AUTHOR’S SYNTHESIS OF THE DISSERTATION

A MULTI-PROCESS COGNITIVE MODEL FOR INVESTIGATING TEXT AND DISCOURSE

(МНОГОПРОЦЕСЕН КОГНИТИВЕН МОДЕЛ ЗА ИЗСЛЕДВАНЕ НА ТЕКСТ И ДИСКУРС)

Scientific field: 2.1. Philology, German Languages (Text Linguistics and Discourse Analysis – English)

by

Nelly Todorova Tincheva-Georgieva

Sofia
2023
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

I. 1. The object of investigation

The point of departure for the thesis is what my experience, in both my capacities as a researcher and as a lecturer, would suggest to be a widespread and an ever-spreading academic need for tackling issues related to texts and discourses. More precisely, these issues relate to the analysis of texts and discourses. The issues prove not only numerous; they tend to associate with, generally, divergent, and, frequently, conflicting branches of linguistic, literary, discourse and cognitive studies. Thus, in most general terms, this thesis addresses the complexity of and the resulting difficulties in approaching analytically texts and discourses.

‘Approaching analytically’ is understood here as falling within two delineable, yet overlapping, domains: the domain of hands-on text and discourse analyses, and the domain of theoretical research on how to conduct hands-on text and discourse analyses. Both domains, clearly, associate with academic activities. This thesis is written in the hope of contributing – however modestly – to the advancement of both scholarly domains.

In doing so, however, the thesis focuses primarily on a third domain – the one of theoretical research on cognitive text and discourse construction. To gain insight into that, the thesis will need to draw on a fourth domain – the one relating to concepts such as TEXT and DISCOURSE. Admittedly, quite a percentage of language users manage to communicate efficiently enough without being aware of the existence of the concepts of TEXT and DISCOURSE. Nevertheless, the abstract nature of the two notions makes the actual – even if sometimes subconscious – use of texts and discourses a more complicated matter than, let us say, the actual use of BREAD, BUTTER, MILK, etc. Thus, the thesis aims to contribute to four overlapping domains and views the complexity inherent in text and discourse analysis as ensuing from cognitive peculiarities of the concepts of TEXT and DISCOURSE.
The two notions (i.e. TEXT and DISCOURSE) are approached here as resulting from cognitive processes and, consequently, as representing cognitive principles. With regard to the nature of the cognitive processes in question, it seems expedient that I highlight as early as this point that, the way they are interpreted in this thesis, cognitive text- and discourse-related processes can be but are not primarily – let alone exclusively – seen as language-related. Language-related processes represent only some of the multitude and varieties of cognitive processes involved in human communication.

On the issue of which general cognitive principles particularly are upheld here, this thesis opts to rest on the set of general cognitive linguistic principles originally laid out in Lakoff and Johnson (1999). However, several of the principles need to be paid special attention to in this introductory chapter as they represent cornerstones for the analysis in the thesis. They also condition the choice of method, data, and the structural organization of the thesis specified later in this chapter.

One of those basic principles holds that ‘surface’ linguistic expressions can be revealing as to ‘underlying’ cognitive structures and processes and, consequently, they can serve as an access point to the ‘underlying’ cognitive structures and processes (see, e.g., Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Langacker 2008; Barsalou et al. 2018; Panther 2022).

It is not that this directionality is considered here to be the actual one underlying the interrelation between cognitive processes and their linguistic expression(s). It is analytical considerations and practicality which dictate the choice to proceed from linguistic expressions to cognitive processes and not vice versa. In reality, it would be simultaneity which I take to characterize the operation of non-language-related cognitive processes and language-related cognitive processes, which control the use of language signals. The problem is that, despite some technological advances in dealing directly with cognitive processing, linguistic research at present can hardly rely on fully conclusive neurobiological data on all the numerous and
diverse linguistic foci of interest. Even if it could, cognitive linguistic research could still contribute by theorizing and hypothesizing about future foci of scholarly interest. One way it could do so is to start from linguistic signals of cognitive processes and then proceed to hypothesizing about ‘underlying’ cognitive mechanisms operating simultaneously.

As indicated above, the line of argumentation presented here maintains a distinction between language-related and non-language related cognitive processes. Language-related cognitive processes in particular are seen here as holding a potential to be coupled with physical linguistic expressions. Throughout this thesis, I will use ‘linguistic expressions’ and ‘language signals’ to refer to physical linguistic ‘carriers’ coupled with language-related cognitive processes.

