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# ГОДИШНИК

НА

СОФИЙСКИЯ УНИВЕРСИТЕТ  
„СВ. КЛИМЕНТ ОХРИДСКИ“  
ИСТОРИЧЕСКИ ФАКУЛТЕТ

Том 100

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# ANNUAIRE

DE

L'UNIVERSITE DE SOFIA  
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FACULTE D'HISTOIRE

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## СЪДЪРЖАНИЕ

<i>Петър Делев</i> – Тракийските беси .....	7
<i>Светлана Иванова</i> – Малцинства – търговци в Румелия през XVII–XVIII век ..	67
<i>Ваня Рачева</i> – Руската преселническа политика, българите и Одринският мир от 2 септември 1829 г. ....	175
<i>Таня Бонева</i> – Българите в Молдова в края на XX век. Етноложко проучване на две български села .....	245
<i>Евгения Калинова</i> – Интелигенцията и комунистическият режим в България в началото на 60-те години .....	293
<i>Искра Баева</i> – Завръщане към европейската конституционна традиция след 1989 г. ....	381

## CONTENTS

<i>Peter Delev</i> – The Thracian Bessi .....	6
<i>Svetlana Ivanova</i> – Minorities Merchant in Rumeli in the 17 <sup>th</sup> – 18 <sup>th</sup> Centuries .....	66
<i>Vania Racheva</i> – Russian Migration Policy, Bulgarians and the Peace Treaty of Adrianople of September 2, 1829 .....	174
<i>Dimitrios M. Kontogeorgis</i> – Georgi S. Rakovski in Wallachia (1855). Two Greek Documents .....	240
<i>Tanya Boneva</i> – Bulgarians in Moldova at the End of XX Century. Ethnological Study of Two Local Communities .....	244
<i>Evgenia Kalinova</i> – The Intellectuals and the Communist Regime in Bulgaria in the Beginning of the 1960s .....	292
<i>Iskra Baeva</i> – A Return to the European Constitutional Tradition Since 1989 ...	380

ГОДИШНИК НА СОФИЙСКИЯ УНИВЕРСИТЕТ „СВ. КЛИМЕНТ ОХРИДСКИ“

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RUSSIAN MIGRATION POLICY, BULGARIANS  
AND THE PEACE TREATY OF ADRIANOPOLE  
OF SEPTEMBER 2, 1829

VANIA RACHEVA

The last two decades made the east Europeans witnesses and participants in intense migration processes. Their significant impact on the societies in political, economic and social transition and on the developed countries which hosted the flows of immigrants has not been sufficiently explored. After 1989 Bulgaria has made no exception to the global trend of group or single migration, and the numbers in the official statistics are quite telling. Bulgarian emigrants numbered 87,900 people in 1990; another 40,300 emigrated in 1991; and 68,000 Bulgarians left their country in 1992. In 1996, seven years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, emigration was no less intense and 62,000 Bulgarians left their motherland that year. These numbers should be supplemented with the number of unofficial emigrants, which is hard to calculate because emigration was disguised as tourist trips, international brigades, friendly visits, and various other forms.<sup>1</sup>

It is currently assumed that during the past twenty years around a million and a half, often well educated people in active working age, have left Bulgaria. Whether this phenomenon has solely a negative impact is uncertain and clearly

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<sup>1</sup> When considering the relative value of these numbers, one should bear in mind that, according to census data, Bulgaria's population counted 8,949,000 people in 1985. Some twenty years later, in 2004, the country's population was already down to 7,761,000 people. See for these and other numbers: *Калинова, Е., И. Баева. Българските преходи 1939–2005. С., 2006, п. 325, 423.* Another census was carried out during my work on this paper. According to the preliminary results published on the website of the National Statistical Institute, by the beginning of April 2011 Bulgaria's population numbered 7,351,214 people. See: <<http://www.nsi.bg/census2011/pagebg2.php?p2=36&sp2=37&SSPP2=38>>. (web. 17 may 2011).

contingent on the vantage point, especially when migration helps for the formation of socially adaptable, “mobile” identities. In the beginning of the twenty-first century the emigrants’ nostalgia and rejection by the host society may be balanced by the growing pluralism, cosmopolitanism and respect for other cultures. On the other hand, the hosting societies’ fears and xenophobia may also grow rapidly, resulting in more frequent application of what is usually referred to as “policy of controlled migration.”<sup>2</sup>

There are almost no historical periods without migration processes, yet the current trend in historiography is to overestimate their importance and to see them as a panacea. Quite obviously, mass migrations are events with long-term consequences, which periodically give rise to new interpretations. This article is focused on the possible research avenues presented by a significant case of migration that took place more than 180 years ago. The mass migration of Bulgarians, nationals of the Ottoman Empire, was the result of the Russo-Turkish War (1828–1829) which ended with the Peace Treaty of Adrianople and of Russia’s imperial migration policy at the time. This case of Bulgarian migration cannot be classified as a new topic in historiography: it has been studied by Bulgarian, Russian, Soviet, Moldovan, Romanian, Ukrainian, and other scholars.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> For a theoretical background on the different aspects of migration and a comparative historical approach to the problem, as well as for a discussion on the century-long traditions of „policy-controlled migration,” see: *Катсиарди-Херинг, О.* Миграция на населението в Югоизточна Европа от XV до началото на XIX в. – Балканистичен форум, 1999, issues 1–2 3, p. 10–13; *Брубейкър, Р.* Последни от разпадането на империите и отсяването на народите. – *Брубейкър, Р.* Национализъмът в нови рамки. Националната общност и националният въпрос в Нова Европа. С., 2004, 262–296 [First published: *Rogers Brubaker.* Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. Los Angeles: U of California Press, 1996]; *История на човешките миграции.* Под общата ред. на *Р. Кинг.* С., 2009 [First published: *The History of Human Migration.* Ed. *R. King.* New Holland Publishers, 2007], 12–13; *Дичев, И.* Граждани отвъд местата. Нови мобилности, нови граници, нови форми на обитаване. С., 2009.

<sup>3</sup> *Скалковский, А.* Болгарские колонии в Бессарабии и Новороссийском крае. Одесса, 1848; *Скалковский, А.* Опыт статистического описание Новороссийского края. Ч. I–II. Одесса, 1850–1853; *Державин, Н.* Болгарские колонии в России. – СБНУН, 1914, кн. XXIX; *Державин, Н.* Болгарския колонии в России. Т. 2. Петроград, 1915; *Бернштейн, С.* Страници из история болгарской эмиграции в России во время русско-турецкой войны 1828–1829 гг. – Ученые записки Института славяноведения (УЗИС). Т. 1. М.-Л., 1949, 327–342; *Велики, К.* Румьно-русская помощь, оказанная болгарам эмигрировавшим в Румынские княжества вследствие войны 1828–1829 гг. – *Romanoslavica (Bucureşti)*, 1958, No 2; *Конобеев, В.* Национально-освободительное движение в Болгарии в 1828–1829 гг. – УЗИС. Т. 20, 1960, 221–274; *Дикулеску, В.* Привилегии, давани на българските преселници във Влашко през 1803–1834 г. – Във: Сб. Изследвания в чест на М. С. Дринов. С., 1960, 399–415; *Кристанов, Ц., С. Маслев, И. Пенаков.* Д-р Иван Селимински като учител, лекар и общественик. С., 1962, 69–96; *Мецержук, И.* Переселение болгар в Южную Бессарабию, 1828–1834 гг. (Из истории развития русско-болгарских дружеских связей). Кишинев, 1965; *Манко, А.* Второто масово преселение на българите в Русия в периода на руско-турската война 1828–1829 г. – Военно исторически сборник (ВИСб.), 1966, № 2, 53–60; *Велики, К.* Изселването от Карнобат във Влашко през 1830 г. – Известия на института по история (ИИИ), 1966, 16–17, 453–466; *Грек, И.* Българските доброволци (волонтери) от 1828–1829 година. – Векове, 1975, № 5, 8–20; *Боев, Р.* Българският доброволчески корпус в руската армия от 1829 г. – ВИСб., 1978, № 4, 84–90; *Велики, К.* Емигрирането на българите от Сливен във Влахия през 1830 г. – Във: Страници от миналото на българския народ.

The possibility of resettling Christians from the Balkan and the Asian territories of the Ottoman Empire and from Persia, with a view to the forthcoming end of the Russo-Persian War of 1826–1828 and the forthcoming Russo-Turkish War, was planned well in advance among the political and military factions close to the Russian Emperor Nicholas I (1825–1855). By imperial decree, a Committee was set up in November 1827 to organize the newly added provinces. It had extensive powers to establish rules for the management of the “Armenian” province, newly founded after the Treaty of Turkmanchai (February 10, 1828) signed between Russia and Persia. The province was formed by the former khanates of Erevan and Nakhichevan. A significant part of the Committee’s tasks consisted in putting into practice the grand plan for the resettlement of the Armenians from Persia and for changing the ethnic composition of this new border province of Russia by settling there a compact Christian population.<sup>4</sup> Not surprisingly, as members of the Committee were appointed a number of functionaries of the Asian department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as some important political figures like Count Karl V. Nesselrode and V. S. Lanski, in charge respectively of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Minister of Finance Egor F. Cancrin, the chief of the Headquarters of the Russian army general Ivan Diebitsch (Karl Friedrich Anton von Diebitsch), and more.<sup>5</sup>

С., 1987, 77–111; *Медведева, О.* Российская дипломатия и эмиграция болгарского населения в 1830-е годы. (По неопубликованным документам Архива внешней политики России). – *Советское славяноведение*, 1988, № 4, 24–33; *Степанова, Л.* Первое консульство России в болгарских землях (Сливен, 1830–1833). – *Във: Проблемы истории стран Юго-Восточной Европы. Политика. Культура. Историография.* Кишинев, 1989, 155–185; *Медведева, О.* Деятельность российского консула в Сливене Г. В. Ващенко (1830–1833 годы). – *Славяноведение*, 1999, № 4, 71–76; *Белова, Е.* Внутренняя политика российского правительства по заселению юга Российской империи. (По материалам Новороссии и Бессарабии 1751–1871 гг.). Дис. М., 2004. The text is partially accessible on: <<http://www.lib.ua-ru.net/diss/cont/64274.html>> (Web. 15 April 2010); *Дойнов, С.* Българите в Украйна и Молдова през Възраждането. (1751–1878). С., 2005, 84–115; *Медведева, О.* Когда говорят документы. – *Във: Славянский мир в третьем тысячелетии. Славянская идентичность – новые факторы консолидации.* М., 2008, 209–226; *Станчев, М.* Болгары в Российской империи, СССР, странах Балтии и СНГ. Т. 1 (1711–2006). Статистический сборник. С., 2009; *Медведева, О.* Первый российский консул в болгарских землях Г. В. Ващенко о местном населении. 1830-е годы. – *Във: Россия – Болгария: векторы взаимопонимания. XVIII–XXI вв. Российско-болгарские научные дискуссии.* М., 2010, 36–55.

<sup>4</sup> *Шишов, А.* Русские генерал-фельдмаршалы Дибич-Забалканский, Паскевич-Эриванский. М., 2001, 60–61. The text of the Treaty of Turkmanchai between Russia and Persia from February 10, 1828 is published in: *Внешняя политика России XIX и начала XX века. Документы Российского министерства иностранных дел. Сер. II (1815–1830). Т. 7 (15).* А. Л. Нарочницкий (ответств. ред.). М., 1992, p. 410–413, doc. 138. During the Armenian migration from Persia there even emerged an idea to dislocate the Muslims from the territory newly acquired by Russia. The establishment of ethnically and religiously homogeneous districts was considered to ensure conflict-free coexistence and easier government. More on this topic in: *Присоединение Восточной Армении к России. Сборник документов. Т. II (1814–1830).* Под ред. на Ц. П. Агаяна. Ереван, 1978, p. 566–567, doc. 332.

<sup>5</sup> *Шишов, А.* *Op. cit.*, p. 61, 290. An important role in the justification and organization of the Persian Armenians’ migration was played by the Armenian Christopher E. Lazarev, a Russian statesman, official from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and founder of the Moscow Institute of Oriental languages. He was also among the first, who immediately after the migration took an active

This Committee, however, was preceded by another organization with similar tasks, established earlier in 1827. Its head was the chief of staff of the Emperor Nicholas I, Count Tolstoy, who was charged with the thorough rationalization and organization of the government in the Transcaucasian region, a region with strategic importance for Russia. The staff members under Count Tolstoy were chosen with that task in view: the Little Russia military governor Knyaz Nicholas Repnin-Volkonski, the chief of the Khersonian settlements General-Lieutenant Count Ivan O. Vitt and the chief of staff of the military settlements General Kleymichel. One of the earnestly discussed projects concerned the resettlement of 80,000 Little Russian Cossacks and their families to the Persian border. This move would allow the formation of a protective shield of militarized Christians in the newly acquired territories where the population confessed different religions. The project was impressive, but not one to withstand careful consideration. Consequently, Emperor Nicholas I, who at the time trusted most in the Caucasian affairs the commander of the Caucasian front, general-field-marshal Count Ivan Paskevich (1782–1856), actually transferred the decision-making to him. Without directly rejecting the idea, general Paskevich undermined it by facilitating instead the resettlement of Orthodox Armenians from Persia to Russia. After signing the Peace Treaty of Adrianople, general Paskevich further organized the resettlement of more than 10,000 Armenian families from Asian Turkey to the Transcaucasian Russian provinces.<sup>6</sup>

The Armenian migration will be discussed in more detail later on. Here we need to emphasize that both generals Paskevich and Diebitsch were given extraordinary powers and enjoyed the Emperor's complete trust during the military campaigns against Persia and the Ottoman Empire. A number of interesting documents from their correspondence have survived, which will allow us the opportunity to trace (in a following paper) the mechanisms of decision-making as well as the parallels between the events at the Balkan and the Caucasian fronts, which lead to the migration of a great number of people.

