts to build a cotton mill made Ivan Bogorov (1863), Garabet Herentz (1897), Yosif Btsurov (1903), Petko Orozov (1907) and Hristo Balabanov (1913-1914). The concession granted to Tsonko Startsev from Ruse (c. 1900) was realized only at the end of 1906, but in 1914 the enterprise had to be liquidated. Only six projects were successfully completed - the Varna "Knyaz Boris" (1899), the Devnya "Progress" (1903), the Ruse

Textile Workers: Social Profile

The majority of Bulgarian textile workers were young, sometimes even minors, girls and adolescents, with insufficient education and little experience in production, who remain in the factory for only a few years, enough to collect *cheis* (trousseau).¹²⁰ Relying on youth over experience, industrialists tried to reduce costs, as the pay of children was three times lower, and of women - only 42-43 percent of that of men.¹²¹ It should also be bored in mind that even men's wages were extremely low. Some industrialists, however, rightfully insisted that "cheap labour and especially child labour is a major obstacle to the application of machine production in many of our industries."¹²²

Only in Sliven, and partly in Samokov, can we speak of a typical proletariat, people, mostly old men, who have nothing "except their pair of hands." Despite his great inexperience and poor training, "immediately after a worker comes from the village to the factory he/she is often placed at the machine, of which he does not even know the name."¹²³ The division of labour is weak, and people are constantly moving "from one ward to another, from one machine to another, without clear and urgent need" for such changes.¹²⁴

The relatively short stay on the factory floor (in Gabrovo, Kazanlak, Karlovo, but not in Sliven and Samokov) only partially reduced the harmful effects that the poor hygiene and unhealthy working conditions had on the still young organisms. Contemporary observers usually describe the conditions of first factories as "unsatisfactory".¹²⁵ The socialist press is significantly more pictorial in its descriptions. According to communist *Rabotnicheski Vestnik*, the Sliven enterprises "hygienically stands lower than the pig farms. The walls have not been plastered for years, the windows unwashed again for years; the floors are broken, soaked with machine-lubricants, covered with dust and mud, are a fertile soil for breeding all kinds of miasmas. The ceilings are smoked with soot, entwined with thick cobwebs, remind the vaults of a dungeon".¹²⁶ It was not until 1905 that fans began to be installed here and there in the workrooms, and before that the owners usually justified the lack of them by saying that "the engineers [the architects who built the factory] had forgotten about them."¹²⁷

company of Ts. Startsev (1906), the Tarnovo "Trapezitsa" (1910), the Sofia mill of Dr. Sariivanov (1910) and the Gabrovo "Prince Cyril" (1912).

¹²⁰ Мишайков, Д. Очерк, с. 496.

¹²¹ Беров, Л. Положението на работническата класа, с. 34.

¹²² Х. С. К-в. Детският труд в производството. – Търговски вестник, III, № 37 14 декември 1902, с. 2. Palaret makes a similar argument for the slow introduction of power-looms in Sliven. Using payroll data of day-labourers (which, as we have already witnessed not always reflect the wages in the textile industry) Palaret insists that falling wages during mid-1890s, combined with a higher productivity of Sliven factory workers "deter the introduction of mechanical looms [in Sliven], which Gabrovo industrialists were compelled to introduce at the very beginning due to the predominantly female staff in enterprises." Palaret, M., *Balkan Economies*, pp. 287.

¹²³ Списаревски, К. Д. Една обиколка в Габрово, с. 4.

¹²⁴ Цончев, П. Из стопанското минало на Габрово, с. 542-443.

¹²⁵ Мишайков, Д. Очерк, с. 512.; Списаревски, К. Д. Една обиколка в Габрово, с. 4.; Staneff, S., *Das Gewerbewesen*, p. 315.

¹²⁶ Сливенските фабрики. – Работнически вестник, I, № 28, 14 март 1898. Цит. по: Работническото движение, Т. 1, с. 137.

¹²⁷ Staneff, S., *Das Gewerbewesen*, p. 315.; K. Miles. Хигиеничните условия в българската индустрия. – Социалист, III, № 53, 8 юли 1897. Quoted from: Работническото движение, Т. 1, с. 103.

Undoubtedly, it was the industrialists to be blamed for the poor hygiene and unhealthy working conditions. However, as the inspection of factory dwellings shows, some of the responsibility also lies with the negligence of the workers themselves. P. Tsonchev says that during his frequent visits to the dormitories he always found the rooms "extremely dirty" because none of the women living in them want to sweep the floor.¹²⁸

The poor health, the hard and exhausting work and the neglected safety measures led to high traumatism, which Iliya Yanulov describes it as "horrifying".¹²⁹ Long working days, accidents, rude treatment and, most often, low wages were the cause of many labour conflicts in the textile industry. A careful study of Marxist historiography, especially when done in combination with the press of the time, reveals the natural tendency of historians of the 1950s and 1960s to reinforce the "proletarian character" of some strikes and to over-glorify them. It is much more surprising, however, that many studies all too often contradict even such undiscussed facts as the date (and even the year) on which a strike was declared or its outcome. Enterprises affected by one or another labour conflict are regularly confused.