Such a choice could evoke comparisons with Saussurean linguistics and, consequently, it could raise issues connected with the choice’s compatibility with principles of cognitivism. As is well-known, de Saussure postulated both the concept and the sound-image (i.e. the two elements of a linguistic sign) to be of psychological nature. Cognitivist Lakoff, on his part, quite similarly writes that “[s]trictly speaking, the sign does not refer to the world of reality but to our mental representation of reality” (1987: 168). Thus, de Saussure’s definition of the linguistic sign has led some (e.g. Reda 2016; Zhang and Zhang 2021) to argue that a number of de Saussurean premises are actually quite compatible with modern cognitive premises. De Beaugrande (1991: 15), discussing this contention of de Saussure’s, upholds de Saussure’s interpretation of the speaking-circuit as divided into psychological (i.e. word-images and concepts) and physiological (i.e. phonation and audition): speaking, both scholars, quite atypically, agree, involves ‘the physiological’, whereas language is exclusively ‘psychological’.

Admittedly, a single theoretical precept should not be extracted and considered in isolation but against the background of the scholar’s whole theoretical framework. Nevertheless, what is of value to the present thesis’ theoretical system is the very possibility to
differentiate between language-related cognitive processes and non-language-related cognitive processes.

With respect to the “interplay between linguistic and general cognitive domains” (Myachykov et al. 2007: 462), Jackendoff not only upholds the existence of linguistic cognitive domains and non-linguistic cognitive domains, but also maintains there exists a language-cognition interface, and that the interface is “localized” in the mapping between general cognitive domains and linguistic cognitive domains (Jackendoff 2007: 362). This thesis upholds a perspective suggesting a fuzzy-boundary ‘interface’ between language cognition and non-language cognition is very likely to be a more readily applicable conceptual metaphor than the discrete-boundaries conceptual metaphor imposed on research. In this claim, the present investigation follows closely Langacker’s line of reasoning that “[t]he cognition envisaged by cognitive linguists is non-insular, being grounded in perception and bodily experience” (Langacker 2008: 28).

Formulating the object of investigation as one associating with text- and discourse-related cognitive processes calls for clarification of the way the terms ‘text’ and ‘discourse’ are understood here. As any literature review will reveal, either term can evoke an array of interpretations of its corresponding concept, so much so that my saying the object of investigation of this thesis associates with TEXT and DISCOURSE may appear significantly uninformative. Due to their capacity to evoke numerous and varied interpretations of their corresponding concepts, ‘text’ and ‘discourse’ can be seen as designating too general and too all-encompassing notions. Although those too general and all-encompassing notions may overlap and may do so to varying degrees, a complete overlap between them is also possible (see Tincheva 2015).

To support my point, let me try and systematize some of the numerous interpretations of TEXT and DISCOURSE as well as trace the existing correlations between the two. What
can be observed throughout the relevant literature is that scholars tend to employ one of three main theoretical strategies. The first strategy is to employ analytically only one of the two terms. For example, de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981) and Halliday and Hasan (1976, 1985) use only ‘text’, while Sinclair and Coulthard (1975, 1977) use only ‘discourse’.

The second research strategy is to approach TEXT and DISCOURSE as opposites. In such cases (e.g., Stubbs 1983; Paltridge 2021; Virtanen 2022), TEXT tends to be postulated as written and DISCOURSE tends to be defined as oral. Another parameter along which the concepts of TEXT and DISCOURSE and their corresponding terms tend to diverge is form: according to this parameter ‘text’ tends to be seen as monologic, while ‘discourse’ – as dialogic (see, e.g., Fairclough 1989, 1992b, 2003). Frequently, those two lines of dissimilarity are taken to run in parallel: ‘text’ is considered as both written and monologic, while ‘discourse’ – as both oral and dialogic (see Virtanen 1990, 2022).

The third research strategy evident in the literature is for scholars to approach TEXT and DISCOURSE not as opposites but as two interrelated aspects pertaining to the same phenomenon. There are several observable subtypes within this approach. The first subtype sees TEXT as a verbal record of DISCOURSE, and DISCOURSE as language in use (e.g., Brown and Yule 1983; Paltridge 2013; Virtanen 2022). This is not the only version of the – let’s call it – ‘product vs. process’ approach.

Another one is found, for instance, in Fairclough (1989), where he additionally clarifies that TEXT should be interpreted as positioned ‘at the center’ of DISCOURSE (see the discussion in V.3.). In other words, to Fairclough, a DISCOURSE ‘surrounds’ and ‘envelopes’ a TEXT, and DISCOURSE is ‘bigger’ and ‘broader’ than its corresponding TEXT.

The second subtype of definitions of TEXT and DISCOURSE as two interrelated aspects of the same phenomenon is exemplified in van Dijk (1977), who maintains that a TEXT is an abstract concept which finds its actual realization in a DISCOURSE. In a fashion not far
removed, Stubbs (1983: 10) suggests that TEXT is to DISCOURSE as SENTENCE is to UTTERANCE. Halliday, practically, employs van Dijk’s principle, only he does so the other way around: Halliday defines DISCOURSE as the abstract notion and TEXT as the realization of discourse (1978: 40).