Similar projects for the resettlement of Christians from the Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire to Southern Russia were discussed immediately before the start of the Russo-Turkish War in 1828–1829. Because of the uncertainties imminent in every emerging military and political crisis, however, no particular specifications or practical measures were devised.<sup>7</sup> Such measures were discussed in

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part in formulating the official Russian version about the events. See: Описание переселения армяне аддербиджанских в пределы России, с кратким предварительным изложением исторических времен Армении. Почерпнутое из современных записок *Сергеем Глинкою*. Москва, в Типографии Лазаревых Института восточных языков, 1831. There are several photo-type editions of this publication. Only in 1990, for example, it was re-published in Baku in thirty thousand copies.

<sup>6</sup> *Шишов, А.* Op. cit., 290–292, 311, 318, 426–427; *Внешняя политика России XIX и начала XX века. Документы Российского министерства иностранных дел. Сер. II (1815–1830). Т. 8 (16). А. Л. Нарочницкий* (отв. ред.). М., 1995, p. 357, 402.

<sup>7</sup> A suggestion about settling a number of Bulgarians in Russia has been expressed on the eve of the war by Emperor Nicholas I himself, but in the context of the terms for forming volunteer detachments. Volunteers had to commit themselves on their free will to an obligation to migrate along with their families to Southern Russia after the conclusion of the peace treaty. Recruiting volunteers



earnest and actually undertaken only at the time of the second, successful but also very risky Russian military campaign in 1829 and were directly linked with the organization of volunteer irregular formations of Bulgarians. These formations were distributed arms and were directed to assist the Russian army not only in the area of hostilities but also at the rear of the Turkish army after the Russians passed the Balkan Mountain Range in the summer of 1829. At a suggestion by general field-marshal count Ivan Diebitsch (1785–1831) and other military and civil officials and on the orders of the Emperor, Bulgarian volunteers committed in writing to migrate with their families to Russia after the war was over.<sup>8</sup> This condition shows without a doubt that the Bulgarian emigration was not only planned, but also expected by the persons directly involved in the war. However, its magnitude would depend on a number of factors, among which were: the actual strength of volunteer units; the policy of the Sultan's administration towards the Bulgarians, and the conduct of the Turkish army towards civilians in the area of hostilities; the campaign launched by emissaries, who were sent by circles and persons directly interested in settling the fugitives in specific areas and estates; the spreading epidemics; the non-observance of the amnesty guaranteed by the Peace Treaty of Adrianople; and even the mass psychosis that affected some settlements...

It appears obvious that during the first years of his rule, Emperor Nicholas I and a number of high government and military officials followed the nearly century-old Russian tradition to complete "a number of internal and foreign goals" by displacing great groups of people.<sup>9</sup> Yet even before the beginning of the Russo-Turkish War of 1828–1829 some differences had already occurred in the views of the political and military figures bound up in the affair; these concerned the scope, the manner of resettlement, and the response to the anticipated objections of the Sublime Porte. Different notions existed also regarding the required *professional qualification* of the settlers, their eventual settling in Crimea or Bessarabia, as well as the actual benefits and the burdens on the imperial treasury ensuing from such a large-scale initiative. Despite the fact that the commanders of the Balkan and the Caucasian fronts, generals Diebitsch and Paskevich, were the driving force behind the practical realization of the migration of thousands of Christian families that were subjects of Sultan Mahmud II (1808–1839), the mediation role

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for irregular military formations assisting the regular Russian army had been a practice at both the Balkan and the Caucasian theaters of war during the Russo-Turkish wars. Носкова, И. Формирование Крымской группы болгар в XIX в. – Във: Георгиева, И., К. Стоилов (eds.). Българите в Крим. С., 2009, р. 81; Внешняя политика России..., Т. 8 (16), р. 206.

<sup>8</sup> See: Внешняя политика России... Т. 8 (16), р. 10, doc. 1, р. 51–53, doc. 17, р. 62, doc. 20, р. 206, doc. 217, doc. 80, р. 227, doc. 85; Пейчев, А. Оперативните действия по време на руско-турската война от 1828–1829 г. – Във: Одринският мир от 1829 г. и балканските народи. С., 1981, 106–110; Боев, Р. Антитурското движение на населението от Българското черноморско крайбрежие през руско-турската война 1828–1829 г. – ВИСБ., 1970, № 5, 18–38; Боев, Р. Българският доброволчески корпус..., 84–90.

<sup>9</sup> The mass migrations of Slavs to Russia supplied "human and material resources for its military forces and its economy; the southern borders of the country were fortified, the cultivation of the uncultivated steppe lands was speeded up." See: Славянские народы Юго-Восточной Европы и Россия в XVIII в. Лещиловская, И. (ed.). М., 2003, 312–313.

of count Alexander Chernishev (1785–1857), a general from the cavalry and a future war minister, who at that time acted as a chief of the headquarters, should not be neglected. No less important were the views on the migration policy held by the New Russian and Bessarabian general-governor Count Mikhail Vorontsov (1782–1856). He had the heavy task to balance the needs of his region, the imperial fiscal policy and the interests of the big landowners and the old colonists in Southern Russia. The success of the planned resettlement would largely depend on his administrative experience and actions. As pointed in previous research on the topic, Vorontsov had earlier proposed to man the Russian Black Sea navy by campaigning among sailors and shipbuilders from the Black Sea ports of the Ottoman Empire. The inadequate success of this initiative had been attributed to the poor popularity of the idea of migration among the Greeks, who formed the majority of the *sea-farers* of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>10</sup>

Migration of separate groups of Bulgarians to Southern Russia<sup>11</sup> started immediately after the beginning of the hostilities. According to the official Russian records, 242 families arrived in 1828 in Southern Bessarabia, mainly from Northern Bulgaria, which had become the terrain of hostilities. Fewer Bulgarians came from the left bank of the Danube, seeking the assistance of the Russian consuls in Bucharest and Iassy for obtaining passports for migration.<sup>12</sup> The episodic migration continued until the start of the active hostilities during the second campaign of the war in the spring of 1829. During the first half of the year Bulgarian families emigrated from the regions captured by Russian troops. They settled mainly in coastal cities on the Russian Black Sea coast, in the agricultural Bulgarian colonies on the Crimean Peninsula and in Bessarabia.<sup>13</sup> Some schol-

<sup>10</sup> One of the first to study the decision-making mechanisms in the process of the Bulgarians' resettlement to Russia during the war of 1828–1829, was the Soviet linguist and scholar of Bulgarian studies Samuel Bernstein (1911–1997). See: *Бернштейн, С.* *Op. cit.*, 327–342. See details about the activities of Vorontsov's emissaries (the Greeks Kumbari, Pheognosti and Kokinos) and about the financial support provided for the popularization among the Bulgarians of the idea of migration to the Russian Black Sea settlements, in: *Мецгерюк, И.* *Op. cit.*, 74–76, 163–164, 172–185; *Носкова, И.* *Op. cit.*, 83–84.

<sup>11</sup> The present article is focused on the migration of Bulgarians to Russia. The examples related to the Bulgarian migration to Wallachia and Moldova (both were under Russian occupation between the Peace Treaty of Adrianople and 1834) are given only to provide a basis for comparison. More details on the privileges of the Bulgarian immigrants who settled in the Danubian principalities as a result of the war, as well as the obstacles they met and the reasons that caused some of them to return to their native places, can be found in: *Трайков, В., Н. Жечев.* *Българската емиграция в Румъния. XIV век – 1878 г. и участието щ в стопанския, обществено-политическия и културния живот на румънския народ.* С., 1986, 76–98, 103; *Косев, Д., В. Дикюлеску, В. Паскалева.* *За положението и стопанската дейност на българската емиграция във Влашко през XIX в. (До руско-турската война 1877–1878 г.). – Във: Българо-румънски връзки и отношения през вековете. Изследвания. Т. 1 (XII–XIX в.).* С., 1965, 287–290; *Дикюлеску, В.* *Op. cit.*; *Велики, К.* *Румыно-русская помощь...*

<sup>12</sup> *Мецгерюк, И.* *Op. cit.*, p. 66, n. 3.

<sup>13</sup> According to archive data, in 1829 a total of 653 people were transported by steamers to Crimea; 1,375 people – to Bessarabia, 47 people – to Odessa, and 80 families – to Wallachia and Moldova. There is evidence of the activity of emissaries and of their obligations in assisting the emigrants from the area of Dobruzha; one such emissary was the Bulgarian – and a Russian na-

ars claim that in the heat of the war from June until September 1829 migrations stopped. All are unanimous, however, that the climax of the legal Bulgarian migration in the Russian territories was in the spring and the summer of 1830. It coincided with the schedule for the phased withdrawal of Russian occupation troops from the Sultan's Balkan territories, and in particular from the Bulgarian lands, which had been previously regulated in clause XI of the Peace Treaty of Adrianople and by the following Convention of Petersburg from April 1830. The withdrawal from Eastern Thrace started in the spring of 1830. Each step of the withdrawal was carried out upon payment by the Sublime Porte of a portion of the war contribution.<sup>14</sup>

#### AVAILABLE DOCUMENTARY SOURCES ABOUT THE BULGARIAN MIGRATION AND THEMATIC RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES

Despite the long history of research on the topic, there are still many factual and thematic gaps concerning the migration discussed here and its consequences. Several factors impede the researchers' progress. The first is the nature of the examined problem: most Bulgarian emigrants<sup>15</sup> from the beginning of the 1830s did

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tional – Peter Ganchev. There is also information about the similar engagement of the military commandants of the Black Sea cities and fortresses conquered by the Russians. More information on this topic in: Манко, А. *Op. cit.*, p. 56; Мецерьюк, И. *Op. cit.*, 75–76, 118.

<sup>14</sup> Мецерьюк, И. *Op. cit.*, p. 93, 111–112. The text of the Peace Treaty of Adrianople and the additional Convention of Petersburg are published in: *Внешняя политика России...*, Т. 8 (16), p. 266–270, doc. 103; Шеремет, В. Адрианопольский трактат и посольство А. Ф. Орлова в Турцию (1829–1830 гг.). – *История СССР*, 1972, № 1, p. 145. Clause XIII of the Peace Treaty of Adrianople provides with general amnesty nationals of both Empires who took part “in the hostilities” or “supported either of the two negotiating states.” Despite the guaranteed amnesty, these persons were also allowed to immigrate with their families and movables during a period of eighteen months to a country of their choice: Russia, the Ottoman Empire, or the autonomous principalities of Wallachia and Moldova.

<sup>15</sup> This article discusses mainly the migration of Bulgarians. Some national historiographies pay particular attention to the so-called Gagaouz (Turkish-speaking Christians). A part of them indeed emigrated en masse during the first quarter of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, mainly from the areas of Silistra and Varna. In this article, however, all emigrants are terminologically referred to as *Bulgarians*. My motives for this come from the indisputable fact that the *majority* of emigrants were Bulgarians, compared to Gagaouz and Greeks. Another reason is that in the official Russian documents on the Bulgarian colonies at least until the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century no distinction was made between Bulgarians and Gagaouz. According to the expert in Bulgarian history Ekaterina Chelak from Kishinev, the ethnonym *Gagaouz* was first mentioned in the confidential “Statistical synopsis of the colonies in the Bessarabian area,” drawn up in 1837 for the needs of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs by the official Ivan Tolstoy. In: Челак, Е. Училищното дело и културно-просветният живот на българските преселници в Бесарабия (1856–1878). С., 1999, p. 32; *Хронологический указатель материалов для истории инородцев Европейской России*. Составлен под руководством Петра Кеплена. Санктпетербург, 1861, 62–63. More about the origin of the Gagaouz in: Димитров, С. Гагаузкят проблем. – *Във: Българите в Северното Причерноморие. Изследвания и материали*. В. Търново, 1995. Т. 4, 147–168 and cited bibliography. Statistics on the number and the proportion of Bulgarian, Gagaouz and Greek colonists compared to the population of Southern Russia in:

not settle at one place or immigrate in just one country. Many left with the notion of temporary migration, dictated by specific critical circumstances (for instance, the policy of preliminary dislocation of population from the war theatre prompted by the Sublime Porte; the threat of retaliation for their partiality for or actual participation in the war on Russia's side; the dangers to physical survival caused by the epidemics of plague and cholera that had broken out; the active Russian agitation; the direct threats and violence to their fellow citizens from disbanded volunteers who had already signed up for resettlement, etc.). Some of the emigrants set off with the intent to leave the Ottoman Empire. However, they did not cross the border but settled in abandoned homes in the settlements along their route, especially in Dobruzha and the ports along the Northern Black Sea coast as well as on the right bank of the Danube.<sup>16</sup> Many refugees, after settling initially at Wallachia, Moldova, or Southern Russia, failed to adapt economically or politically, or could not cope with homesickness and moved on, putting their families to ruin. A significant part of them took advantage of the eighteen-month period fixed by the Peace Treaty of Adrianople, and of the urgent policy of the Sublime Porte to bring them back, and had already returned to their homeland before the end of 1831. Yet many managed to settle well and started a new life in their new homeland. Therefore, we aim to investigate not a single act of emigration, but a process of transition and adaptation of a large group of people in very different environments; a process that over the years spanned thousands of lives and had economic and social repercussions on domestic policy in certain parts of the Ottoman Empire, Russia and the Danubian principalities of Wallachia and Moldova.