The Manufacturers: Industrial Sociology

The bold and risky step of the old *abadji* and *daytandji*¹³⁰ to start a textile factory was made in a markedly hostile economic environment of declining demand and strong foreign competition. This requires a closer look at the profile of the first Bulgarian textile industrialists. With the help of a large number of sources, 196 industrialists were identified, for whom relatively complete biographical data were found. The information collected includes the years (and dates when possible) of birth and death, the family background (father's profession and a rough estimate of his financial means), the education, the position in the factory, the previous or parallel business, the participation in the revolutionary movement (including IMRO), the participation in cultural, educational or professional organizations, the party membership, the high administrative positions, and the family ties¹³¹.

Contrary to some claims of the press at the time¹³², most of our first industrialists came from wealthy or at least not poor families (a total of over 96 percent of all cases). This gave them access to relatively

¹²⁸ Цончев, П. Из стопанското минало на Габрово, с. 535.

¹²⁹ Янулов, Ил. Злополуките на труда в България. – спБИД, XV, 1911, № 8, с. 585.

¹³⁰ It is no coincidence that in an article from 1882 "Something about the industry in Gabrovo" the newspaper *Bulgarsky Glas* emphasizes that the first Gabrovo factory was the work of "the noble risk of Mr. Kalpazanov and Tsokev". Cit. by: <http://stoves.blog.bg/lichni-dnevnic/2010/11/24/petko-cokev-osnovatel-i-sydrujnik-v-pyvata-vylneno-predac hni.639593>.

¹³¹ More could be desired in mapping family ties, participation in local government (municipal councilors, mayors) and in local cultural or spiritual initiatives - community centers, construction of churches, monuments, etc. Relatively incomplete information on professional and property status to the parents of the manufacturers, as well as for the education received by them. I owe a huge debt of gratitude to Milko Palangurski for the lists of MPs provided to me.

¹³² An article in the Samokov *Polezen Savetnik* newspaper, stated: "Let it be known that in Gabrovo the middle-class people are most of the initiators of several of the factories there, while the main capitalists shied away, dealing with usury. The most unfortunate thing is that both the *chorbadji* [local notables] and the middle class in our country are distinguished by their indecision and cowardice to engage in industrial enterprises. Suffice it to say that the local company "Budashte" has already taken [as dividends] its capital several times so far, and yet it has done nothing to expand or improve its production." *Полезен съветник* (Самоков), I, № 5, 12 ноември 1905, с. 1.

good start-up financial and social capital. Within the Bulgarian network society¹³³, many of their families can be found near the network centres - local and sometimes even national. It is noteworthy that we can talk about an intra-generational transmission of a profession in just under half of cases (44.2 percent). Thus, much more capital (financial, social) was transferred between the generations than a specific profession. This is an important marker of the increased economic dynamism after the beginning of the nineteenth century. The relatively favoured origins of the early manufacturers also affected their higher education. Of course, it was only relatively better, mainly against the background of the predominantly rural population of Bulgaria, but it was by no means high in a pan-European perspective.

At the time of the establishment of the factories, most of the founders were already established business figures, with accumulated funds and interwoven family and business ties. Their average age at the opening of their enterprises was about 42 years, which is relatively high with the measured 67-68 years life expectancy of Bulgarian textile elite. Less than half (42.2 percent) of the first industrialists upgraded their existing artisan companies, engaged in the production and/or trade of textiles. In most of them we have a classic transition from a craftsman (*abadji*, *gaitandji*, etc.) through an organizer of the putting-out system (*kara-abadji* in Sliven terminology) to a manufacturer.¹³⁴

The relatively high share of individuals engaged in banking and usury makes a strong impression. This is very interesting, against the background of the contradictory statements in the literature, starting from the in-depth and often quoted here study of Stoil Stanev.¹³⁵ It must be emphasized, however, that this were by no means people dealing only with financial transactions. In most cases, the exact definition of the profession is difficult, because along with the loans given against "godless interest" "bankers" trade in various goods, engage in tax-farming, become contractors of various public buildings (mainly railways), get involved in production and the sale of rose oil, etc. We should also mention another social group that joined Bulgarian post-liberation factories - teachers, priests, booksellers, people of culture (including artists), practicing various free-lance professions (lawyers, doctors, pharmacists), and officials who constitute 19 percent of all manufacturers.

Even the fragmentary information speaks of a very strong family ties of the first manufacturers. At least two thirds of them invited their relatives - children, parents, but also brothers-in-law, sons-in-law, father-in-law, cousins, and uncles to their business initiatives. In addition, almost 45 percent of industrialists had important, "strategic alliances" - through marriage and kinship - with prominent local or national families. This clearly indicates the relatively low level of trust in society and in general - the

¹³³ Иванов, М. Мрежовият капитализъм, с. 442-461.

¹³⁴ According to Hr. Gandev, this is the main type among the early Bulgarian industrialists. The seven factories he examined were not set up by merchants or artisans, but by "old pre-liberation capitalists who owned putting-out systems." Again, according to Gandev, these people came "as already shaped types of capitalists." Гандев, Хр. Проблеми на Българското Възраждане, с. 451. As can be seen from the data presented in Table 10 and Annex 11, along with the manufacturers, many of the first industrialists were craftsmen, moneylenders and merchants.