A last alternative which needs to be mentioned here concerns definitions of discourses (especially dialogic exchanges) as sequences of texts. De Beaugrande (1980: 19), for example, argues a discourse consists of texts, and investigates how the texts can be related to each other. Typically, in such interpretations, a participant’s contribution will be related to a discourse action/ discourse act. Virtanen (2022) even uses ‘textual discourse’ to refer to separate texts ‘within’ discourses.

Not only is there an abundance of academic classification strategies employed in the case of TEXT and DISCOURSE but none of the strategies and subtypes of strategies can be generalized to associate rigorously with any specific theoretical approach or discipline. For instance, as stated above, critical discourse analyst Fairclough (1989) and cognitive poetics theorist Stockwell (2008, 2020) both expound basically the same view of DISCOURSE as ‘surrounding’ and ‘enveloping’ TEXT. That adds substantially to what the impression of ‘a gray area’ around the two notions.

In my perspective, however, the considerable interpretative variety around the notions, which allows them to be situated against the background of various approaches, need not be seen as a negative. Instead, it could be viewed as confirmation of the rich conceptual structure and potential of TEXT and DISCOURSE. That rich conceptual structure is precisely what makes the two notions so promising from a cognitive analytical perspective even today. It is my belief that any related impression of ‘grayness’ and vagueness needs to be, in fact, seen as proof of the yet not fully explored malleability of the concepts of TEXT and DISCOURSE.
Targeted at this research niche, the thesis tries and contributes to explorations of TEXT and DISCOURSE. More specifically, the thesis tries and contributes to explorations of TEXT and DISCOURSE by concentrating on the cognitive mechanisms at work in people’s processing TEXT- and DISCOURSE-related information. As the general theoretical standpoint adopted here is highly procedural, the investigation will not lay emphasis on the ‘end product’ of cognitive processes (as discussed in Chapter IV), and the main focus of the thesis will fall on the isolation of the cognitive mechanisms which control TEXT and DISCOURSE related information.

In that, a cognitive mechanism will be seen in this thesis as functioning through one or more component cognitive operations such as image scanning, attention, selection, analogy, etc. A cognitive mechanism will be seen as a problem solving tool targeted at an organism’s surviving and employed in creating meaning(s).

Moreover, cognitive mechanisms and conceptual structure(s) will be perceived here as different from research techniques for studying cognitive mechanisms and conceptual structure(s). The primacy of the former over the latter and the dependence of the latter on the former, however, can hardly be denied. Therefore, attaining the main objective of this thesis is also seen as a prerequisite for further investigations which could establish correspondences between the cognitive mechanisms systematized here and specific research techniques via which the mechanisms could be studied.

I. 2. Research questions

The central hypothesis in the thesis is the existence of a set of cognitive mechanisms which operate simultaneously and coherently to control (a) concepts associating with TEXT and DISCOURSE, and (b) the procedural mental unfolding of actual texts and discourses.
The major point to be highlighted about the hypothesis is that it focuses on a whole set of cognitive mechanisms and not on a single mechanism. As the two chapters in Part I will demonstrate, with the notable exception of research on metaphoronomy, there has been a steady tendency throughout the literature to aim for the isolation of separate cognitive mechanisms (e.g. resemblance, analogy, conceptual metaphor) and not for their integration.

The thesis argues in favour of harmonizing principles from studies on conceptual figurativity, gestalt psychology, text-world theory and cognitive text linguistics. The thesis tries and provides a step towards achieving greater cross-fertilization in text- and discourse-oriented cognitive research. The thesis addresses the following research questions:

- Is there a set of cognitive mechanisms which controls the mental processing of TEXT, DISCOURSE and related concepts?
- Is there a set of cognitive mechanisms which controls the mental processing of actual texts and discourses? Is this set the same as the set of cognitive mechanisms, which controls TEXT, DISCOURSE and related concepts?
- Does the set operate as an internally-coherent entity with internal co-ordination and dynamics, or do the component cognitive mechanisms in it function independently?
- If the component cognitive mechanisms function as an internally coherent set, what tendencies can be traced in the set regarding the joint operation of the component mechanisms (i.e. are there observable tendencies in the set’s cognitive mechanisms’ co-functioning)?
- Can the presence of the set of cognitive mechanisms account for both academic and non-academic uses of texts and discourses as well as of uses of TEXT- and DISCOURSE-related notions (i.e. can they account for those uses by both people familiar with the notions as well as by laymen unfamiliar with the notions?).
I. 3. Approach, Method, Data

It can be taken for granted that cognitive studies of language and language use support the primacy of individual cognition over social cognition. However, Langacker emphasizes that “the dynamic nature of conceptual and grammatical structure leads us inexorably to the dynamics of discourse and social interaction” (Langacker 1999: 376).