Second, difficulties to evaluate the magnitude of the migration process after the Treaty of Adrianople stem from the need to establish the approximate number of the Christians who left the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire. Such attempts have been made by the Bulgarian historical science as well as by contemporaries of the events, some of whom were also either participants in the migration, or their immediate descendants. It seems to me, however, that even today these challenging estimates, which rely on different numbers stated in various surviving documents, defy an objective calculation and get embellished by social or political motivations. These motivations differ in time and affect not only the national historiography. They are the product of political partisanship, of disappointment caused by national catastrophes and the failed attempts at national unification, and of a methodology burdened by the obligatory postulates of *the class-party approach*.

Intriguing, for instance, are the numbers of the Bulgarian emigrants mainly from the eastern Bulgarian lands, which were "swept by the hurricane of massive

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Державин, Н. Болгарския колонии в России... Т. 2, VI-VII.

<sup>16</sup> Interesting data about this *internal* migration, which has never been studied in its own right, is provided by many witnesses and participants in the process. Later testimonials about the fate of the settlers and their descendants are published in works on local history. This interesting topic deserves separate examination.

emigration”<sup>17</sup>, as pointed out by the Bulgarian Marxist historiography until 1989<sup>18</sup>. The following examples are extracts from the works of recognized historians, experts in the problems of the Bulgarian emigration during the 19<sup>th</sup> century. In 1980 the Romanian specialist in Bulgarian history Constantine Veliki and the Bulgarian historian Veselin Traykov published a collection of documents of the Ministry of Finance of Wallachia. They report the emigration of Bulgarians there during and after the end of the Russo-Turkish War of 1828–1829. The collection is restricted by the thematic scope of the volume and does not include materials about other regions where the refugees headed to. In the introduction the compilers discuss the problem in general terms and assume that “some regions of Southeastern Bulgaria remain depopulated”, because “in total, more than a hundred thousand people” have emigrated. In 1981, when Bulgaria celebrated thirteen hundred years of statehood, a valuable joint collection was published to present works of Bulgarian and Soviet historians dedicated to the Russo-Bulgarian relations during the Revival period. The volume contains an article by the Bulgarian historian Stefan Doynov about the migration movements from the Bulgarian lands during the Russo-Ottoman wars in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. On the basis of his work in Russian archives but also relying on other data, the author calculated that “during the war and in 1830” “about 140,000 Bulgarians sought refuge” in Bessarabia, Odessa, Crimea, Moldova and Wallachia. (In 1978 the Academy of Sciences of the Armenian Socialist Republic issued a documentary collection, in the introduction of which the number of Armenian immigrants to Russia as a result of the Russo-Persian War of 1826–1828 and the Russo-Turkish War of 1828–1829 was calculated. Accidentally or not, the exact same number was pointed out:

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<sup>17</sup> This figurative comparison was articulated by Viktor Teplyakov, a witness of the events, Russian traveler, amateur archeologist, writer and aide to the New Russian and Bessarabian general-governor S. Vorontsov. Teplyakov was sent for the period from March to July 1829 to the Balkan territories under Russian control with the task to explore and collect archaeological artifacts: [Тепляков, В.]. Письма из Болгарии. Писаны во время кампании 1829 г. Виктором Тепляковым. М., 1833, p. 124.

<sup>18</sup> Historians who are aware of the mechanisms of ideological legitimacy that function in totalitarian societies would probably bear in mind some features of the Marxist historiography practiced in the countries of the former socialist bloc. In the Bulgarian case, works on Russia’s role in the massive Bulgarian migrations from the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, clearly show an inclination towards commenting on *less dangerous* aspects of the problem; the sanctioned discourse draws on the terminological array of categories and epithets that became a fixture of the Soviet and the Bulgarian historiographies. For instance, the controlled launching of armed detachments of Bulgarian volunteers in the Russian army during the war of 1828–1829 is regarded exclusively as a manifestation of the “struggle for national liberation” from Ottoman rule. A customary convention in the historiographical tradition is the inclusion of statements regarding the “deep-seated historical roots of amity between the Bulgarian and the Russian nations” and the important role of the “strong Bulgarian Diaspora” that was instrumental in the following decades. Even the usual negativism towards tsarism in general, and to the “policeman of Europe”, the Russian emperor Nicholas I, in particular, fails to cast doubt on the assertion that Russia did *not* organize the migration which in reality led to a demographic and economic collapse of entire areas in Eastern Bulgaria. Therefore I am inclined to reflect on the possibility that the conspicuous focus placed by the Bulgarian historians from the *pre-perestroika* period on the number of Bulgarian emigrants is their tacit and only possible means of dissent against the obligatory historiographical tenets of the totalitarian period.

“around 140,000 people.”<sup>19</sup>) Another Bulgarian example appeared in 1986 in a monograph on the economic, political and cultural aspects of Bulgarian emigration beyond the Danube from the 14<sup>th</sup> century until the Berlin Congress in 1878. In this volume Bulgarian historians Veselin Traykov and Nikolay Zhechev assumed that from 1828 to 1830 “around 140,000–150,000 people emigrated from Bulgaria”. They even speculated that “these numbers are only approximations, for multiple crossings of the Danube have remained undocumented”.<sup>20</sup>

These examples illustrate that the vast amount of primary sources on a certain topic does not *a priori* facilitate its investigation. Here lies the next significant challenge to the researcher of the Bulgarian migration waves in the second quarter of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. In contrast to the lack of information about previous Bulgarian migrations, thousands of diverse Russian (as well as Romanian, Ottoman, Bulgarian, etc.) documents have been preserved about the events of 1828–1830, including many lists of (potential) immigrants prepared by the Russian authorities at different phases of the planning stage and the actual migration process. These documents include further data about the later process of partial reverse migration back to the Ottoman Empire through the end of the 1830s. One of the reasons for the abundance of primary material is that the convoys of refugees were accompanied by Russian soldiers all the way from their homelands in the Ottoman Empire through the principalities of Wallachia and Moldova to the Russian border; then the refugees stayed under quarantine controlled by Russian civil authorities, and were registered by Russian or by Romanian officials. From 1829 to 1834 the latter carried out the instructions of general count Pavel Kiselyov (1788–1872), chairman of the Wallachian and Moldovan parliaments (Divan) during the Russian occupation regulated by the Peace Treaty of Adrianople. This documentation, when it becomes available to more researchers, will make possible a multifaceted interpretation, including statistical research. Currently, however, *the migra-*

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<sup>19</sup> See: Присоединение Восточной Армении..., p. 5. To the best of my knowledge the latest published figures on the number of Armenian immigrants estimate a total of 14,047 families, or between 90,000 and 100,000 people, see: Паяслиян, С. История на Армения от наченките до наши дни. С., 2011, p. 124 [First published in English: *Simon Payaslian. The History of Armenia from the Origin to the Present.* Palgrave Macmillan, 2007]. See and: Хаджар, В., Р. Гусейн-Заде. „Родословная” армян и их миграция на Кавказ с Балкан. Баку, 2003, Application № 3.

<sup>20</sup> For the examples see: Велики, К., В. Трайков. Българската емиграция във Влахия след руско-турската война 1828–1829. Сборник от документи. С., 1980, p. 7; Дойнов, С. Преселнически движения от българските земи по време на руско-турските войни през първата половина на XIX в. – Във: Българското възраждане и Русия. С., 1981, 310–311. Later on, the author changes his estimate, and in his monograph already mentions “the greatest migration wave – around 150,000 people”, see: Дойнов, С. Българите в Украйна и Молдова..., p. 9, 111. (He is also among the first ones who after 1989 openly judge the Russian migration policy towards Bulgarians as negative: Дойнов, С. Последното масово преселение в Южна Русия (1861–1862). – Исторически преглед, 1992, № 11–12, 18–39); Трайков, В., Н. Жечев. Op. cit., p. 113; Станчев, М. Op. cit., p. 25. It should be stated that the authors (representatives of different national schools) who have explored the migration only to a particular area or state point out a comparatively smaller number of Christian emigrants. See: Челаков, Е. Op. cit., 30–31; Манко, А. Op. cit., p. 54; Трайков, В., Н. Жечев. Op. cit., p. 92; Носкова, И. Op. cit., 89–90; Мецърюк, И. Op. cit., p. 94–95, n. 87–88, p. 124.

tion archives are in the possession of at least six countries (Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Turkey, and Bulgaria) that in the course of over 180 years have passed through different stages of co-operation or confrontation, neighborly relations or hierarchical dependence. Only an insignificant part of what is preserved has been published.<sup>21</sup>

To this context belongs also the following feature in the representation of the discussed migration: the thesis that the Bulgarian migration “has not been urged” by the Russian government, an assertion which has been persistently promoted in the Russian and Soviet historiography over the past 150 years. According to its proponents, the Russian government not only did not organize the process of migration, but, “proceeding from its economic and political interests, was skeptical about it and took measures to stop it”.<sup>22</sup> This thesis was advanced immediately after the Peace Treaty of Adrianople. On the one hand, it was part of the attempts of the Russian diplomacy to prevent further confrontation with Great Britain and the other Great Powers in view of the forthcoming decisions about the status of the young Greek state. On the other hand, public declarations by the commander-in-chief general Diebitsch and the chancellor Nesselrode (and some partial and belated initiatives of Russian officials<sup>23</sup> to restrict the migration) were meant to prevent further deterioration of the relations with the Sublime Porte after the signing of the Peace treaty, when Russia was apprehensive of the Ottoman administration’s response to the significant loss of taxpayers from the Balkan and Asian provinces. Not surpris-

<sup>21</sup> Without any claims for a comprehensive review, the iconic works on the topic include: *Кисимов, П.* Бягство на сливенци подир руските войски на 1830 г. – Българска сбирка, 1903, № 1; *Селимински, И.* Народното братство в град Сливен и голямото народно преселение в 1830 г. – Библиотека *Исторически спомен*. Кн. 9. С., 1928; *Романски, С.* Българите във Влашко и Молдова. Документи. С., 1930; Документи за българската история. Т. III. Състав. *Панчо Дорев*. – Документи из турските държавни архиви (1564–1908). Ч. 1 (1564–1872). С., 1940; *Тодоров, Н.* Руски документи за демографското състояние на част от Източна България през 30-те години на XIX в. – Известия на държавните архиви (ИДА), 1967. Т. 13; *Трайков, В.* Българската емиграция във Влахия...; *Боев, Р.* Руски документи и материали за крепостта Варна от 1828 г. – ВИСБ., 1980, № 3, 168–172; *Плетньов, Г.* Руско-турската война 1828–1829 г. и положението на българския народ. (По приписки и летописи). – ВИСБ., 1988, № 6, 124–131; *Медведева, О.* Проблемът за българската емиграция в Русия през 1830 г. в дейността на руската дипломация (по неопубликовани документи на АВПР). – ИДА, 1989. Т. 57, 155–205; *Христакиев, В.* Документи за Созополската българска доброволна дружина по време на руско-турската война 1828–1829 г. – ВИСБ., 1992, № 1, 154–168.

<sup>22</sup> *Степанова, Л.* Op. cit., p. 177; *Медведева, О.* Материали Российского консульства в Сливене как источник для изучения положения болгарского населения в 30-е годы XIX века. – Славяноведение, 1995, № 5, p. 70; *Медведева, О.* Проблемът за българската емиграция..., p. 157; *Медведева, О.* Когда говорят документы..., 208–218; *Внешняя политика России...* Т. 8 (16), p. 5. Few studies disagree with this thesis. For example, see the work of the Soviet linguist and expert on Bulgarian history Samuel Bernstein: *Бернштейн, С.* Op. cit., p. 327–342.

<sup>23</sup> Such as Gerasim Vashtenko, for example, an official of the Russian embassy in Istanbul, who in the spring of 1830 was appointed for interim Russian consul in Sliven. By January 13, 1830 general Diebitsch had already foreseen the scale of the forthcoming migration and duly informed the Emperor through general Chernishev. Being well-informed about the situation in the Bulgarian territories, the commander-in-chief considered it “useful not to weaken the Christian population in this area.” *Мещеряк, И.* Op. cit., 81–82.

ingly, the authors who interpret Russian policy in this vein base their arguments specifically on diplomatic correspondence from the period.<sup>24</sup>

Even current Bulgarian historiography ignores many significant topics directly related to the Bulgarian migration. The nineteenth-century observers have already stated the profound demographic and economic consequences for the Bulgarian ethnic community in the affected areas. Nevertheless, the decade after 1829, when the abandoned settlements in the Ottoman Empire were gradually recovering, has not been sufficiently studied. The attitude of the Sublime Porte and the local authorities to the Bulgarian emigration has never been the object of adequate research. The response of the Muslim population in these regions and the attitude of the other Bulgarians to the migration and its consequences have not been discussed. The subsequent Ottoman policy of encouraging the emigrants' return has not received serious attention. This transitional period for the Bulgarians was part of the greater process of reform in the Ottoman Empire and it is potentially an appropriate vantage point for a study of the changes in the local power structures and the interpersonal, socio-political and economic relations and dependencies at the local level. The mechanisms for the social and psychological adaptation of the refugees in the host countries have been insufficiently studied. Only some recent studies have begun to address the adaptation and the rationalization of the mass emigration into the collective memory of the community.<sup>25</sup>

Let us revert to the place of Bulgarians in the Russian imperial policy during the 1820s–1830s. The role of Russia as the mastermind of the Bulgarian emigration after the signing of the Peace Treaty of Adrianople can be interpreted correctly only if understood in the context of the general Russian strategy for the defense of Southern Russia, for its settling and economic development.<sup>26</sup>

#### SOME ASPECTS OF RUSSIAN MIGRATION POLICY UNTIL THE BEGINNING OF THE 1830S AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BULGARIANS

The Russian policy to stimulate migrations of Christians from the Ottoman Empire and the Austrian monarchy started under Peter I (1682–1725, emperor

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<sup>24</sup> Successful policy implementation, however, often requires some difference between publicly declared intentions and real actions. At thirty one years of age, Emperor Nicholas I was already aware of this in 1827. On the occasion of the forthcoming parley with Persia, he commented in front of general Paskevich on the *rules of the oriental policy*, where “lie and deceit” aren’t considered vices if only “they provide an opportunity for gaining any benefit.” *Внешняя политика России...* Т. 7 (15), p. 71–72, doc. 26.