¹³⁵ According to Stanev, the "*chorbadji* capitals" that came to light after the Liberation invested heavily in usury and the purchase of land, instead of in industry, which hindered its faster development. Staneff, S., *Das Gewerbewesen*, p. 88.

economic hostility of the environment. It had to be 'normalized', as far as possible, through family and other non-economic mechanisms.¹³⁶

Family ties were upgraded by various institutionalized networks – membership in *chitalishte* (community centres), craft-guilds, professional and business associations, etc. This indicator is very inconsistently documented with only 26 such participations being identified (only 13 percent of all 196 industrialists' names). Thanks to the Sisyphean work of Milko Palangurski and Yordanka Gesheva, the political contacts of the first manufacturers are much better documented.¹³⁷ About a third of the industrialists (76 people) were involved in politics, with most of them (twenty-eight or 41.8 percent) leaning towards the Stambolov's National-Liberal Party. The high popularity of the Stambolov's Party can be explained by its relatively long participation in power (between 1886-1894 and 1903-1908). The military comradeship in the revolutionary movement, with which 30 of the manufacturers (or 22.2 percent) are connected to one degree or another, probably has a certain role. The members of the Narodna Party, who definitely dominated the business elite during the interwar period, clearly still had a limited representation before the Wars.¹³⁸ With the exception of the Democrats and the Progressive Liberals, other parties have only a symbolic participation among the textile industrial elite.

In many cases, it seems, parties looked for affluent and influential local businessmen (and large employers) who could guarantee a better representation and funding. However, industrialists often also take advantage of their party contacts to promote personal or business interests. The protectionist legislation is a clear example of successful political lobbying by the business elite. It is claimed that the large Sofia factory for hemp products and ropes "Tsonyo Payakov & Ivan Vazharov" was launched with party protection, for example.¹³⁹

Capital Scarcity

The lack of sufficient capital and the difficulties with credit were a key problem for the entire Bulgarian economy after the Liberation. Factories tried to compensate for their lack of fixed and working capital with loans from all possible sources. At the same time, banks, including the state Bulgarian National Bank, prefer to keep a healthy distance from emerging textile factories. In their eyes, such ventures seem too risky to be directly involved in the promotion, establishment and even less in the participation in the capital of new companies. Of the 35 woollen textile enterprises existing in 1904-1909 (excluding the smaller hosiery mills), there are only eleven cases of raising bank capital.

¹³⁶ Иванов, М., Г. Ганев. Бизнес елитите на България. 1912-1947, 1989-2005. С. „Изток-Запад“, 2009, с. 22-24. Иванов, М. Мрежовият капитализъм, с. 456-458.

¹³⁷ Гешева, Й. Държавната институция Велико народно събрание. 1879-1911: Исторически аспекти. С., „Иврай“, 2001. 320 с.; Палангурски, М. Бащите на Конституцията. В. Търново, „Фабер“, 2019. 207 с.; Палангурски, М. Учредителите. Участниците в Учредителното народно събрание в Търново 10. II. – 16. IV. 1879 г. С., „Сибир“, 2014. 327 с.; Палангурски, М. Избори по стамболовисти (1887-1894 г.). В. Търново, УИ „Св. Св. Кирил и Методий“, 2008. 279 с.; Палангурски, М. По българските парламентарни избори. 1894-1913 г. В. Търново, УИ „Св. Св. Кирил и Методий“, 2011. 372 с.

¹³⁸ Иванов, М., Г. Ганев. Бизнес елитите, с. 26-30.

¹³⁹ Иванов, М. Един бизнес ангел от началото на XX век: Цоню Паяков. – *Fobres*, № 2, февруари 2020, с. 128. The factory was founded after receiving a concession from the state for a monopoly on the production of hemp products in much of Western Bulgaria. Initially, the privilege was denied by the National Assembly, but after the new elections for a positive decision, it is said that Finance Minister Lazar Payakov (brother of one of the industrialists) and MP Petar Vazharov, brother of the other manufacturer, actively contributed. Йорданов, Д. Принос, с. 62-63.

Technological Modernization

Insufficient own funds and problems in obtaining working capital through loans stifled modernization in the years of economic recession.¹⁴⁰ Although only partially surviving, the archives of the first factories clearly show that in the beginning they were mostly looking for cheap, obsolete technology or second-hand machines. Price cuts by just a few Levs led to real battles, and manufacturers were always more inclined to compromise on the quality of the equipment than on its price.

Transport significantly added to the cost of machinery imported from abroad. Based on 32 observations for deliveries of Ivan Kalpazanov Gabrovo mill in the period 1897-1914, it is evident that on average the transport added 18.97 percent above the invoiced value of the machines. Most of them (13.15 percent) were paid for freight to Bulgaria. The lack of direct transport means the use of several shipping companies for each order. Once delivered, the machines must be installed, serviced, repaired and supplied with consumables (frames for the looms, pipes for the boilers, belts for the transmissions, lubricants for the looms and the weaving machines, etc.). These additional costs are often omitted in the literature, but the surviving documentation of the Sliven factory of Nedev & Saraivanov shows that in 1910 alone, 23 deliveries of parts and consumables were made at a total value of nearly 55,000 Levs.¹⁴¹ Given the insufficient technical training of manufacturers and workers, the costs for "importation" of foreign specialists were even higher. Throughout the post-liberation period until the Wars, the more highly qualified Bulgarian factory weavers received about 2.00-2.50 Levs per day, the carders - 1.60-2.20 Levs, and the weavers 1.20-2.50 Levs. In the general case, however, wages rarely exceed 1.00-1.50 Levs, as women and especially children receive daily pay of just 0.60-0.80 Lev.¹⁴² Against the background of this miserable salary, foreign specialists had affluent wages of little over 10 Levs per day.¹⁴³

In addition to the cost of capital, transport and skills, the transaction costs associated with the modernization of factory production include additional burdens such as customs duties and information asymmetries.