In a similar vein, conceptual metaphorist Gibbs upholds views of human cognition and learning as “better understood in terms of the entire system (i.e., a person’s brain and body interacting with the world” (Gibbs 2022: 61). Above all, it is Cognitive ecologists such as Hutchins (2010) and Yu (2014) who address the complex functioning of the mind–brain–body system, in which “the body does not terminate with the fleshy boundary of the skin, but rather extends out into its environment that is at once physical, social, and cultural, engaging in all sorts of bodily and sociocultural interactions, so that the organism and environment are not independent” (Hutchins 2010: 706).

Thus, the thesis seeks to contribute, however modestly, to the scholarly understanding of “the rich ecology of minds in action” (Gibbs 2022: 65). As a consequence, the thesis can draw for some of its research techniques and instruments on sociolinguistic investigations. It also accords with cognitive studies which rely on statistical data obtained from real language users. In brief, verifying a hypothesis such as the one formulated in this thesis requires interdisciplinary, problem-oriented, adaptive research instruments be employed. As a result, hybridization of quantitative and qualitative methods is the analytical option preferred in the thesis. Each chapter, in its focusing on a specific topic and on a specific facet of our object of investigation, opts for either a qualitative or a quantitative method; each chapter discusses its choice of method separately.

That principle also applies to choice of data analyzed in each chapter. A chapter may draw its conclusions from a (systematic or scoping) literature review, and, thus, use existing
research on a general topic as a dataset. Clearly, such a chapter will provide meta-analysis on a theoretical topic, and, depending on the type of review, it can conduct the analysis either qualitatively or quantitatively. Alternatively, a chapter may draw its conclusions from a dataset of texts, which, again, can be achieved either qualitatively or quantitatively. Another alternative is for a chapter to employ data obtained from real language users, which would typically entail quantitative analysis be conducted. All three options are employed throughout the thesis in dependence with the current topic and/or facet of the object of investigation.

I. 4. Organization of the chapters in the thesis

The thesis includes nine chapters organized into three parts.

**Part I** starts after the introductory **Chapter I** and is dedicated to the isolation of cognitive mechanisms as candidates for inclusion in the hypothesized multi-process model. Those mechanisms, in most general terms, operate simultaneously in people’s processing text- and discourse-related information. **Part I** includes two chapters.

**Chapter II** employs inductive procedures with a view of isolating cognitive mechanisms controlling conceptualizations and uses of the concept of POLITICAL SPEECHES. It focuses on perceptions of multi-functionality typically attached to a POLITICAL SPEECH.

**Chapter III** studies the notion of TEXT STRUCTURE and its numerous scholarly interpretations. The chapter’s main aim is to verify or refute the cognitive mechanisms selected (in Chapter II) for inclusion in the hypothesized multi-process model

**Part II** situates the multi-process set of cognitive mechanisms within the relevant theoretical literature. **Part II** includes two chapters.

**Chapter IV** points the potential position of the model within Text Linguistics.
Chapter V points the potential position of the model within Discourse Analysis. Additionally, both Chapter IV and Chapter V demonstrate the feasibility of applying the multi-process cognitive model proposed in this thesis to the branches and approaches constituting present-day Text Linguistics and Discourse Analysis.

Part III elaborates on the multi-process cognitive model proposed by tracing its operation within a variety of domains. Above all, this part centers round the cognitive notion of ‘Real Worlds’ proposed in the thesis and argued to perform a key function in text- and discourse-related analyses. Part III includes three chapters.

Chapter VI focuses on the theoretical distinction between gestalt psychology’s notion of ‘background’, Text World Theory’s notion of ‘Discourse World’, and language-use-related theoretical interpretations of ‘context’.

Chapter VII focuses on ‘Brexit’ as a notion displaying an atypical transition from Text and Discourse Worlds into Real Worlds.

Chapter VIII focuses on the genre of Facebook posts, which is seen as one transitioning from Discourse Worlds into Real Worlds.

In all the chapters in Part III, it is the mechanisms from the multi-process model proposed in this thesis which are employed in the explanation of the cognitive and social phenomena in question.

Chapter IX provides a conclusion by summarizing the main contributions of the eight previous chapters. It relates the contributions to the research questions and the objectives of the thesis formulated in the introductory Chapter I.

The thesis ends with a Bibliography.
PART ONE
CHAPTER II. EXTRACTING THE MODEL

The point of departure for this chapter is a previous investigation I conducted, which focuses on, arguably, the earliest registered object of text- and discourse-centered analysis (van Dijk 1997: 12), namely political speeches.

As is well-known, in Classical Rhetoric times, aiming to account for the effectiveness of a political speech, Aristotle (1991, trans. Kennedy) listed the components a speech needs to include. Within the boundaries of these main segments, Aristotle determined the ‘proper’ places for the speaker to reject conflicting arguments, to refute opponents’ reasoning, to attack and counterattack the opponents themselves, to clear potential ambiguity, to assert oneself, to refer to similar previous cases and issues, etc. Focuses on the interpersonal function(s) each speech segment should perform. I say ‘most of his analysis’ as the functions of ‘recapitulating the main points of the speech’ and ‘referring to previous issues’, for instance, could not be subsumed under the ‘interpersonal function’ category. A second generalization that calls for attention is that, in this kind of analysis, each function is meant to associate with a separate text segment.