<sup>25</sup> *Drosneva, E., M. Kirova. Wars and Migrations: Field Observations, 1828–2009.* – In: *Mitev, P., I. Parvev, M. Baramova, V. Racheva, (eds.). Empires and Peninsulas. Southeastern Europe between Karlovitz and the Peace of Adrianople, 1600–1829.* Berlin, 2010, 271–279, and cited bibliography.

<sup>26</sup> In this article we do not discuss in detail Russian settlement policy. It is interpreted, however, as a consistent imperial policy for assimilation of the new frontier territories with a focus on the period of the Bulgarian migration.



from 1721). In 1715 he issued a decree on allocating land in the large provinces of Kiev and Azov for the settling of Moldavian, Wallachian and Serbian officers and soldiers and on supplying them with adequate annual financial and food support. These measures were related to the formation of Hussar regiments according to national-territorial affiliations; the measures were aimed at ensuring security at the western and southern borders.<sup>27</sup> The practice of transplanting militarized Russian population started at the same time and with the same aim. Although at first the policy of displacement was used as a punishment for disobedience, after 1722 and the so-called Caspian campaign against the Persian fortress of Derbent it acquired a new aspect. Emperor Peter I ordered the construction of a special fortress, called the Saint Cross, and the resettlement of 1,000 Don Cossacks to serve as its garrison and frontier security guard.<sup>28</sup>

Between the death of Emperor Peter I in 1725 and the ascension of Empress Catherine II in 1762 there had been eight coups d'états in Russia. Each new leader "would replace the members of the ruling elite."<sup>29</sup> Such *dynamics* are not supposed to lead to the establishment of a lasting political strategy and policy. This supposition is disproved however by the Russian colonizing policy, and particularly its success in guarding the border, reinforcing the army, and the gradual but permanent economic reclamation of the steppes. Difficulties were not insignificant. Researchers stress the pervasive lack of "material and human resources" to protect the southern Russian frontier. Therefore, as early as in the 1740s under Empress Elizabeth Petrovna (1741–1761), a project to fortify the border and to settle farmers there (Russian colonists, escaped serfs or immigrants) was worked out along with plans for military colonization.<sup>30</sup>

With that end in view the Russian government started a practice of dispatching officers and officials abroad to recruit Christians, mostly among the Austrian Serbs, to settle in the Southern Russian territories. The initiative was facilitated by the demilitarization undertaken in the mid-18<sup>th</sup> century in some parts of the Austrian Military border along the Middle Danube and by the transition of these territories under the jurisdiction of Hungarian civil authorities. As a result of a settlement between Vienna and Petersburg in 1751–1752 the so-called New Serbia and Slavo-Serbia were established and populated. Military colonists were organized in military-type settlements and separated in Hussar and infantry regiments. They received in "eternal and hereditary possession" land and annual financing in accordance with their rank, and in peacetime they were allowed to engage in trade and crafts. In 1760 the two regions had a population of 26,000, settled in 122

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<sup>27</sup> Recruitment of migrants, especially from the Austrian territories, and their transportation to the Russian borders was carried out secretly. *Лециловская, И.* Сербы в России. – Вѣв: Славянские народы..., 277–279; *Белова, Е.* Русско-турецкие войны и миграционная политика России в первой половине XVIII в. – *Вопросы истории*, 2008, № 5, p. 141.

<sup>28</sup> *Шишов, А.* Казачьи атаманы. М., 2008, p. 95, 98, 101. See also: *Хронологический указатель материалов для истории инородцев...*, p. 7, 14.

<sup>29</sup> *Каменский, А.* Российская империя в XVIII веке: традиции и модернизация. М., 1999, p. 137.

<sup>30</sup> *Белова, Е.* Op. cit., p. 144.

towns and villages. In the mid-18<sup>th</sup> century among the Slav immigrants in the New Russian steppes there were around 1,600–1,800 Bulgarians.<sup>31</sup>

Under Empress Catherine II (1762–1796) the Russian immigration policy saw a new development that affected the future Bulgarian immigration in the Russian Empire. Catherine II continued the efforts of her predecessors for recruitment of Christian immigrants from the Balkans and from the frontier areas of the Habsburgs for the Hussar regiments. On her ascendance to the throne she issued a manifest which summoned foreigners to settle in Russia. At the same time the Empress initiated political and administrative changes aiming at the administrative centralization of the areas along the southwestern border inhabited by privileged colonists. In 1762 the Office for Supervision of Foreign Settlers, presided by count Grigoriy Orlov, was founded by imperial order. Soon New Serbia and Slavo-Serbia were transformed administratively and included in one of the many Russian provinces, New Russia, established in 1764. Imperial manifests were issued providing privileges to attract German and Balkan Christian colonists, but these were now encouraged to settle as farmers and craftsmen.<sup>32</sup>

The extension of the southern Russian borders and the strategic and economic interests of the Empire in Crimea and Transcaucasia led to further changes. After the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji (1774) the province of New Russia encompassed new lands along the northern Black Sea shore. The shift of the borders eliminated the need of semi-autonomous Cossack governance in the Ukrainian territories that had lasted for almost two centuries and was known as the Zaporizhian Sich. The formal reasons for the abolishment of the system of self-governance in 1775 were the crushing of the riot led by Yemelyan Pugachev and the crack-down on heresy. After the annexation of Crimea in 1783 New Russia was turned into Ekaterinoslavsko namestnichestvo (a district named after Catherine II the Great).<sup>33</sup> The Russian-Ottoman wars of 1768–1774 and 1787–1791 resulted in the first compact groups of Bulgarian immigrants coming to New Russia. Although there is no precise data on the number of Bulgarian immigrants at that time, it is

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<sup>31</sup> See more in: Хронологический указатель материалов для истории инородцев..., 59–60; *Костяшов, Ю.* Сербские граничары. – Вопросы истории, 1997, № 5, 143–144; *Челак, Е.* Op. cit., p. 26. *Медведева, О.* Переселение болгар в Россию. – Вѣв: Славянские народы..., 299–301; *Лециловская, И.* Op. cit., 283–286, 295; *Станчев, М.* Op. cit., 17–18.

<sup>32</sup> One of the reasons for withdrawing the special status of the military settlements was their inefficiency as well as the widespread corruption and the permanent quarrels between the settlers, the local residents, and the neighboring Cossacks. Some researchers point out that by 1764 the huge sum of seven million rubles had been spent for New Serbia alone: *Лециловская, И.* Op. cit., p. 288.

<sup>33</sup> Some of the former Zaporozhians found refuge and an opportunity to pursue their traditional way of life at the mouth of the Danube under Ottoman rule. Later others settled in Banat by permission of the Austrian Emperor Joseph II (1765–1790). Still others were settled between the rivers Western Bug and Dniester by Prince Grigoriy A. Potyomkin-Tavricheski, who rehabilitated the Cossack army during the Russo-Turkish war of 1787–1791. He was the architect of the Russian settlement policy in Crimea and as a statesman began its actual implementation. *Водарский, Я., О. Елисеева, В. Кабузан.* Население Крыма в конце XVIII – конце XX веков. (Численность, размещение, этнический состав). М., 2003, p. 70, 78, 87–88; *Шишов, А.* Op. cit., 133–138, 141, 156–157, 160–163; *Костяшов, Ю.* Op. cit., p. 141; *Лециловская, И.* Op. cit., p. 288 and cited bibliography. Following the Peace of Iassy (1791), Ochakov and later Bessarabia in 1812 were also added to New Russia.

well-known that the majority of them entered the newly formed military detachments. Along with other settlers from the Ottoman Empire and former Zaporozhian Cossacks, they formed the so-called Black Sea Cossack army.<sup>34</sup>

Colonization has clearly proven its effectiveness since the Roman Empire, shortly after the conquest of the hostile regions along its frontiers, settled there loyal citizens from the interior. Researchers of global migrations appropriately focus on the myth of the Trojan hero Aeneas, who survived the destruction of Troy and settled in Latium in Italy, where he founded a dynasty. Not incidentally, Aeneas was depicted in Roman mythology as a warrior-turned-colonist.<sup>35</sup> A clear indication of the effectiveness of the Russian colonization policy was the fact that in 1787 when Empress Catherine II visited New Russia the population of the province had already reached 700,000 people.<sup>36</sup>

It should be pointed out that the resettlement of Bulgarians from the Ottoman Empire to Russia was carried out as an illegal operation in peacetime. According to the treaties of Kuchuk-Kainarji (1774) and Iassy (1791), only the inhabitants of the Danubian principalities of Wallachia and Moldova were entitled to immigrating in Russia.<sup>37</sup> Yet many Bulgarians lived in the two principalities. The resettlement of Christians beyond the Danube in Russia was not regulated by any other treaties. This circumstance, reinforced by the neighborly relations between the two empires during part of the rule of Emperor Paul I (1796–1801) and Sultan Selim III (1789–1807), obstructed legal migration.

Migration did not stop, however. On the contrary, a new tendency in the Russian policy was launched towards immigration of Bulgarians to South Russia, which became quite obvious at the beginning of the rule of the next Russian Emperor, Alexander I (1801–1825). I refer to the support of the Russian ambassadors in Constantinople and the Russian consuls in Wallachia and Moldova, as well as the Kherson military governor Armand Emmanuel du Plessis, Duc de Richelieu, to the illegal transfer to Russia, by land and by sea, of hundreds of Bulgarian refugees. They originated mostly from Thrace and the Black Sea coast, but there were also people who came from more distant territories, fleeing from the anarchy that swept large parts of the Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The preferred settlers were experienced farmers and stock-breeders, gardeners, vine-growers and craftsmen. They were accommodated for the most part in the Crimean Peninsula, in the districts of Kherson, Tiraspol and Odessa, and less in Southern Bessarabia.<sup>38</sup> The

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<sup>34</sup> *Тютюнджиев, И.* Български военни формирования в Украйна през XVIII в. – ВЪВ: Българите в Северното Причерноморие. Изследвания и материали. Т. 4. В. Търново, 1995, 132–134; *Дойнов, С.* Българите в Украйна и Молдова..., 5–58; *Державин, Н.* *Op. cit.*, p. VI; *Носкова, И.* *Op. cit.*, 66–67; *Медведева, О.* *Op. cit.*, 301–303; *Белова, Е.* Внутренняя политика российского правительства по заселению... – ВЪВ: Славянские народы..., p. 238, 243–244.

<sup>35</sup> See more in: *История на човешките миграции...*, p. 50.

<sup>36</sup> *Лециловская, И.* Сербы в России... – ВЪВ: Славянские народы..., p. 288.

<sup>37</sup> *Медведева, О.* *Op. cit.*, 305–306.

<sup>38</sup> *Державин, Н.* *Op. cit.*, p. VI; *Трайков, В., Н. Жечев.* *Op. cit.*, pp. 53, 55–56; *Георгиева, И.* Българите в Крим. – ВЪВ: Българите в Крим..., p. 8, 10; *Носкова, И.* *Op. cit.*, 69–74; *Бернцгейн, С.* Из истории болгарских поселений в Крыму (По материалам Одесского исторического архива). – ВЪВ: Изследвания в чест на М. С. Дринов. С., 1960, 273–281.

details of the process such as preparations, mechanisms for recruitment and concealment of the emigrants, the financial provision for all links along the chain as well as for the direct organizers, many of whom were Balkan employees of the Russian missions, were elaborated on for the first time by the Soviet historian Victor Grachev (1926–2010), an expert on the history of the Southern Slavs in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Grachev's interesting yet not quite popular article examines the role of the Russian government in the successful organization of illegal and exploitative human trafficking. (Accuracy requires to note that when Grachev wrote in 1981 about the Bulgarian migration of 1800–1806, he did not employ the present-day terminology used in this paper.) From 1800 through 1805, as a result of secret arrangements, 3,731 people “of this very useful in agriculture and tirelessly hardworking nation [i.e. Bulgarians]” were transported by sea; twelve piasters were paid for each person to the ships' captains.<sup>39</sup>

The Russo-Turkish War of 1806–1812 put an end to the secret resettling of Christian subjects of the Sultan on the right bank of the Danube. One of its consequences was the first organized mass migration of Bulgarians to Russia. Many documents about these events have been published and many of the facts and aspects have been studied. During the war of 1806–1812, however, the Russian government had not yet settled on a strategy for the future status of the settlers. Already in May 1805 the provincial authorities in Crimea were ordered to acquire land from the local estates and to hand it in possession of the Supervisor of the Crimean colonies for the settling of the Bulgarian colonists. An imperial decree from September 1, 1807 bestowed additional privileges to the Bulgarian settlers in Russia. It provided 60 tenths<sup>40</sup> for each family “in perpetuity.” These measures proved hard to put into practice mainly because a significant part of the land in Crimea and Bessarabia was private. As a result, the first attempt to accommodate the immigrants from 1807–1808 ended with many being resettled in the interior of New Russia, where they were awarded with “all the benefits, advantages and patronages of the law, prescript to the Russian nationals by birth.”<sup>41</sup> In practice,

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<sup>39</sup> *Грачев, В.* Към въпроса за преселването на българи в Русия в началото на XIX в. (1800–1806 г.). – Във: *Българското възраждане и Русия*. С., 1981, 264–289. See also: *Хронологический указатель материалов для истории инородцев...*, p. 60, 156; *Станчев, М.* Op. cit., p. 25. Later authors describe the initial settling of Bulgarians on Crimea as “considered carefully and adequately organized by the authorities.” See: *Носкова, И.* Op. cit., p. 71, 81. Traditional interpretations of Soviet historiography on the nature of the migration policies of the Russian Empire have been recently re-introduced with the assertion that the Slavs' migration to Russia represented “the humane aspect of the Petersburg's policy on the Balkans”: *Лециловская, И.* (ed.). *Славянские народы...*, 312–313; *Медведева, О.* *Болгарские переселения в Россию в политике российского государства в XVIII – первой трети XIX вв.* – Във: *Славянский мир в третьем тысячелетии. Россия и славянские народы во времени и пространства*. М., 2009, 35–38.