In summary, if we assume that in the mid-1880s a textile company imported machinery for, say, 10,000 Levs (this is more or less the cost of a steam engine with its accessories or 6-7 power-loom), then it should to pay additional 9,500 Levs as transaction costs: (1) Levs for freight to Bulgaria; (2) 582 Levs for domestic transport from the border to the factory; (3) 800 Levs import duty; (4) 1,000 Levs for wages for installation, commissioning of the equipment and training of local workers (4 months x 10 Levs per day); (5) at least 1,562 Levs for the trip to and from Bulgaria of the foreigner technician; (6) 80 Levs for accommodation, heating and lighting during his stay; (7) 400 Levs for food during his four

¹⁴⁰ Весов, Д. Мерки за подобрене на местната индустрия. Доклад на XXXIV редовна сесия на Камарата. С., СТИК, 1929, с. 13.

¹⁴¹ ДА-Сливен, ф. 23к, оп. 1, а. е. 81.

¹⁴² Беров, Л. Положението на работническата класа, с. 29.; Работническото движение в България. Материали. Т. 1. С., Профиздат, 1953, с. 363-364.; Работническото движение в България. Материали. Т. 2. С., Профиздат, 1954, с. 109-110.; Staneff S., *Das Gewerbewesen*, pp. 131, 133, 137.

¹⁴³ The 15 wages observations of foreign technicians in the Gabrovo *Alexander* and *Uspeh* factories show an average daily rates of 11.90 Levs during 1880s, 8.80 during 1890s and 10.77 Levs in the first decade of the twentieth century.

months stay; (8) 500 Levs commission for the intermediary who assisted the industrialist in placing the order¹⁴⁴; (9) at least 2,000 Levs for travel expenses, food and hotel in case one of the owners, or his representative, personally went abroad to order the machine and (10) 1,200 Levs for interest on the loan taken by the bank.¹⁴⁵ The total transaction costs for the equipment reach 94 percent above the invoice price of the equipment. For lower value machines, the additional costs would significantly exceed their manufacturer's price.

Over time, some of the elements of this hypothetical purchase fall away or decrease. If the delivery was made in the second half of the 1890s (after the enactment of industrial protectionist legislation), the final amount would fall by 8 percent due to adopted duty-free import and another 3.88 percent for the food of the foreign technician entrusted with the installation of the machine. A further reduction of another 33 percent would occur on the eve of the Wars, when domestic transport and credit became slightly cheaper, local technical skills increased and, if at all necessary, the use of foreigners for installation and training, these would last significantly shorter. It can also be assumed that due to increased competition, the brokerage commission has halved. Or with firm, albeit hypothetical figures, the machine purchased in 1885, with a manufacturer's price of 10,000 Levs, would have cost the Bulgarian factory 19,439 Levs, compared to 18,251 Levs around 1895 and 13,695 Levs in 1910. With a banking-loan, the company can only secure between half (in the 1880s) and three quarters (around 1910) of the total value of the equipment. The rest must be financed by ploughing back own resources. With the narrow market and the deep recession that lasted until the beginning of the twentieth century, few industrialists took the risk to modernize their machinery.

This is the reason why once built and equipped, most companies postponed the renewal of their machinery for as long as possible. From 1902-1903 onwards, however, the import of machinery and equipment began to revive. International comparisons, as far as they are possible with scarce statistical information, show that this was happening at a rather accelerated pace. Thus, in the eight years between 1904 and 1912, the number of engines' horsepower increased annually by 23 percent compared to 4 and 6 percent for approximately the same period in Italy and Russia, but at a much higher starting base. The installed capacity of an enterprise doubled in Bulgaria from 31 to 79 hp. almost reaching the levels in Sweden and Russia and ahead of Austria-Hungary, Italy and Serbia in this indicator. With its average productivity of about 5,500 Levs per hp. Bulgarian companies fall behind their American and Russian competitors by only 10-15 percent and by a quarter compared to the British wool-textile mills. This means that the equipment purchased after 1902 is no longer mostly second-hand, and if not the most modern, certainly not technologically obsolete machines are chosen. Unlike Serbia for example, the wool-textile factories of which larger number of workers and less technical equipment, after 1902 Bulgarian companies were clearly opting for accelerated modernization. This is evidenced by the aforementioned 23 percent increase in engine power and the declining number of workers per factory (from 60 to 56). At the same time, the productivity of Bulgarian textile workers increases by one fifth - from about 4,200 to 5,300 Levs.

Craftsmen and Domestic Industrialists: Model Hybridization

¹⁴⁴ That was what G. T. Rasheev received as a "clerk and translator from German" entrusted to select and procure the machinery for *Uspeh* factory. ДА-Габрово, ф. 30к, оп. 1, а. е. 9, л. 55-56.