Not unlike Classical Rhetoric studies, modern-day investigations also display an interest in political speeches as “structured verbal chains of coherent speech acts” (Reisigl 2008: 243). In other words, they also tend to see a political speech as a sequence of structural segments, with each segment dedicated to performing a specific ‘communicative action’. Additionally, they tend to associate a ‘rhetorical strategy’ (which they tend to treat synonymously with a ‘communicative action’, or an ‘interpersonal function’; on the cognitive conflation of ‘action’ and ‘function’ see Chapter VIII) with specific linguistic expressions, or ‘rhetoric structures’ (as in, e.g., Charteris-Black 2005).

The need for explorations of textual multi-functionality has been advocated by Fairclough and Fairclough (2015: 187). In a similar vein, Miller (1984) and Cillia and Wodak
(2005) argue that politics involves reconciling interpersonal differences through discussion and persuasion, and that, as a consequence, politics is highly dependent on communicative practices such as discussing, persuading and bargaining. Unfortunately, Miller (1984) continues, the high degree of conflation between political actions and communicative actions makes them extremely hard to delimit.

This chapter isolates the cognitive mechanisms which need to be accounted for in order for both the chapter’s objectives and the whole thesis’ objectives to be attained. In other words, the chapter’s analytical progression is targeted at isolating the cognitive mechanisms which constitute the hypothesized theoretical model and which operate simultaneously to control conceptualizations and uses of political speeches as multi-functional phenomena.

The first step involves acquiring data from actual language users. On the basis of generalizations of that data, relevant cognitive mechanisms will be ‘extracted’ and, as a second analytical step, the presence of each cognitive mechanism will be tested against a dataset of political speeches. The dataset includes 50 speeches by British and American politicians delivered within the span of the last 80 years. The speeches cover a wide range of topics, speaker’s political orientations and audience profiles. The dataset is also the source of the sample texts included here.

The two questionnaire-based studies I conducted are separated by a decade. In 2009, Study 1 (Tincheva 2013, 2015) had 100 university students complete a questionnaire, which was intended to distinguish political speeches from other political discourse genres such as disputes, interviews and newscasts. In 2019, Study 2 (unpublished) aimed to replicate the original survey but it also included two questions concerning non-political genres.

Study 1 finds that, when asked to define a political speech, the respondents prototypically characterize it as (1) a monologic text (2) delivered orally (3) by a politician (4) before ‘ordinary citizens’. The respondents would classify a text as a political speech even if it
was delivered by a politician before other politicians, but they were reluctant to do so, if the text was delivered by a non-politician before other non-politicians. Perhaps interestingly, the respondents felt the necessity to introduce the parameter of ‘topic’ of the speech only when they had to decide about atypical cases such as the last one mentioned above. Moreover, even in case they believed the topic to be ‘political’, that was not enough for as many as 92% to classify a text as a political speech, when it was delivered by a non-politician before other non-politicians. Defining a ‘political’ topic, the respondents characterize it as having to do with an unresolved (social) issue or with a situation in which there is something (socially) problematic. The respondents’ answers vary as to the domain of activity the situation associates with. For example, both a speech about economic problems and a speech about political ethics can be seen as ‘being about’ a political topic.

Study 1’s results can be generalized to demonstrate that, when classifying a text as a political speech, people almost exclusively base their decisions on contextual parameters such as who the speaker is, who the audience are what both the speaker’s and the audience’s social status is. The topic occupies a distant second place in terms of importance, while language-related peculiarities such as overall structure or rhetoric devices are rarely listed as significant by the participants in their deciding on what a political speech is.

With respect to the objectives of this thesis, Study 1’s results strongly suggest our set of cognitive mechanisms needs to be able to account for both contextual as well as for textual peculiarities. Likely candidates are mechanisms related to Discourse World building (which could account for how participant information is processed) and Text World creation (which could account for how topic information is processed).

Study 2, which took place 10 years after Study 1 and replicated it, intended to register existing generational differences in attitudes toward the genre of political speeches, if any. The three main conclusions from Study 1 remain still valid in Study 2 (although they vary in terms
of degrees): first, contextual parameters related to speaker and audience are the most important factors in respondents’ definitions of a political speech; second, the topic of the speech occupies second position in terms of importance; third, linguistic peculiarities and rhetoric devices are of little significance in respondents’ definitions of a political speech.

There are three cognitive peculiarities the chapter tries and accounts for: (a) the need for the text of a political speech to be about speaker and listeners ‘passing through’ a common socio-political issue, (b) the expectation for the speech to be delivered by a politician who, in real-life, is seen as ‘leading’ society ‘through’ the socio-political issue, and (c) the salience of the contextual parameters in (a) over the textual ones in (b). Thus, three main candidates for inclusion in our set of cognitive mechanisms are isolated on the basis of the two studies conducted.