<sup>40</sup> A tenth is equal to 10,925 decares. Cited: *Челак, Е.* Op. cit., p. 29.

<sup>41</sup> *Трайков, В., Н. Жечев.* Op. cit., 58–67; *Носкова, И.* Op. cit., 73–74, 79; *Челак, Е.* Op. cit., 28–29; *Грек, И.* *Органи на управление на „заддунавските преселници“ през първата половина на XIX в.* – Във: *Българите в Северното Причерноморие*. Т. 3. В. Търново, 1994, p. 127; *Багратион в Дунайских княжествах*. Сб. документов. Т. 3. М., 1949; *М. И. Кутузов*. Сб. документов. Состав. *Л. Г. Бескровнаго*. Т. 3, М., 1952; *Кутузов в Дунайских княжествах*. Сб. документов. Состав. *Н. В. Березняков*. Кишинев, 1948.

this meant expanding serfdom over the refugees, and was met with considerable resistance.

The arrangements regarding the civil status and assimilation of Bulgarian refugees during this long Russo-Turkish war obviously caused some difficulties to the Russian commanders-in-chief. General Mikhail Kutuzov (1745–1813) placed refugees under the care of a special official, state chancellor Coronelli. The reluctance of a great part of the Bulgarian emigrants in the Danubian principalities to be transplanted to Bessarabia and the attempts of some representatives of the Bulgarian political elite to find a way out of this predicament have been discussed in historiography. Led by the bishop Sophronius of Vratsa (1739–1813), a group of Bulgarian notables suggested to the Russian authorities a project for giving territorial, cultural, educational, and judicial autonomy to the Bulgarian emigrants in Wallachia and Moldova after the Peace Treaty of Bucharest (1812). The proposed district would include the areas of temporary settlement on the left bank of the Danube.<sup>42</sup> The project was not approved. With an eye on the forthcoming resettlement of the emigrants to Bessarabia, on the eve of the signing of the Peace Treaty of Bucharest on May 5, 1812, Coronelli organized the collection of comprehensive statistical data about them. His list, however, included Bulgarians that had settled in the principalities before 1806. It appears, consequently, that an attempt to point out an accurate number of Bulgarian emigrants during the war will be somewhat speculative.<sup>43</sup> It is noteworthy, however, that before the first Russo-Turkish War in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, in the district of Budzhak (the southern part of Bessarabia enclosed between the mouths of the rivers Danube and Dniester, nowadays in Moldova and Ukraine) there were around 8,000 Bulgarians that were Transdanubian emigrants. By 1819, the official Russian statistics about Bessarabia showed a much larger number of Bulgarian families, from 2,524 to 4,348.<sup>44</sup> These numbers include the families of Bulgarian volunteers who participated in the war on the Russian side. At first, they kept their militarized status in the new settlements.

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<sup>42</sup> Велики, К. Емигрирането на българите във Влахия по време на руско-турската война от 1806–1812 г. – Във: Страници от миналото на българския народ. С., 1987; Рачева, В. Неприметным образом. Начало болгарско-российских политических контактов при Александре I. – Российский исторический журнал Родина. М., 2009, № 6, 37–40.

<sup>43</sup> Coronelli was a governor of all territories conquered by the Russians on the right bank of the Danube. He was appointed in 1809 by the commander-in-chief general Petar I. Bagration (1765–1812) and granted extraordinary authority on all civil matters. The data Coronelli collected refers to 20,316 Bulgarian families numbering in total 87,037 people. Грачев, В. Към въпроса за преселването на българите..., р. 275; Дойнов, С. Преселнически движения от българските земи..., 300–301.

<sup>44</sup> Statistics about the number and dislocation of Bulgarians in Bessarabia and in Crimea during the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when the majority of the Bulgarian colonies in Russia were actually established, is included in: Челах, Е. Ор. cit., р. 28, 32; Дойнов, С. Ор. cit., р. 301; Носкова, И. Ор. cit., р. 80; Станчев, М., Ор. cit., р. 25, 27–30; Уварова, Е. Греко-болгарские колонии юга Украины в начале XIX в.: опыт сравнительного анализа. – Във: Университетски четения и изследвания по българска история. Ред. И. Баева, П. Митев. С., 2008, 145–155; Полторах, В. Основание болгарских колоний Херсонской губернии в начале XIX века в свете топонимических данных. – Във: Просвета и промяна. Сб. в чест на Румяна Радкова и по случай 150-годишнината на Болградската гимназия. С., 2010, 425–458.

Emperor Alexander I continued the policy of his famous grandmother about restricting the freedoms of the Cossack regiments.<sup>45</sup> In 1803 he issued Rules for the Ural Cossack Army that marked another step for turning them into regular formations. A symbol of the new arrangements was the introduction of a standard uniform for the Cossacks, but the most essential aspect was the concentration of the civil and military power over the Cossacks in the hands of a single administrative authority. The reforms caused unrest and riots among the Cossacks, many of which were “staroobryadtsi” (“old-believers”). After the Peace Treaty of Bucharest (1812) when Bessarabia was added to Southern Russia, the need of frontier service on the Dniester diminished. One of the results of this was the transformation in 1817 of the Bugski Cavalry Cossack Regiment into an Ulan division. This reform affected around 600 families of Balkan immigrants, most of them Bulgarians, which were also included in the personnel of the so-called military settlements.<sup>46</sup>

Obviously, the status of the Bulgarian colonists in Russia was established under Emperor Alexander I. However, for a number of reasons, including the Napoleonic Wars, the final decision on the issue was postponed until 1818. Then the Board of Trustees for the foreign settlers in the Southern part of Russia was established, presided by General Ivan Inzov (1777–1845) who reported directly to the Minister of Interior Affairs. In the following year, the Bulgarian settlers were granted rights of foreign colonists. A decree of the Governing Senate of December 29, 1819, followed by a written act of the Ministry of Interior Affairs of March 12, 1820, determined their social, economic, legal and administrative status. Fifty-seven Bulgarian colonies were organized in four colonial provinces: Kagulski, Prutski, Izmailski and Budzhashki districts, managed by the Bessarabian Office of Foreign Settlers.<sup>47</sup> The Bulgarian colonists were considered a special category of rural population. According to the documents, each of them

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<sup>45</sup> The tendency of settling only married Cossacks in the frontier areas was firmly established at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, when by Catherine II's order Cossacks and their families were transplanted in the devastated Black Sea steppes in the Kuban region. Around 25,000 people were divided across 40 Cossack settlements. Their administration, despite the Cossacks' resistance against the practice of serfdom and the occasional desertions, irreversibly progressed towards centralization. Шишов, А. *Op. cit.*, p. 136.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 172–179, 194–195, 203; Конобеев, В. Българското националноосвободително движение. Идеология, програма, развитие. С., 1972, 170–171; Ячменихин, К. Экономический потенциал военных поселений в России. – *Вопросы истории*, 1997, № 2, 40–43.

<sup>47</sup> Since we are discussing the Bulgarian migration to Bessarabia (the area between the rivers Prut and Dnepr was given the administrative name District of Bessarabia in 1813), our focus is on the administration of the Bulgarian colonists there. The administrative reorganization affected also the Bulgarians in Crimea, who used to be subordinate to the Offices of Kherson and Tauric and (along with the district of Bessarabia) were directly subordinate to the Board of Trustees and general Inzov. In 1818 the settlement of Bulgarians in Crimea was already discontinued and even an official order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of August 5, 1819 was issued on this matter. See: *Хронологический указатель материалов для истории инородцев...*, p. 61; Носкова, И. *Op. cit.*, p. 80; Челах, Е. *Op. cit.*, p. 28, 31; Водарский, Я., О. Елисеева, В. Кабузан *Op. cit.*, p. 79, 81, 92–93. The colonist status of Bulgarians, as well as the other foreign colonists, was abolished in 1871, when they were given the same status as the former state peasants. See: Белова, Е. *Op. cit.*

received 60 tenths for use in perpetuity, without the right to sell it. The colonists were allowed to import in Russia property and goods to the value of 300 rubles per family without paying taxes. Theoretically, they were granted the opportunity to found factories, practice crafts, trade and sell goods throughout the country. They could also buy land as a private property, but out of the territory of the establishment. Bulgarians who settled in Bessarabia during and after the war of 1806–1812 were exempted from taxes and communal and military service for seven years, and those who came earlier – for three years. After this period, each family would pay 14 rubles a year in state taxes as well as a land tax of 15–20 kopecks per tenth.<sup>48</sup> The colonists were exempted from civil and military service as well as from sojourn and support of army staff at their homes in peacetime. The decree also guaranteed them “freedom of worship according to their customs.”<sup>49</sup>

With regard to the Bulgarian topic, special attention deserves the Russian immigration policy in the first years of Emperor Nicholas I’s rule. Some facts were discussed in the beginning of this article where also emerged the main figures involved in the implementation of the imperial migration policy. Now I will pay attention to the migration of Orthodox Armenians from Persia and the Ottoman Empire to Russia, which was organized by Russia in the late ‘20s and the early ‘30s of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The exploration of this event would allow for more adequate interpretation of contemporary Russian immigration policy regarding Bulgarians. A detailed comparison between the two topics would provide interesting, perhaps surprising parallels. However, here I will only attempt to outline some aspects of such a comparison:

- Figures and administrative structures with crucial role in the process of migration;
- Organization, protection and escort of the refugees’ convoys to the quarantine stations;
- Allocated financial resources for the enterprise;
- Specifics of the initial reception and accommodation of the refugees.

The migration of Armenians from Persia to Russia and their settlement in the newly acquired frontier province, which was purposely named Armenian, was established by Clause XV of the Treaty of Turkmachai (February 10, 1828). The

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<sup>48</sup> After the new settlers arrived in 1830 some provisions were revised: the tenths of land in the colonist districts were decreased from 60 to 50 and the land tax was increased to 22 kopecks per tenth. Those settlers who due to the lack of vacant land were accommodated in settlements outside the Bulgarian colonies were allotted the same amount of land as the state Russian peasants (30 tenths) by an ordinance of the Committee of the Ministers from October 1830. *Челак, Е. Op. cit.*, 30–31; *Мецгерюк, И. Op. cit.*, 137–138.

<sup>49</sup> *Челак, Е. Op. cit.*, 29–33. The magnitude of the administrative reforms in the South Russian frontier territories which were undertaken by Emperor Alexander I can be understood better, if we bear in mind that the administrative, territorial, financial, and agrarian changes covered also the government of the Don Cossacks’ and the other military-cum-agricultural settlements. In 1818, a special commission was entrusted with suggesting changes in the regime of land ownership and financing of the Cossack settlements. It was led by the aforementioned general-aide-de-camp Alexander Chernishev, a future Military Minister under Emperor Nicholas I and an upholder of the immigration policy. See further details in: *Шушов, А. Op. cit.*, p. 203, 219.

process of resettlement was paced in accordance with Persia's promptly paying its war-contributions and with the deadlines for withdrawal of the Russian troops from the occupied Persian territories. The withdrawal deadlines were specified in an additional act of the treaty and bound to the payment of contributions.<sup>50</sup> The resettlement started in the early spring of 1828 from the vicinity of Maragi from where the Russian army had to withdraw in the end of March. Afterwards, in the end of May, it was turn of the emigrants from Urmiyski and Hoyski districts. "Eight thousand two hundred forty-nine families with a total number of approximately 45,000 people" were included. By preliminary calculations of the Russian government the emigrants would receive land lots, would be exempted from taxes for a period of six years, and the poorest among them would be granted a one-time financial aid. For that purpose, 50,000 rubles from the Persian contribution would be committed to the commander-in-chief general Ivan Paskevich.<sup>51</sup>

Behind the initiative for Armenian migration in Russia stood two Armenians, closely bound to Russian state and apologists of its role as a protector of the Orthodox Christians. The first of them is an official of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, the aforementioned Colonel Christopher Ekimovich Abamalek-Lazarev (1786–1858), an heir of a wealthy and prominent Armenian family. In 1816 Lazarev, who played a major role in organizing the migration, had founded and backed financially the Institute of Oriental Languages in Moscow. Numerous published documents about Armenian immigration expose his direct participation in recruitment of immigrants on behalf of the Russian government during the war. Lazarev participated also in collecting the detailed statistics of the migrants' property status and in the preparations of preliminary lists of immigrants. His contribution to the organizing of the refugees' convoys is undoubted, along with his efforts to ease the difficulties of the emigration and to prevent the ruin of his compatriots who took the path of emigration. The second important figure involved in the organization of the Armenian mass migration to Russia in 1828 was the chief of the Armenian eparchy in Georgia, Bishop Nerses Ashtaraketsi (1771–1857).<sup>52</sup> The activity of a wealthy Armenian lobby among the Russian rul-

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<sup>50</sup> An Imperial decree from 21 March 1828 established "Armenian province" out of the former Erevan and Nakhichevan khanates, see: Хронологический указатель материалов для истории инородцев..., p. 18; Присоединение Восточной Армении..., p. 446–451, doc. 245; Внешняя политика России... Т. 7 (15), p. 422–423, doc. 139, p. 692, n. 196. The Treaty of Turkmanchai provided a one-year period, during which all who wished were allowed to emigrate. For arrangement of property or other financial issues, however, were provided five years as well as an opportunity for authorization of special persons to represent the emigrants locally. The obstacles from the Persian government and the difficulties in realization of the procedure itself are probably among the reasons why the Peace Treaty of Adrianople's provisions regarding the same matters are simplified. The treaty of September 2, 1829, which gave legal opportunity for resettlement of Christian nationals of the Ottoman Empire, provided a period of only eighteen months for exchange of population and sale of property: Внешняя политика России... Т. 8 (16), p. 266–270, doc. 103.