¹⁴⁵ All these elements of the transaction costs are calculated according to the real costs incurred by the factories *Alexander*, *Kalpazanov* and *Uspeh* factories in Gabrovo.

With the onset of the textile recession in the mid-1870s and the emergence of factories in the 1880s, significant changes took place in the domestic industry and crafts. The April Uprising and the Russo-Turkish War ruin to most proto-industrial towns, south of the Balkan Mountains range. Some of their inhabitants perished or had to flee in front of the advancing armies. The majority of the surviving population of the former textile centres, however, refrained after 1878 to take advantage of the opportunities for emigration to the fertile plains or to larger cities.¹⁴⁶ Remaining in the former prosperous townships, these people were doomed to a miserable existence, inclined to accept any job that brought them some, albeit small, additional income. Even grimmer was the economic situation in the western Balkan Mountains regions (Berkovitsa, Chiprovtsi, Tsaribrod, Trun) and in the Rhodope, separated by the new 1878 borders from their natural hinterland.

The decline of *gaytan*-making and the emergence of the modern factories did not brought immediate collapse to the both artisan and domestic production. As we have seen, due to capital and organizational shortages, the first textile companies continued to use home-based weavers and spinners. It was not until the eve of the twentieth century, with the widespread use of power-looms, that home weaving finally died out.

After 1878 the traditional domestic industry of hand spinning and *shayak* weaving mainly survived in the remote parts of the Central Rhodope. It is difficult to assess to what extent this could be contributed to the Ottoman economic and political model which was survived there until 1912¹⁴⁷, the geographical isolation of the region or rather to Muslim population in the surrounding foothills and Aegean Thrace.¹⁴⁸

It may seem at first sight that in many of its output characteristics (lack of machines, home-based production, privately owned looms) the post-1878 domestic industry were not too different from the forms that prevailed after the liberation. In organizational terms, however, the *Vazrajdane* putting-out systems preferred not to resort to non-economic means of control and coercion. Spinners and weavers largely retained their independence and hence, received a better wage. With the economic recession after 1875, domestic producers lost most of their clientele and the opportunity to sell their own products at fairs. Rural families who continued to engage in domestic production fell entirely under the control of local *chorbadji* - manufacturers, traders, moneylenders, innkeepers or larger artisans. This deprived them of a significant part of their income, reaching, as the examples from Chiprovtsi showed, up to one third of the selling price. The wages which the domestic carpets weavers were forced to accept ranged from 0.20-0.30 Levs in the remote mountain villages to 0.40-0.50 Levs in the better integrated and equipped "factories" in Panagyurishte, Kotel and Samokov. For comparison, the

¹⁴⁶ Even the most vigorous proponent of this thesis admits that 80 percent of the population of proto-industrial textile centres did not migrate after the Liberation Palaiet, M. *Balkan Economies*, p. 200.

¹⁴⁷ Palaiet, M., *Balkan Economies*, pp. 346-347.

¹⁴⁸ This, according to A. Primovski, explains the "temporary exclusion from the general decline of *abadji* craft" in the Ahachelebi region, which, supposedly continued to grow until the Wars. Примовски, А. Бит и култура, с. 376. Contemporaries, however, do not share the notion about the flourishing textile crafts after 1878. Instead, both Nedelev and Shishkov claim that the "in the last ten years [i.e. from the mid-1880s onwards] *abadjiystvo* has been significantly ruined and goes backwards" Неделев, Бележки из Средне-Родопското население, с. 33.; Шишков, С. Устово, с. 43.; Шишков, С. Поминькът в Родопите. Пловдив, Печатница Хр. Г. Данов, 1899, с. 7-8.

independent Sopot producers can earn from 0.70-0.80 up to 1 Lev a day.¹⁴⁹ The wage in the state encouraged industry was about 0.50 Lev at the end of the nineteenth century and 0.71 Lev in 1909.¹⁵⁰

Several more enterprising craftsmen were successfully taking advantage of the grim situation in which a large part of the proto-industrial mountain population found itself after 1878. The business model created by the Armenian Jovanes (Ohanes, Ivan) Bogosyan reached its most complete and profitable form.¹⁵¹ Extremely enterprising and equally unscrupulous, Bogosyan quickly managed to turn his small carpet workshop into a state-sponsored factory. Although it bore the proud name of called a "factory" and enjoyed state encouragement, the enterprise was in fact an expanded putting-out system with partial centralization of some phases of the production process. Except for the steam-powered dyeing facility build with state financing the "factory" used no any other machinery. Nevertheless, Bogosyan's hybrid business model, which combined non-mechanized production in a "factory" establishment with manual work at home, seems very successful. It relied on extremely cheap and skilled labour, miserable working conditions, technological innovations, active market demand and mass advertising.

Similar to carpet weaving was the model prevailing in the domestic production of cotton textile - *yasmi* (colourful printed scarves), *aladzhi* (mixed fabrics of cotton and silk or cotton and wool), *basmi* (thin cotton fabrics with printed patterns), towels, bath shirts and sheets. Just like the domestic carpet weaving, it successfully occupied the niche which opened up with in the decline of home production of *gaytan* yarn, *aba* and *shayak*. The same hybrid model, combining domestic-work with production in a artisan or "factory" enterprise, but with a greater degree of mechanization, was also used by the hosiery industry, which also developed after 1878.