Cognitive research (e.g. Langacker 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Lakoff 2007) rejects basic principles of classical categorization such as clear boundaries between categories (i.e. boundaries without border-line cases or fuzziness), shared properties (i.e. obligatory conditions for category membership), ‘checklist’ uniformity among all members of a category, inflexibility of category boundaries, objective conditions for category membership, etc. Mental imagery, bodily experiences and socio-cultural factors, her studies reveal, control human categorization. Hence a crucial role in the analysis here is played by the assumption that there exists culturally-conditioned and, consequently, statistically verifiable agreement among the members of a culture about the best example of a category. Every category in this investigation (e.g. POLITICAL SPEECHES, TEXT STRUCTURE, TEXT, DISCOURSE, TEXT TYPE, CONTEXT, GENRE, BREXIT, FACEBOOK POST) is expected to display prototype effects. No category is expected to be cognitively delimited from neighboring categories (e.g. TEXT from DISCOURSE) by rigid boundaries. Instead, fuzzy boundaries among categories are expected to be operational.
Cognitive mechanisms: Conceptual metaphor

The participants’ responses in Study 1 and Study 2, and especially the participants’ perceptions of MOVEMENT through a political speech, strongly suggest the relevance of research on fictive motion to the present investigation. As is well-known, ever since Lakoff and Johnson started exploring metaphor (1980), it has been viewed as a major cognitive mechanism and not simply as a matter of surface linguistic flourishes. More specifically, metaphor has been redefined as transfer from a conceptual source domain to a conceptual target domain.

In this respect, a prominent example discussed in the chapter is the one simulating POLITICAL GOALS as DESTINATIONS. According to this example, INITIAL STATES in which the goal is not attained are understood as STARTING POINTS and DESIRED STATES are understood as END POINTS in MOTION. What stands in the middle – the trajectory linking the INITIAL POINT to the END one – will be forever interpreted as a POLITICAL PATH along which it is possible to reach the POLITICAL GOAL (Tincheva 2012). Nothing, it should be noted, in the objective nature of any political issue requires that it be thought of as the end point of movement. Purposeful motion, freed from human conceptualization and metaphoric mappings, is not objectively analogical to human political behavior. It is conditioned by the nature of our bodily – sensimotor – perceptions.

An all-important example of a complex metaphor is A PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY (Grady et al. 1997, 1999), which pre-defines ‘good’ behavior and castigates a person as ‘lost’, ‘without direction’ and not knowing ‘which way to turn’, if that person does not impose a sense of purpose on their life. This complex metaphor, which operates extremely powerfully on a daily basis:

A PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY.
A PERSON LIVING A LIFE IS A TRAVELER.
LIFE GOALS ARE DESTINATIONS.
A LIFE PLAN IS AN ITINERARY. (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 61; also Lakoff 2014)

As far as the object of investigation in this chapter is concerned (with the chapter focusing on conceptualizations of POLITICAL SPEECHES), it has to be admitted that, despite the enormity and variety of the research branches cited above, CMT is not finely tuned to the needs of an investigation of conceptualization. CMT has displayed an emphatic preference for tackling categorization processes and not conceptualization ones. The first one concerns the possibility for isolating conceptual metaphor manifestations as actual, in-text occurrences, and that is the major trend explored throughout the literature. Lakoff’s second major premise, however, the one implying recursive conceptual-metaphoric use creates (perceptions of) ‘stable’ metaphor-deriving concepts, has not attracted equally abundant interest (Bolognesi and Vernillo 2019). Overall, it seems safe to argue that out of the two simultaneous processes of conceptualization and categorization (conceptualization being directed at the internal structure of a concept, and categorization – at situating the concept within the already internalized conceptual network of the individual), it is only categorization that has found its rightful place in CMT literature so far.

Unfortunately, a cognitive (re-)interpretation of the concept of POLITICAL SPEECH would unambiguously require focusing on the processes of its metaphoric conceptualization in particular. POLITICAL SPEECH is of low cognitive degree of granularity (term as in Langacker 2008), i.e. it is a general concept; it is also an abstract concept, which, as Bolognesi and Vernillo (2019) demonstrate, makes its very emergence unavoidably metaphoric.