<sup>51</sup> Внешняя политика России... Т. 7 (15), p. 692–693, n. 196; Присоединение Восточной Армении..., p. 463–466, doc. 255. In comparison, in 1830 from the Asian provinces of the Ottoman Empire to Russia would migrate "more than 90,000 Armenians". Мещеряк, И. *Op. cit.*, p. 200.

<sup>52</sup> There are many published documents and comments about the two, see for instance: Хронологический указатель материалов для истории инородцев..., p. 15; Внешняя политика России...



ing circles is one of the crucial differences, easily detected by even a cursory comparison between the Armenian and the Bulgarian migrations. In the early '30s of the 19<sup>th</sup> century Bulgarians were much less known in Russia and mostly Russian officers and officials without any connections to Bulgaria were bound up in organizing the migration. The single evidence of Bulgarians sent as emissaries among their compatriots during the Russo-Turkish war I have discovered, concerns few Russian nationals, most of whom were with the status of colonists.<sup>53</sup>

It is interesting to elucidate the mechanism of organization, security and escort of the refugee convoys of Armenians and respectively of Bulgarians to the quarantine stations at the Russian borders. In the case with the resettlement of the Persian Armenians, there are detailed instructions, the application of which in the spring and summer of 1828 can be traced in many published documents. Unfortunately, no such instructions concerning the Bulgarian emigration in the spring and summer of 1830 have been published, neither a sufficient amount of Russian documents concerning their putting into practice has been issued. It is quite striking that in the interesting series „Внешняя политика России XIX и начала XX века. Документы Российского министерства иностранных дел” (repeatedly cited here) only two notes in volume 8 (16), which includes documents from October 1828 to July 1830, concern the Bulgarian migration.<sup>54</sup> This lack of documents contrasts sharply to the number of documents and annotations, which elucidate the migration of Armenians from the Asian provinces of the Ottoman Empire, which migration was guaranteed by the same Clause XIII of the Peace Treaty of Adrianople and took place at the same time. Yet, thanks to a number of articles and monographs, intriguing facts are still available, and these allow for some parallels to be drawn.

General Paskevich was a skillful commander-in-chief and a diligent administrator determined to implement the instructions to increase the number of the Christians in the former Nakhichevan and Erevan Khanates, transformed in the new Armenian

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Vol. 7 (15), p. 382, 438, 554; Присоединение Восточной Армении..., p. 21–22, doc. 3, p. 443–444, doc. 243, p. 456–457, doc. 249, p. 479–480, doc. 270, p. 552–553, doc. 321, p. 564–568, doc. 332, p. 617, n. 6; *Дегоев, В.* Россия и Кавказ XVIII – первой половины XIX вв.: Взгляд с Запада. – Вьв: *Дегоев, В.* Большая игра на Кавказе: История и современность. М., 2001, p. 72.

<sup>53</sup> Even in the commission formed in the fall of 1830 to manage the Bulgarians' accommodation in the vacant state lands outside the colonists' districts, the two Bulgarians recommended by the President of the Commission Colonel Harchevnikov for the positions of “officials for special missions” were not approved by the authorities. The Bulgarians in question, Petar Gavrilovich Ganchev and Petar Ivanovich Dimov, were Russian nationals, who had fulfilled several assignments concerning resettlement of Bulgarians in Russia between 1824 and 1830. See: *Мецперюк, И.* Op. cit., 118–119. As an exception to the rule of the few Bulgarian emissaries being former colonists in Russia, can be mentioned Ivan Seliminski from the town of Sliven. Thirty-one year old, Greek-educated, Seliminski lived in Europe for a few years and was among the supporters of the immigration in Russia, though after 1830 he himself settled in Wallachia. Seliminski even refused an offer of the Russian authorities to contribute to the establishment and arrangement of the new colonies in Bessarabia. His memoirs are among the most cited *local, Bulgarian* sources about the resettlement in 1830 and its consequences. *Кристанов, Ц., С. Маслев, И. Пенаков.* Op. cit., p. 98, and the works cited there.

<sup>54</sup> See: *Внешняя политика России...*, p. 649–650, n. 298 to doc. 188 and p. 651–652, n. 303 to doc. 196.

province. Pashkevich himself signed detailed instructions for “moving the Armenians from their places and escorting them to our borders” just two weeks after the signing of the Russian-Persian Peace Treaty. Under Colonel Christopher Lazarev’s command, General-major Pankratiev, supported initially by twenty five Cossacks and an officer, was put in charge of organizing the refugees in accordance with the schedule for the withdrawal of the Russian troops. Pankratiev was responsible for the immigrants up to their crossing the border, where they would pass under the care of a specially formed temporary Erevan management, later replaced by a special Committee to the Armenian district management. In his instructions General Paskevich recommended that no force should be used in the process of recruiting prospective immigrants to Russia. Instead, the Armenians should be persuaded to expect significant privileges, following their adoption of Russian citizenship. They were to be encouraged in the belief that after their resettlement in the Russian territories, they would be able to engage in trade, to settle in towns and benefit from having common rights with the local merchants<sup>55</sup>, while villagers would get proper land in a sufficient amount... All families who voluntarily wanted to immigrate in Russia were registered in lists prepared in accordance with detailed list templates, with special references to the poorest and those most in need of assistance with the travel. The lists were transferred to general Paskevich and then, after his departure from the occupied Azerbaijanian province, to the chief of the occupation army who replaced him.<sup>56</sup> All families (or even entire settlements) were given free standard passes. The passes contained the number of settlers as well as a statement guaranteeing their exemption from taxes. For convenience and logistic and security purposes, people were divided into groups of 150 to 300 families. Colonel Lazarev was initially provided with 25,000 silver rubles from the contribution paid by Persia, to distribute among the poorest in the form of a loan, and

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<sup>55</sup> Documents interpreted by Ivan Meshteryuk suggest that similar promises were also given by Russian generals to Bulgarians from towns along the Black Sea and in Eastern Thrace. It is known, however, that in the early ‘30s of the 19<sup>th</sup> century in the four Bulgarian colonists’ districts there was only one urban-type settlement – Bolgrad (Bolhrad). Most merchants and craftsmen among Bulgarian immigrants wanted to settle in the seaport towns of Reni, Kishinev, Galatz, Izmail, Akerman, etc. The cases of immigrants who originated from urban areas and insisted to stay in the towns of Reni and Izmail are interesting. Many of them could no longer wait for permission and returned to the Ottoman Empire. In their stubborn struggle against the town administration and the judicial authorities, the few families who remained insisted that they had arrived in 1830 at the “beneficent invitation” of the generals I. Diebitsch and L. Rot, who had assured them that they would receive protection and would not be left without the “necessary support.” By 1837 only 27 Bulgarian immigrants had remained in the town of Reni. They complained that they have not yet been able to restore their property to its “original state”, i.e. to the prosperity they had achieved in Varna. *Меуерюк, И.* Op. cit., p. 152, n. 159, p. 153–157.

<sup>56</sup> What is known regarding the involvement of general Diebitsch in organizing the Armenian migration, allows us to conclude that two years later he acted similarly in the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire. Not surprisingly, through 1828 General Paskevich was promptly and regularly informing Diebitsch, then chief of the Headquarters, about the course and the effectiveness of the measures concerning the Armenian resettlement. General Diebitsch was accompanying the Emperor who personally attended the Balkan theater of war during the first campaign of the Russo-Turkish War. The two were constantly in touch with each other, and probably were able to track the effectiveness of the measures concerning the Armenian migration. See: *Присоединение Восточной Армении...*, p. 496–498, doc. 286; *Внешняя политика России...* Т. 7 (15), p. 554.

also for incidental expenses. Each family in need received aid, not to exceed 10 rubles, in return for a special receipt.<sup>57</sup>

Resettlement of so many people in a region devastated by war was indeed accompanied with considerable incidentals. In May 1828 General Paskevich was informed that many of the emigrants had come to “extreme poverty” and needed money to buy or hire pack-animals to transport their property. Those who had left in April were in the worst situation because they not just hadn’t been able to arrange their property and financial affairs, but also could not benefit from the harvest of the crops. More funds were needed also because the refugees had to be supplied with food through the next harvest and to be provided with sowing-seeds. The situation of the specially founded Committee for assistance of the settlers was difficult as the resources of the region were primarily calculated to support and provide food supplies for the Russian army, which was already engaged in the war with the Ottoman Empire which had started in April 1828. As it often happens, the refugee wave soon led to a humanitarian crisis: a part of the Armenian immigrants were doomed to famine and bankruptcy and many did not survive the winter.<sup>58</sup>

Russia’s growing interest towards the frontier Asian provinces of the Ottoman Empire, where Armenian Christians lived, can be traced from the fall of 1828 on. Then the Headquarters of the Russian army gave orders for data to be collected regarding the number, material status and the disposition toward migration among Armenians in the districts of Bayazed, Vaspurkan, Mush, Kar and Ahaltsik. Published diplomatic and military documents prompt that the strategy of Russia towards these territories and the Armenian and other Christian population living there was determined not only by the imperial interests for securing “stable borders,”<sup>59</sup> but also by the course of the war itself. And in 1828, as it is well-known, it went better for Russia on the Caucasian front. Logically, in some circles of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs gained popularity the idea to use “the current situation to obtain all sorts of benefits for the districts” under Russian control, by “attracting people from the newly conquered areas through peaceful means for voluntary resettlement to the Russian frontier territories of the Caucasus”. However, the forthcoming second campaign of 1829 and its financial funding, the problems with the establishment of the Armenians in Persia, the lack of vacant lands in Georgia and in the Armenian province, as well as Commander-in-chief General I. Paskevich’s sober view on the topic, were among the reasons which delayed “the hasty migration” of Christians from the Turkish Asian districts. Thus, in the beginning of February 1829 General Paskevich was given the right to determine, on his own, the scale of the migration by taking into account the “necessary political cautiousness as well as the local circumstances.”<sup>60</sup> It can

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<sup>57</sup> Присоединение Восточной Армении..., р. 463–466, doc. 255, р. 564–568, doc. 332.

<sup>58</sup> Присоединение Восточной Армении..., р. 481–483, doc. 271, р. 486, doc. 275, р. 487–488, doc. 277, р. 496–498, doc. 286; Внешняя политика России... Т. 7 (15), р. 554.

<sup>59</sup> Присоединение Восточной Армении..., р. 552–553, doc. 321; Внешняя политика России... Т. 8 (16), р. 48.

<sup>60</sup> Внешняя политика России... Т. 8 (16), р. 48, 87–88, 92; Хронологический указатель материалов для истории инородцев..., р. 19, 160.

only be added that at the same time, general Ivan Diebitsch, the other favorite of Emperor Nicholas I was appointed for Commander-in-chief at the Balkan theater of war with extensive powers, similar to those of General Pashkevich.

In order to complete the brief description of the Armenian migration in Russia, I will add a few more details about the steps made after the signing of the Peace Treaty of Adrianople. In October 1829 General Paskevich asked for official permission to organize the immigration of 10,000 Armenian volunteers' families, who despite the amnesty guaranteed by the treaty, were considered in danger of Turkish persecution. The General calculated that one million rubles in bank-notes should be sufficient for the purpose (grown wiser after the difficulties of the migration in 1828, now Paskevich stipulated for 25 silver rubles per family<sup>61</sup>). Emperor's answer was soon received through the commander of the Headquarters General Chernishev. Nicholas I allowed for "90,000 chervontsi" (a gold coin, costing 5 or 10 rubles) to be used for the Armenians' migration. This sum had been initially granted by the treasury for the recruitment of Kurds in Russian military service. There was also a proposal that a part of the Armenians who participated in the war would settle in the vicinity of the fortress of Ahaltsik in order to secure the new border.<sup>62</sup>

In December 1829 many Armenian families in the Turkish pashalics occupied by the Russian troops had already received their tickets for resettlement "in Georgia and other Russian territories". To meet their needs, General Paskevich, in his capacity of a Commander-in-chief of Georgia, set up a special Committee under the chairmanship of the Georgian governor Sergey S. Strekalov to supervise the immigrants' settling down at the new places.<sup>63</sup> In the summer of 1830, at the height of the emigration from the district of Erzerum (which coincided with the climax of Bulgarian migration), the Sublime Porte, worried about the economic, fiscal and demographic consequences for the affected provinces, started addressing complaints to the Russian government.<sup>64</sup>

But let us return to the Balkans and trace some significant steps of the Bulgarian mass migration in 1830. It affected the areas of the hostilities and especially the settlements along the Bulgarian Black Sea shore, Eastern Thrace (mainly the towns of Sliven, Yambol, Karnobat, Aytos, Kotel, Nova Zagora and the settlements in their vicinities, as well as the area of Edirne), Dobrudzha and the

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<sup>61</sup> It might be interesting to know that according to the account of the contemporaries, at the same time the monthly pay of a soldier in the Turkish irregular military forces at the Balkan theater of war was "around 16 Russian rubles." [Тепляков]. *Op. cit.*, p. 181.