Bulgarian handicrafts did survive, but this was at the cost of shrinking incomes and loss of status in society. From one of the most prosperous and popular professions, in just a decade, craftsmen found themselves close to the bottom of the social ladder. Their public authority declined sharply, and the summarized reports of regional governors across the country showed that by 1888 the population was already looking at them "with a bad eye" or, outright, "with contempt."¹⁵² In order to survive the recession, artisans had to combine their main occupation with by-employment in agriculture, viticulture, trade, cattle breeding, as well as to let most of their assistants and journeymen leave the workshop.¹⁵³

All government attempts to rescue the domestic producers and artisans seem belated, clumsy and uncertain. Instead of promoting the gradual modernization of production, the path taken by some of the Tsaribrod cotton sheet makers, for example, with the supply of semi-mechanical looms, the

¹⁴⁹ Съкратени протоколи ПТИК, 1908, с. 16-17.

¹⁵⁰ Работнички на килими. – Работнически вестник, V, № 4, 27 септември 1901 и Работнички на килими. – Работнически вестник, IV, № 23, 2 февруари 1901. Цит. по: Работническото движение в България, Т. 1, с. 223-224.; Анкета на насърдаваната индустрия през 1909, с. 37.

¹⁵¹ As the studies of D. Quataert for Turkey and A. Seyf for Iran show, this model of centralized putting-out system was widely used in carpet production in the Middle East in the end of the nineteenth century. Quataert, D., 'Machine Breaking', pp. 476, 479-482.; Seyf, A. 'Carpet Manufactures', pp. 205-208.; Seyf, A., 'Carpet and Shawl Weavers', p. 683.

¹⁵² Сведения по икономическото състояние, с. 112-114.

¹⁵³ Ibid, с. 108-109.

government tried to resurrect the craft-guilds in a new mandatory forms (so-called craft associations).¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁴ Тишков, П. Принос към история на българското еснафство. С., печатница С. М. Стайков, 1911, с. 53.; Хинков, Хр. Занаятчийството в България, с. 45-46, 63-65.

CONCLUSION

There were two main tasks that this study had in its introductory part: to outline in a verifiable quantitative form the economic rhythm during the long nineteenth century and to seek for answers about the peculiar Bulgarian asynchrony (the so called: swimming against the tide). In the course of the dissertation, however, several other key issues emerged, with which the research inevitably entered into a dialogue, striving to achieve a deeper understanding of the processes taking place in *Vazrajdana* and post-1878 period.

Firstly, despite its assumed prosaicness, the study of Bulgarian textile industry shed light on the backside of modernization, on its "price", which has remained so far from the scientific interest. Just like in many other parts of the "periphery" along with modernization, industrialization, and economic growth, the First Globalization (1870-1914)¹⁵⁵ brought colonialism, deindustrialization, and growing inequality. What this study revealed, however, was the astonishing vitality of Bulgarian secondary sector which, despite all odds, successfully crossed the Rubicon between proto-industrial production and modern factory-based industry.

The second, new topic, which unexpectedly arose in the process of writing, is related to the role of geography. Bulgarians are used to think that they live at a crossroads, literally at arm's length from the "navel of the world" (Constantinople). Since Peter Mutaфchiev and his brilliant essay on the Balkans Mountains and their role in shaping Bulgarian history¹⁵⁶ the national historiography rarely found it necessary to return to the decisive role of the geographical factor. Located far from the international commercial highways, lacking significant natural resources in combination with the "deplorable state" of its infrastructure until 1878 Bulgarian lands have been shielded from the destructive forces of deindustrialization. Locked between mountains and with an outlet only to an inland sea during the late Ottoman period Bulgarian textile producers successfully managed to capitalize on their unique geographical and transport position – both far from world trade highways and at the same time close to the major consumer centres such as Constantinople, Edirne, and Salonika. Such unique location guaranteed relative protection against external competition, but also allowed Bulgarian *abadji* and *gaytanji* to take advantage of trade liberalization of the Ottoman Empire without having to immediately pay the price of deindustrialization. At least until the mid-1870s, Bulgarian lands were reminiscent of an island whose inhabitants often waved from the shore at the passing ships, sometimes finding gifts that had fallen overboard, but it was too rare when a ship take the courage to stray from its course and drop anchor in these unfamiliar waters.

The true meeting of the Bulgarians with the outer world of modernity took place during the Russo-Turkish war. And even if some may argue to what extent St. Petersburg and Moscow were actually part of 'the West', it is clear that in 1877 and 1878, for the first time, large sections of the population got acquainted with foreign fashions, customs, and lifestyles. Gradually, the Bulgarian tastes also became more sophisticated, the old coarse *aba* give way to lighter *shayak* and later – to the fine fabrics

¹⁵⁵ O'Rourke, K., J. G. Williamson. *Globalization and History: the Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1999).; O'Rourke, K., J. G. Williamson. 'When did Globalization Begin?' *NBER Working Paper* 7632, 2000.; Williamson, J., *Globalization and the Poor Periphery before 1950* (Cambridge, Mass., 2005).