One image schema of special significance to POLITICAL SPEECHES is the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL one. Previous analysis I conducted on the speeches in the dataset (Tincheva 2015) confirms the hypothesized conceptual transfer from the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL image schema. The linguistic signals used in the speeches indicate that the mapping from the three-part image schema results in an INITIAL STATE – STEPS – DESIRED STATE cognitive
structure, which displays the following internal organization in each of its three segments (ibid.):

INITIAL STATE (containing slot: leader, slot: followers, slot: unresolved social issue/social task; slot: time, slot: place)

↓

PATH (containing slot: leader, slot: followers, slot: activity/sequence of activities)

↓

DESIRED STATE (containing slot: leader, slot: followers, slot: resolved social issue/fulfilled task, slot: time, slot: place)

To generalize, the analysis of the political speeches in the dataset confirms the conclusions drawn from the two questionnaire studies, and, more specifically, the conclusion that, while processing the text of a political speech, the audience set up INITIAL STATE, STEPS and DESIRED STATE cognitive segments and organize the whole text of the speech by mapping these three parts of the cognitive structure onto what they hear or read. Thus, the audience expect a political speech to project a PATH of the ideas of the politician as to how a social problem should or could be solved. The audience expect to be GUIDED or LED along that PATH through TIME and SPACE, and STEP by STEP. The PATH is hypothetical and, arguably, a political speech is successful, if it evokes convincing or desired images for the audience.

Furthermore, the presence (or absence) of all the parts of the INITIAL STATE – STEPS – DESIRED STATES structure is highly likely to be what gives text receivers a ‘sense’ of the speech being complete (or incomplete). As scholars belong within the category of text receivers, INITIAL STATE – STEPS – DESIRED STATE can also be argued to be the cognitive structure controlling scholars’ perceptions of textual segments (such as Introduction, Body, Conclusion, or the Aristotelian rhetoric structural organization discussed in the introductory section of this
chapter). The mere activation of INITIAL STATE – STEPS – DESIRED STATE, however, could not account for scholarly perceptions of simultaneity in the operation of interpersonal functions and ‘speech act sequences’ (also discussed in the introductory section of this chapter).

Another major point to emphasize is that, as already mentioned above, some political speech segments (especially, although not exclusively, segments related to STEPS and DESIRED STATE) do not explicate the TIME and PLACE at which the speech is delivered but, instead, they explicate time(s) and place(s) related to past situations. In contrast, INITIAL STATE does tend to explicate (although also not exclusively) the TIME and PLACE at which the speech is delivered. As a result, what we are dealing with is a mixture of time and place references and the resulting cognitive construction of a series of spatio-temporally defined EVENTS and SITUATIONS which all relate to the cognitive construction of a political PATH. Crucially, only one or some of those EVENTS and SITUATIONS is the one of the actually happening communicative exchange surrounding the actual political speech.

This can be seen as a case of double mapping of the same SOURCE – PATH – GOAL image schema, with the first mapping taking place in the first cognitive space and controlling people’s expectations for a POLITICAL SPEECH ‘to be about’ a political ‘leader’ and a leader’s ‘followers’ ‘passing through’ a common socio-political issue (as evident in Studies 1 and 2). The second mapping, in the second cognitive space, proves to control people’s expectations for a political speech to be delivered by a speaker of higher social standing who talks to their audience so that the communicative exchange can be seen as a STEP along the general political PATH (as also evident in Studies 1 and 2). Perhaps surprisingly, the participants’ responses in the two studies strongly suggest it is the second mapping, taking place in the second cognitive space, that is more salient in the case of the genre of political speeches.

To differentiate in principle between the two kinds of what I have so far been calling – rather generically – ‘cognitive spaces’ and to be able to trace specifics of the operation of the
double mappings within those cognitive spaces, the chapter introduces another set of theoretical premises and harmonize those with CMT, namely premises from Text World Theory.

**Cognitive mechanisms: World creation**

The chapter draws on both de Beaugrande and Dressler’s (1981) and Werth’s (1999: 20) acknowledgement that they borrow the very term of ‘TW’ from van Dijk (1977). The chapter, however, focuses on some differences in the two approaches to TWs. For instance, de Beaugrande and Dressler’s TW is not about ‘true’ or ‘false’ renditions of reality. Their idea of a World in general bears little resemblance to the philosophical or logics notion of ‘possible worlds’ and ‘actual worlds’ (e.g. Kripke 1963; Lewis 1977) Reality, in de Beaugrande and Dressler’s viewpoint, is a conventionalized version of it that is generally considered valid by a society or a culture. As a consequence, a TW may or may not cohere with this socially and culturally accepted version of what reality is. Text World Theory (e.g. Gavins 2007; Whiteley 2011), nor Cognitive poetics (e.g. Semino and Culpeper 2002; Stockwell 2002/2020) inherited de Beaugrande and Dressler’s TW-related premises. Instead, Text World Theory and Cognitive Poetics emerged from Werth’s works (1999)

A TW, from Werth’s (1999: 87) point of view, is a “situation distinct from the immediate one of the language event”; more precisely, it is “the ‘story’ which is the subject of the discourse, together with all the structure necessary to understand it”. Moreover, Werth’s TW is a mental space ‘populated’ by PEOPLE and OBJECTS which are constructed as CHARACTERS in the ‘world’. PARTICIPANTS in the communicative exchange (i.e. TEXT PRODUCER and TEXT RECEIVER) in their turn can become elements in another World – a DW, which in its turn is defined by Werth [1999: 83] as “the situational context surrounding the speech event itself”. In other words, while a TW contains PEOPLE and OBJECTS as CHARACTERS, a DW contains communicative exchange PARTICIPANTS (1999: 83).
Crucially, to Werth, a TW and its corresponding DW may coincide, when PARTICIPANTS in a DW come to be simultaneously constructed as CHARACTERS in its corresponding TW (1999: 86). Such instances, Werth argues, could be interpreted as “discourses about the discourse world itself” (ibid.).