<sup>62</sup> *Внешняя политика России...* Т. 8 (16), p. 357, 407.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 404, 437.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 552. Two years earlier Persia reacted similarly to the financial losses and "depopulation of Maraga, Salmas and Urmiya": *Внешняя политика России...* Т. 7 (15), p. 594–595, doc. 196. Ethnic resettlement undoubtedly affects the regions of origin for many decades to come. For an intriguing 21-century point of view on the topic, with valuable historical references, see: *Форест, Б. Новият път на коприната.* – *National Geographic – България.* 2010, Август, 51–77. [Forrest, Brett. *The New Silk Road. A railroad through the southern Caucasus will soon connect Europe and Asia, fueling dreams and discord in the region.* – *National Geographic*, 2010, August], See: <<http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2010/08/new-silk-road/forrest-text>> (Web. February 2012).

eastern part of the Bulgarian bank of the Danube. In July 1829 General Diebitsch undertook a move surprising to many – he passed the Balkan Mountains with two columns near the Black Sea coast. The manoeuvre was successful, albeit extremely risky – as the Russian Commander-in-chief had at his disposal no more than 37,000 people according to the most optimistic calculations.<sup>65</sup> In this difficult situation the successful advancing of the Russian army (which was shrinking because of the plague and cholera epidemics), was definitely facilitated by the volunteer detachment forces formed of local Christians (the same strategy was applied at the Asian theater of war). After May 1829 Emperor Nicholas I allowed the Commander-in-chief to equip the volunteer detachments with trophy Turkish arms. Considering the mass participation of Bulgarian population from some settlements in the hostilities during the last stage of the war, but also their taking part in plundering the property of those who had fled, it is easy to imagine the fears and the sentiments in favor of emigration to Russia even after the amnesty, which was proclaimed by the Sublime Porte and set forth in Clause XIII of the Peace Treaty of Adrianople.

In Russia, in this situation, the details of the impending migration were under discussion. On October 8, 1829, the Committee of Ministers passed a decision of interning the emigrants “from Rumelia” in Bessarabia, and the Minister of Internal Affairs was obliged to advance the issue.<sup>66</sup> Meanwhile, the leadership was undertaken by General Diebitsch, who organized Bulgarian migration committee. Under his supervision were the generals Rot (who would replace Diebitsch as a commander-in-chief of the Russian troops on the right bank of the Danube and retain the post until the troops’ final withdrawal), Obruchev, Vahten and a considerable number of military functionaries. They were engaged both in collecting data about the Bulgarians willing to resettle and in issuing special “migration tickets” on behalf of the commander-in-chief. In the beginning of February 1830, in the course of the preliminary arrangements for the migration, Diebitsch received special instructions from Nicholas I. The Emperor granted the right to settle in Russia mainly to those Christians who had participated in the war and had reasons to fear for their lives. However, he did consider an influx of poor emigrants from the Balkans in Russia undesirable. The instructions stated documents of migration to be issued only to those who could resettle “on their own expenses.”<sup>67</sup> Whether this order was observed strictly or not it is hard to prove; yet it was hardly accidental. General Diebitsch and his subordinates would spend the winter in the eastern Bulgarian districts of the Ottoman Empire. This would allow them to collect reli-

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<sup>65</sup> Пейчев, А. *Op. cit.*, 106–107; Шишов, А. Русские генерал-фельдмаршалы..., 88–100; Рачева, В. Отражението на руско-турската война от 1828–1829 г. и Одринският мир от 2 септември 1829 г. върху българите в Добруджа. – Във: *Времето на Левски*. Сб. статии. С., 2010, 20–28, 34–40.

<sup>66</sup> It must be specified that these measures concern the emigration during the spring and summer months of 1830. From September 1829, when the Peace Treaty of Adrianople was signed, through March 1830 only 2,399 people had resettled, according to the unpublished „Register of the number of the citizens of Rumelia, to whom passes are issued for resettlement in Besarabia.” See: Мещеряков, И. *Op. cit.*, 85–86, 137.

<sup>67</sup> Носкова, И. *Op. cit.*, p. 82.

able information about the material status of the Bulgarians in the Empire through the spring, when the withdrawal of the occupation army from the territories south of the Balkan had been scheduled. Not surprisingly, the first detailed lists of those who wished to resettle were prepared as early as February 1830. Apart from data about the number of the family members and their property status, they included also the men's professions.<sup>68</sup>

The information about the anticipated migration was dispatched by the Headquarters of the Commander-in-chief of the Balkans to a number of key figures in Russia directly involved with the decisions concerning the resettlement of the Bulgarians. Thus, in February 1830, the trustee of the Bulgarian colonies General Ivan Inzov recommended decreasing of the colonists' land shares from 60 to 50 tenths, a suggestion which was provoked by the lack of vacant state lands in the territories under his control. Inzov calculated that around 4,000 families could settle in Budzhak.<sup>69</sup> His proposal was approved by the Emperor. Moreover, measures were undertaken to decrease the land shares of the old colonists with 10 tenths and thus to provide more space for the new immigrants in the four colonists' districts.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> About the relative prosperity of the population in the southeastern Bulgarian lands back then, as well as for statistical information based on unpublished Russian archives regarding the social and economic characteristics of the 32,000 Bulgarian emigrants expected by February 1830, see: *Трайков, В., Н. Жечев*. *Op. cit.*, p. 83, 92, 95; *Мецерьук, И.* *Op. cit.*, p. 124, 172–175. A big part of the Bulgarians arrived in Bessarabia with property consisting of a considerable number of domestic animals, Ottoman currency, and various goods, imported over the border in accordance with the colonists' privileges not to pay duty or taxes. However, many of them had left their immovable property in their homeland and only few had managed to sell it at a fair price. It is interesting that the Russian authorities registered "not a few wealthy families" even among the emigrants who spent the winter in Bessarabia in temporary lodgings and did not settle, but started to return back to their homelands in 1831. This group included "families who possess a great quantity of live-stock, various movable property and carts for its transportation." Such examples give good reasons to the Soviet historian Ivan Meshteryuk to suggest that mostly "well-off emigrants" emigrated abroad: *Мецерьук, И.* *Op. cit.*, 183–184.

<sup>69</sup> The trustee of the Transdanubian colonists General Inzov and his subordinates initially did not have accurate information about the available vacant lands in the districts under their subordination, namely Kagulski, Prutski, Izmailski and Budzhashki districts, which had been populated with earlier Bulgarian colonists. One of the reasons was that many governmental offices and high-standing officials demonstrated involvement in the settling of the new immigrants, but their efforts lacked coordination. Reception and accommodation of the migrants was concentrated in the hands of the civil authorities of New Russia and Bessarabia districts, of the Trustee Committee for Foreign Settlers in Southern Russia, and of the trustee of the Transdanubian settlers in Bessarabia. The general management was carried out by the Committee of Ministers and by the Minister of Internal Affairs. However, the final success depended on "callous and indifferent officials from the central and local institutions." The measures taken for securing the necessary land shares resulted in acquisition of between 140,000 and 250,000 tenths of land, on which, in accordance with the new norm, around 5,000 newly arrived families could settle. In Bessarabia, however, the newcomers turned out to be around 7,000 families. A similar lack of accurate information regarding the amount of vacant lands became obvious in May 1830 when count Vorontsov asked the departments of the Tauric civil governor and the mayors in Crimea for a reference. An easy solution of this serious problem happened to be the permission for *temporary* settlement of the migrants on privately owned lands, in the estates of the big landowners. *Мецерьук, И.* *Op. cit.*, 102–103, 111, 131–133; *Носкова, И.*, *Op. cit.*, 86–87.

<sup>70</sup> *Хронологический указатель материалов для истории инородцев...*, 61–62; *Мецерьук, И.* *Op. cit.*, p. 90, n. 79, p. 111, n. 30, p. 133, 137.

The commanders of the Second army, preparing for the migration of “tens of thousands of people,” ordered the emigrants’ convoys guarded by Cossacks and disbanded volunteers, to head for several major border stations. Depending on the final destination, marked on the migration tickets, these were: Nikopol–Măgurele, Svishtov–Zimnicea, and most often Silistra–Călărași, Hârșova–Pioa Pietri, Măcin–Brăila, and then northwards to Galatz and Akerman. Among General Diebitsch’s greatest concerns, apart from the food supplies for the emigrants, which were managed by the commissariat, was the need to prevent epidemics among the troops returning to Russia. Thus, in April he had already urged on Vorontsov the necessity of sufficient control over the quarantine facilities as well as of supplying food to the emigrants during their stay at the stations.<sup>71</sup>

However, the General-Governor of Southern Russia chose to act upon logic very different from the considerations of the military officials. Well-known for his proverbial pursuit of economies, he supposed that “even at small cost and with less effort the diseases among the immigrants can be prevented, if those among them who are in need are provided with what is the most necessary.” It was decided to give aid only to the poor, and more specifically to those among them who wanted to settle as colonists-farmers in Budzhak. In most cases the townspeople among the migrants were refused any “monetary and food aid.” The treasury paid for the immigrants’ sojourn in the quarantine (which lasted from 15 to 45 days) 30 kopecks per adult and 15 per child “daily aid for food supplies.” Those who arrived in Russia “with tickets” signed by the Russian consuls or commanders did not receive any “state quarantine aid.”<sup>72</sup> In order to exchange the Turkish currency which immigrants brought with them, initially 15,000, and later 10,000 rubles more were given in disposition of the official Zolotarev. However, Vorontsov ordered him to exchange money only to the ones in need and in such amounts which would allow them to meet only their most urgent needs. Obeying this order, Zolotarev used for exchange only about half of the provided money. Thus, in the words of the expert in the problem Ivan Meshteryuk, the government undertook measures from the very beginning in order the immigrants “to manage without state material support.”<sup>73</sup> As a result of all this even wealthy Bulgarians fell into hardship and were not able to benefit from the Turkish money they brought, because the food suppliers at the army refused to accept these as a means of payment...

These data, issued by Ivan Meshteryuk on the grounds of his work in the Soviet archives, reflects the situation at the quarantine station Sotunovo in the peak of the Bulgarian migration in the spring and the summer of 1830. The same author makes an attempt based on incomplete data to calculate the total amount of the governmental aid, provided to the Bulgarians who arrived in Bessarabia. He grounds his estimate on the calculations of Samuel

<sup>71</sup> Трайков, В., Н. Жечев. *Op. cit.*, p. 88; Мещерюк, И. *Op. cit.*, p. 90, 96, 103.

<sup>72</sup> Носкова, И. *Op. cit.*, 85–86. For instance, the arrival of around 800 Bulgarians and Greeks “in very poor condition” was expected in the beginning of May 1830 in Akerman. To meet their most urgent needs and supply them with tents, flour, semolina (groats), and firewood, Vorontsov granted to the frontier and quarantine officials only 3,000 rubles. Мещерюк, И. *Op. cit.*, p. 107, 108–109, 154.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, 105–108, 115–116, 121.

Bernstein (Meshteryuk considers these to be “clearly lowered”), according to whom by the summer of 1831 the expenses “reached totally 65,000 rubles and 71,000 leva.” According to Meshteryuk, the sum was much bigger. For instance, according to a report by Vorontsov, the total amount of 95,754 rubles in bank-notes had been spent on 51,150 people between June 1, 1829 and September 29, 1830. But only 67,353 rubles were spent on food aid. The rest were spent on building and heating of quarantines, on support of officials and doctors, and on postal and other expenses. On the other hand, according to data from the Headquarters, foods costing 96,926 rubles were granted for food aid from the Bessarabian military stores. It seems that Meshteryuk just summed up the last two numbers and thus reached the conclusion that by the end of September 1830 the average sum of 2 rubles and 19 kopecks had been spent per each emigrant.<sup>74</sup> However, we should not forget that a part of the aid was raised from contributions by the old colonists. And also, that it was given as a loan at interest.<sup>75</sup> In the following months and years this last circumstance will be an impediment for the return to their homelands of those families who lacked the means to repay their debts...

I have focused on the financial aspect of the reception and accommodation of the Balkan migrants in 1830 mainly because I do not deem it inappropriate to assume that the allocated financial resource indicated the overall attitude of the Russian government and local authorities towards the Bulgarians. Moreover, I assume that the amount both of the allocated and of the practically realized financial support happened to be of crucial significance to the success (or failure) of the Bulgarian migration in Bessarabia. In this context it should be remembered that the actual contribution provided by the Peace Treaty of Adrianople and paid by the Sublime Porte to Russia was around 5 million Dutch ducats. I will make yet another comparison: on April 18, 1828 (i.e. four days after the announcement of the Russo-Turkish War) Emperor Nicholas I ordered a secret payment of the first gratuitous grant for Greece to Count Ioannis Kapodistrias, the first Greek president and former Russian Foreign Minister. The grant amounted to 1,500,000 rubles, paid in Spanish escudos. The second grant made at the end of March 1829 of the following year approached one million rubles.<sup>76</sup> At stake were the imperial interests of

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<sup>74</sup> Meshteryuk estimates the amount of money as insufficient and draws the conclusion that “all these kinds of aid were one of the means to keep the emigrants in Budzhak.” It should be also mentioned that in November 1830, because of the already critical situation for some of the emigrants and also because of the approaching famine in the winter due to poor crop, the state treasury urgently allocated new 100,000 rubles to Vorontsov for meeting the most urgent needs of those migrants who were scattered in temporary lodgings. Thus, according to one of the few authors who tried to calculate (though approximately) the expenses on the support of the migrants, the total sum allocated in Bessarabia through the end of 1830 was about 265,000 rubles. *Мещерюк, И.* Op. cit., p. 110, 127–128.