¹⁵⁶ Мутафчиев, П. Балканът в нашата история. – Книга за българите. С., БАН, 1987, с. 65-89.

with a variety of colours and decorations (plaids, stripes, embossed elements). The *gaytans* became obsolete and were replaced by embroidery and lace. The change in tastes is important, but it is not the only reason for the deep crisis in which the textile sector fell after 1878. The impact of the Long Depression seems much more significant. Agricultural prices, which have fallen by almost a half brought economic stagnation and late - decline of the already low standard of living. The "lean decades" stretching both before and after the Crimean War remain were already a history. In order to survive Bulgarians had to limit drastically their consumption - clothing and even food - and withdraw temporarily into self-sufficiency.

Turkish emigration in the late 1870s only added to the falling purchasing power bereaving Bulgarian producers of several hundred thousand customers. Furthermore, the economic nationalism that flourished at the same time in most of textile export markets (Bosnia, Serbia, Romania) effectively closed the access for the famous Bulgarian *aba*, *shayak* and *gaytan*. The remaining territories in the Ottoman Empire were hit with similar force by the Long Depression and also turned to self-sufficiency in textiles. The destruction of the *chiftliks* after the migration of the Turkish population siphoned all savings of the population which invested them into land purchases. And since the money hidden under the mattress were far from enough, peasant buying out former Turkish properties turned to the "help" of moneylenders. Charging "godless interest" many of the usurers literally enslaved entire regions of the country. They, however, refused to acquire the collateral (the land) of the unperformed peasant debts, because of its low profitability. Instead, moneylenders prefer to parasitize on information asymmetries and de facto stifle the agricultural modernization.

Deprived of most of its customers, within a just a few years, the once thriving textile proto-industry was brought to its knees. What followed was a nearly three decades long decline (ca. 1875 - 1902) which brought a sharp contraction in both the volume of textile production and in its labour force. Bulgaria has become just another deindustrializing country in the "poor periphery." However, things had changed in early twentieth century but this has so far been over-watched by the literature¹⁵⁷. In his pessimistic account, Michael Palairet found only "the replacement of the [old manual] proto-industrial with mechanized production", which "fails to compensate for the decline of woollens".¹⁵⁸ This was only the first act of Bulgarian textile drama. What emerges from the new set of output estimates presented here is the U-shaped trajectory of Bulgarian deindustrialization. Instead of a "sharp decline in the old woollen industries"¹⁵⁹, we see a long double-dip recession, followed by a rapid recovery in the early twentieth century. The trough of the crisis was probably immediately after the Russo-Turkish War, before mushrooming textile factories appeared on the scene. A second, shallower trough followed, at the very end of the nineteenth century during the so-called *fin de siècle* crisis (1897-1902).

Only around 1902-1903 did Bulgarian industry manage to recover and achieved impressive growth in the years leading up to the Balkan Wars. It should be noted that only a handful of peripheral countries managed to successfully modernize their proto-industrial sector during the First Globalization. In that way, the Bulgarian case becomes very interesting, especially if we look through the lenses of the proto-

¹⁵⁷ Palairet, M., *Balkan Economies.*; Palairet, M. 'Decline'.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid, pp. 349-350.

¹⁵⁹ Palairet, M. 'Decline', p. 343.

industrialization theory.¹⁶⁰ From this historiographical perspective, it is clear that the Bulgarian wool-textile industry was in fact one of the few examples of a successful transition from manual to machine production in the "poor periphery". During the critical three decades after the Liberation, precisely when the forces of the First Globalization were the strongest, the Bulgarian textile industry emerged from the narrow craft workshops and took the big step towards machine factory production.

At the heart of this process, as it became clear in the third chapter, were the former *abadji* and *gaytandji*, who transferred their capital and experience from the years of the textile boom and invested them in modern factories. With its protectionist legislation, the state appeared on the scene only when the first wave of textile factory promotion was over. For the most part, the government's measures were too limited, in the wrong direction (protectionist legislation), or come too late (fight against usury). At best, they play a complementary rather than a decisive role in the recovery of the textile industry.

Due to the acute capital shortages, the low and further falling solvency of the population, the shrinking demand and the weak technical literacy of the first industrialists, the factory modernization was inevitably slow and went only halfway until the Balkan Wars. In chapter three, I called this model a hybrid because it retained a number of the practices and methods of the old handmade home industry for a long time. Initially, most of the industrial establishments, proudly adorned with the loud name factory, were in fact larger putting-out systems with partial centralization and even more fragmented mechanization of individual processes.

With the end of the economic recession, a wider horizon has finally opened up for the former craftsmen who have become manufacturers. In just one decade, they, together with their sons who came to replace them at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, studied abroad and knew very well the technical innovations and good management practices, managed to quickly turn their centralized putting-out systems into modern industrial establishments similar to the most enterprises in Central, South-Eastern and Northern Europe.