<sup>75</sup> *Манко, А.* Op. cit., p. 58; *Мещерюк, И.* Op. cit., p. 128.

<sup>76</sup> For information regarding the financial compensations paid by the Sublime Porte to Russia as well as how the contribution was spent by the Russian government see: *Внешняя политика России...* Т. 8 (16), p. 266–270, doc. 103, p. 601–602, n. 165. Detailed and interesting data about the financial expenses of Russia on the support of the Greek refugees after the outbreak of the Greek



Russia in the newly founded independent Greece; undoubtedly these interests were considered significant and supported accordingly.

But let us leave the financial aspects of the issue and eventually outline how the accommodation of Bulgarian migrants in the towns and villages of Bessarabia was put in practice. Basic instructions were prepared in April 1830 by General-governor Vorontsov. According to these, all migrants who after leaving the quarantine wished to pass under the control of the main custodian of the Transdanubian settlers General Inzov were accommodated according the colonists' decree of December 29, 1819, which provisions have already been commented on in this article. By July 1, 1830, all the vacant lands in the four Bulgarian colonists' districts were occupied. There settled totally 4,393 families of farmers and craftsmen, or around 27,000 people. Among these were also migrants from the towns of Sliven and Yambol, the majority of whom preferred to establish themselves in the only urban-type settlement in Bessarabia – Bolgrad. Official statistics show that in 1832 the newcomers in the town were 3,841 people, and thus the number of its citizens had increased more than four times.<sup>77</sup>

However, it is known that the Bessarabian quarantines continued accepting Bulgarian immigrants even through the end of August. So the rest of the migrants (the ones who for one reason or another were not admitted to or did not wish to be granted the status of colonists-farmers) were allowed, again in accordance with general Vorontsov's instructions from April 1830, to live in Bessarabia and in New Russia freely, "in accordance with the tickets issued by the Bessarabian civil governor" Sorokunski. No one had the right to collect taxes from them or to make them serve duties. These conditions, however, were valid temporarily until new directives have been issued. The Minister of Internal Affairs suggested that the colonists' privileges should also spread over the settlers outside the actual colonies. But for various reasons, among which not without importance were the private interests of big landowners from the area (some of whom were high state officials), the final decision was delayed, and a voluminous correspondence was formed on it. A good illustration of the dimensions of the problem is an imperial decree from July 4, 1830, which temporarily suspended the resettlement of Russian state peasants and terminated the distribution of lands in Bessarabia to private individuals until the situation of the emigrants from Rumelia was resolved.<sup>78</sup>

The situation required a "Commission for temporary management of the Rumelian and Bulgarian immigrants, interned on state lands in Bessarabia" to

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riot from 1821 to 1829 and about the repeated financing of the Greek president Kapodistrias and his administration see in: *Внешняя политика России...* Т. 7 (15), p. 506, 507, doc. 169, p. 550–551, doc. 183; *Внешняя политика России...* Т. 8 (16), p. 154–155, doc. 57, p. 578, n. 82, etc.

<sup>77</sup> *Мещеряк, И.* Op. cit., 103–105, 110–111, 133, 152–153, n. 159.

<sup>78</sup> Some clarity about the number of migrants whose status remained unsettled at that time is provided by a partial statistics from November, concerning the immigrants temporarily settled in state or private lands in Akermanski and Izmailski districts (no data about Banderski, Ogreevski, Yashki and Hotinski districts has been published). The statistics include more than 1,739 families, who possess 830 horses, 4,127 head of cattle, 10,941 sheep and goats. *Мещеряк, И.* Op. cit., p. 103, 113–114; *Челак, Е.* Op. cit., 124–125, 133, 175.

be founded, under the chairmanship of Colonel Harchevnikov. Harchevnikov was well aware of the problems of the migration from its very outset as he had been a subordinate of General Diebitsch. The Commission started its work in mid-September 1830, and functioned as an independent body with sessions in the town of Akerman. At the end of November 1830 the Commission was placed under the direct command of General Inzov.<sup>79</sup>

The commission was entitled to communicate all issues that concerned the settlers directly to the Bessarabian civil governor Sokorunski and to the New Russian and Bessarabian General-governor Vorontsov. Thus the local police and civil service officials were formally suspended from intervention in all matters concerning the migrants. The civil service and police officials had to refer to the Commission for any administrative or judicial interventions in the migrant's affairs. The commission's tasks were formulated according to instructions by Sorokunski, Inzov and the Corps commander Krasovski, and which were eventually sanctioned by Vorontsov. These tasks were restricted to the completion of the process of housing the migrants in either state or landowners' villages, as well as to the selection of sites for new settlements. Among the Commission's priorities was the determining of the settlers' needs and of the adequate aid to be given by the government. Although the food supplies were also among the major tasks of the Commission, for a long while Colonel Harchevnikov had no precise instructions on that issue. Not only do we lack information today, but it also appears that it had not been clear to Harchevnikov himself whether he was to help the immigrants who settled on the landowners' lands or in the cities, or just those who settled on state lands. It remains unknown, too, how he was supposed to treat the immigrants who considered their sojourn in Bessarabia as temporary and were planning to return to their homeland or to settle beyond the river Prut. The conditions in which the members of the Commission worked as well as the open or tacit opposition of the local authorities, represented significant impediments to the Commission's initiatives. Yet by November 16, 1830, lists of all temporarily settled migrants were completed; the needs of each family were determined as well as the professions the settlers intended to pursue. The migrants who settled in urban areas, however, remained out of the sight of the Commission.

Up to my knowledge, there is no comprehensive statistical data regarding the Bulgarian merchants and craftsmen who in 1830 requested to settle in the towns of Bessarabia. More data has been published and discussed concerning the merchants and craftsmen who immigrated in the Danubian principalities at the same time. After the war, the number of Bulgarian emigrants in the Vallachian capital Bucharest only exceeded 10,000. Of a special interest is the case of the Bulgarians

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<sup>79</sup> The immigrants who had remained in Bessarabia under the government of the Commission of Harchevnikov were transferred under jurisdiction of the colonists' department not earlier than the end of September 1831. Thus, the commission's formal abolition was on October 1, 1831, when its archives were handed in the office of the Chief custodian of foreign immigrants. Our comment on the commission's activities draws on the study of Ivan Meshteryuk: *Мещерюк, И.* Op. cit., p. 117, 119–123, 126, 130, 134, 154.

from the town of Sliven. Some of them, even though they reached the Russian border, decided not to enter Russia, but to settle instead in Brăila, Galatz, Giurgiu, Bucharest, Ploești, and even founded their own town – New Sliven (Nov Sliven, later Alexandria).<sup>80</sup>

Regardless of the lack of comprehensive information, scholars who have studied the migration of Bulgarians in Bessarabia in particular, state that in fact “around the half of all immigrants” used to be townspeople in their homeland. In the beginning of July 1830 the Russian government directed General-governor Vorontsov’s to facilitate the permanent settlement of this particular category of migrants. As a result, the merchants and the craftsmen were offered to settle freely in the towns, to benefit from considerable privileges, and to practice their professions independently from local corporative communities and urban authorities.<sup>81</sup> However, if fully put into practice, these privileges would have threatened to turn the newly arrived enterprising Balkan merchants and craftsmen into strong competitors of the local entrepreneurs. The latter circumstance was one of the reasons for the local authorities and district institutions’ delaying and sabotaging of the instructions. The professional guilds and the local urban community logically viewed the ten-year period of exemption of the newcomers from taxes and military service as the greatest source of concern; that is well illustrated and discussed extensively in the literature.<sup>82</sup>

From the preceding discussion it follows that there existed considerable reasons for the significant number of Bulgarians leaving Bessarabia in 1831 (and then through 1834, when the issuing of passports for the immigrants after the Treaty of Adrianople would cease<sup>83</sup>). Undoubtedly, crucial among those reasons were administrative issues and the lack of accommodations and initial support for the newcomers. Of no less importance, however, was the lack of natural resources and the consequent impossibility for the migrants’ families to procure some basic necessities. The requests for documents required for returning to the Ottoman Empire, the numbers of which were growing quickly in the early spring of 1831, were often backed up with complaints about the poor quality of the granted land, lack of conditions for stock-breeding, lack of water, lack of buildings for living and farming, as well as lack of building materials.

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<sup>80</sup> Кристианов, Ц., С. Маслев, И. Пенаков. *Op. cit.*, p. 110, 108, 111, 112; Табаков, С. *Опит за история на град Сливен. Т. 2. Общественополитически живот в Сливен и Сливенско. II изд. С.*, 2002, 109–175; Велики, К., В. Трайков. *Op. cit.*, 7–11, 15–17, 21–22, 37–45, 51–52, 60–61, etc.; Кирова, М. „Голямото преселение” от Сливенско през 1830 година – някои исторически проекции. – Във: Българската емиграция през Възраждането. Състав. Кр. Шарова. Сливен, 2003, 93–97.

<sup>81</sup> Манко, А. *Op. cit.*, p. 59; Мецерьук, И. *Op. cit.*, p. 149, 151, 157.

<sup>82</sup> Мецерьук, И. *Op. cit.*, 134–135, 150, 153–159, 161, etc.

<sup>83</sup> By 1835, when the measures undertaken by the Russian government seized the reverse migration to the principalities of Wallachia and Moldova and to the homelands in the Ottoman Empire, nearly 19,000 people had emigrated from Bessarabia. More see in: Трайков, В., Н. Жечев. *Op. cit.*, p. 100; Мецерьук, И. *Op. cit.*, 198–199. For information regarding the number, the territorial distribution, and the economic status of the immigrants “from beyond the Danube” who by 1832 still remained in Bessarabia, see: Станчев, М. *Op. cit.*, 31–35.

A careful study of the impact of the Bulgarian migration of 1830 on the community's collective memory is still to come. However, the outlines of the representation of the *Bulgarian* Bessarabia in one of the first public accounts of the events, which was published by an anonymous author in the Istanbul Bulgarian magazine "Български книжици" in April 1859, are quite telling. "When they came," the text reads, the Bulgarian "refugees" found the area "a barren desert" where "only wolves were howling". However, for "a few years ... the hard-working Bulgarians ... drove away the wolves..., and the bank became green with vines and gardens..., and in the wide fields sheep started to bleat," and the wind to bring "the voices of Bulgarian maidens" in the wild fields and desolate valleys.

#### INSTEAD OF A SUMMARY

What would have been the destiny of the thousands of Bulgarians who set off for Southern Russia in 1830, to Wallachia and Moldova, or settled in Dobrudzha and in towns along the Danube, if there had been no Clause XIII in the Peace Treaty of Adrianople, but instead the treaty had declared the division of the Ottoman Empire? Some say that in history there is no *if*. But others state that the questions we formulate might be more important than the answers discovered. Is the question about the possible future of those Bulgarians completely speculative, when during the Russian-Turkish War of 1828–1829 there was no lack of Russian projects for a fundamental resolution of the Oriental issue by the reorganization of the European part of the Ottoman Empire?

When discussing the potential consequences of the Russo-Turkish war for the Bulgarians, I would like to take into consideration the following fact. According to the records of the sessions of the "Special Committee on the Eastern Question", which was formed by Emperor Nicholas I just two days after the signing of the Peace Treaty of Adrianople, the aforementioned projects were considered the departing point for the decisions regarding the further policy towards the Ottoman Empire.<sup>84</sup> But the predetermined decisions of the Committee actually legitimize the Russian imperial policy to benefit from the preservation of the *weak neighbor* in the person of the unreformed Ottoman Empire.

Authors of the documents under discussion are experienced Russian diplomats and high-rank officials in the Asian department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Among those were the former Russian Foreign Minister and now President of the newly established Greece, count Ioannis Kapodistrias, a Greek by origin, the Corsican at Russian service and an ambassador in Paris at that time, count Pozzo di Borgo, and one of the few who were experts in the details of the Russian oriental policy, the secret adviser Dmitry V. Dashkov, who was also a confidant of Chancellor Carl Nesselrode.<sup>85</sup>

Reduced to the question of what should emerge in the Balkans in lieu of the collapsed Ottoman Empire, the contents of the projects can be summarized thus.

<sup>84</sup> Внешняя политика России... Т. 8 (16), p. 278–280, doc. 106, p. 285–287, doc. 107.

<sup>85</sup> The summary of these projects is in accordance with: Внешняя политика России... Т. 8 (16), p. 287–294, doc. 108.

The decision will clearly be a collective one of the Great Powers, but Russia must be master of the situation with an opportunity to “set the pace” of the discussions. In case of a *sudden* dissolution of the Sultan’s empire there are two possible variants: “division of the Ottoman territories among the big states, or their fragmentation in a few independent districts”. The latter variant appears more interesting to us. According to it, the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire would constitute five districts: Dacia (to cover Wallachia and Moldova), Serbia (which would annex Bosnia and Bulgaria), Macedonia (“under this name are understood the entire contemporary Rumelia and the islands in its possession”), Epirus (along with “Upper and Lower Albania”) and “the district of the Hellenes” (or Greece). It is clear that the *lack of a Bulgarian lobby* in the Russian Foreign Ministry is among the reasons no Bulgarian state is envisioned and the Bulgarian ethnic territories are divided mainly between two of the planned districts. In this reading of the pertinent history, the Bulgarian migration perhaps doesn’t appear only as an event of tragic proportions...