During this first "golden decade" of the twentieth century, factory production successfully exceeded by 15 percent (in square meters of fabric) the maximum levels reached by the old proto-industry around 1870. It was the braiding, however, which failed to recover from the changes in tastes and customs barriers raised in most of its foreign markets. In case it had regained its pre-liberation volume, the total wool textile production in 1911 would have been not 12, but about 35 percent more than that at the end of the Ottoman period. All efforts by the government, business, local authorities and chambers of commerce to find a replacement for the declining *gaytan*-making in the face of carpet weaving did not yield the expected result. Despite the 73 percent growth achieved between 1896 and 1911 and the introduction of a new type of product (Persian carpets), it never managed to compensate for the losses from the braid. Once the tidal wave of the recession receded around 1902 it became clear that beneath the surface the old handicrafts had not only survived, though suffered enormous damage, but had also been reborn in modern factories. In this sense, the post-liberation decades are

¹⁶⁰ Янева, С. Пътища на индустриализацията: протоиндустриите в Европа и в българските земи (XVIII-XIX в.). – Исторически преглед (ИПр), LVI, 2000, № 5-6, с. 99-119.

a period of difficult transition despite, even in spite of, the hostile environment. A transition that is fully deserving, not pathetic admiration, but careful and unbiased study.

Twelve appendices have been annexed to the text, presenting in detail the collected data and the ways of calculating the various economic and social indicators.

Annex 1. Volume of textile production, 1870-1912;

Annex 2. Export of cereals 1840-1878;

Annex 3. Foreign trade of the Bulgarian lands, 1840-1878;

Annex 4. Prices, 1790-1912;

Annex 5. Wages and salaries;

Annex 6. Exchange rates;

Annex 7. Experimental ethnography;

Annex 8. Textile employment;

Annex 9. Textile factories;

Annex 10. Factory production of woolen cloth, 1870-1904;

Annex 11. Textile Manufacturers, 1870-1912;

Annex 12. Appendix strikes.

Information on the Scientific Contributions of the Dissertation

1. This dissertation is the first attempt in Bulgarian-language historiography to collect and analyse the rich, but extremely diverse historical, economic, ethnographic and local history literature that had piled up over the years. From that vast body of literature the dissertation derives a number of hitherto invisible trends in Bulgarian society during the "long nineteenth century";
2. For the first time in the literature on Bulgaria the process of modernization is considered not only on its positive side (development), but on its contradictory "reverse side" that hides many "dark spots", underwater reefs and risks (painful structural transformation, re-agrarization, and loss of status for large sections of the population);
3. Stepping on a rich historiographical base and on archival source, many of which were put into scientific circulation for the first time here, the study is tailored not only to outline the already mentioned processes during the first wave of modernization, but also to offer valuation of their quantitative dimensions:
 - The dissertation offers an attempt to measure the terms of trade (terms of trade) of the Bulgarian lands in today's Bulgarian borders in the period from 1840 to 1912;
 - For the first time, estimates for the foreign trade (import and export) of the Bulgarian lands during the Revival and after the Liberation to the Wars are presented;
 - A new improved database with prices and wages has been built which is far more comprehensive than the existing before (L. Berov).
 - All available information on exchange rates between currencies used in business transactions in Bulgarian lands from ca. 1800 to 1912. On this basis, a "transition" between the Ottoman currency *kurus* and the Lev of Bulgaria was proposed.
 - A more complete and accurate assessment of the volume of proto-industrial (textile) production during the Renaissance has been made;
 - Checked, corrected and extended in time is the assessment of M. Palairret for the volume of industrial (textile) production from the Liberation to the Wars;
4. With the help of this vast quantitative information, more complete and consistent answers to a number of open questions in the literature about the prolonged economic stagnation after 1878, the failed urbanization and the lack of structural transformation of Bulgarian society have been proposed;
5. Based on the quantitative estimates in the dissertation, again for the first time, the hypothesis of a one-way, linear economic decline after the Liberation is refuted and instead a U-shaped trajectory is discovered of partial and temporary deindustrialization, followed by a decade of reindustrialization between 1902 and 1912;
6. The dissertation formulates the phenomenon of "swimming against the tide". A number of explanations of this interesting from a theoretical point of view economic asynchrony are also offered;

7. The dissertation ranks after the few Bulgarian studies, which bring to the fore the role of geography for the economic and social development of Bulgaria.
8. The paragraph on the sociology of the first Bulgarian industrialists can also be considered innovative. The collected nearly 200 biographies of textile industries have been analysed and then a number of conclusions have been formulated regarding the dimensions, successes and failures of the early Bulgarian modernization.

List of Author's Publications on the Topic of the Dissertation

1. Ivanov, M., M. Kopsidis. 'Industrialization in a Small Open Wheat Economy during the First Globalization: Bulgaria c. 1840-1911', *Economic History Review*, (forthcoming).
2. Kopsidis, M., M. Ivanov. 'Industrialization and De-Industrialization in Southeast Europe', in: O'Rourke Kevin H. and Jeffrey G. Williamson (eds.): *The Spread of Modern Industry to the Periphery since 1871*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, pp. 91-114.
3. Kopsidis, M., M. Ivanov. 'Modern Industry in Southeast Europe 1945-2010: From Rapid Industrialization to Deindustrialization'. in: *Online-Handbuch zur Geschichte Südosteuropas. Band: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in Südosteuropa nach 1800*, edited from the Leibniz-Institut für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung (IOS Regensburg), 2018. <https://www.hgoe.ios-regensburg.de/texte-des-online-handbuchs.html>.
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