As far as the very nature of TWs and DWs is concerned, the following rationale is adopted in the thesis and it is meant to enable the present research in its drawing more systematic parallels between TWs and DWs:

[...] human information processing and exchange, of which textual communication is part, might not be dealing directly with an objective reality. The critical shift of angle is that textual communication – like any other human activity – has to do directly only with mental simulations of an objective reality and not directly with reality itself. Human-specific information processing mechanisms invariably stand as the mediator between the two. (Tincheva 2021: 7)

The rationale behind this choice is that, if adopted, the premise could help us interpret the two conceptual entities (i.e. a TW and a DW) as sharing the same ontological status. Correspondingly, the chapter avoids metaphorizing WORLDS as LEVELS, which tends to be done (in, e.g., Stockwell [2002] and Gavins [2007]), where hierarchies between DWs and TWs as well as between text- and sub-worlds are postulated. To the best of my knowledge, as of today, there has been no sound neurobiological confirmation of levels’ actual operation; neither has there been prevailing neurobiologically-supported consent on the issue of how accessibility between Worlds actually takes place.

Generally, as conditioned by Johnson’s crucial realization (acknowledged in Lakoff 1987), all human understanding depends on the nature of the human body, on the firing of neurons in our brains, and on our innate perceptual capacities and motor skills. A claim such as this derives from the theory of embodied realism (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999), according to which our bodily experience is what gives rise to and then controls our linguistic and social functioning. As a consequence, any human image, model, or – in our case – World is, by
definition and by electro-neuro-physiological necessity, a simulation of reality (or some part of it). In other words, human data processing is bound to be only interpretative.

A confirmation of the interpretative character of World-related cognitive processes, the chapter argues, is the existence of ambiguity as to the scope of a DW (scope variation is discussed in Chapters III, VII and VIII). The example analyzed in the thesis is that of a parliamentary political speech. Such a speech may be delivered within the physical limits of a parliament chamber, but it may also be simultaneously broadcast to audiences far away from the actual physical environment of the person delivering it. Thus, to the person delivering it, the political speech’s DW may only employ cognitive constructs of MPs as LISTENERS; alternatively, it may include cognitive constructs of MPs, SENIOR CITIZENS FROM LARGE CITIES, COUNTRYSIDE TV VIEWERS, YOUNG MOTHERS, etc. Furthermore, such a speech may be recorded and aired later, which would also introduce changes to its DW. In this case, the changes would not be in terms of location but of time. The existence of these alternatives could be interpreted as the existence of a narrower or broader DW scope for the same text. In essence, such issues concern the interplay between a DW and reality. The first question here is how far a DW can extend ‘into reality’. The second and, from my perspective, more important question is where a DW ‘extends’.

A most significant point of this chapter, as well as of the whole thesis, is my interpretation of the difference between ‘a RW’ and ‘reality’. The first point is that my interpretation relies on the principles of cognition, therefore it does not approach ‘reality’ as referring to a fully describable and fully analyzable phenomenon which stands independent of human understanding and needs to be fully matched or perfectly represented by human cognitive structures and human academic theories. My interpretation approaches ‘reality’ simply as a describable and analyzable phenomenon (though not fully so) which does stand outside human minds and of which human cognition can (and needs to) create simulations. In
turn, a RW is the human cognitive interpretation/simulation of what ‘reality’ may be. A perfect fit between the two, I believe, is not needed as humans can and do manage to function on no more than ‘sufficient’ fits between reality and their RWs.

This discrepancy between a viewpoint on ‘reality’ as fully amenable to human representation and ‘reality’ as no more than something sufficiently well simulated by human cognition can trigger a significant blur of theoretical and analytical focus. What can remain outside our lens is the important assumption that human information processing and exchange, of which textual communication is part, might not be dealing directly with an objective reality. The critical shift of angle is that textual communication – like any other human activity – has to do directly only with mental simulations of an objective reality and not directly with reality itself. Human-specific information processing mechanisms invariably stand as the mediator between the two. It is my conviction that a theoretically sound approach could only benefit from taking this into account. What seems much more attainable for linguists, as humans, is the study of the human version, i.e. the human interpretation, of the (possibly) objective reality. No matter how opaque, principles of human mental modelling and simulation still appear to be more accessible for us than the reality they serve to interpret. Perceptions of objectivity, on their part, are most likely brought into effect through high frequencies of occurrence of similar human-nature-conditioned mental interpretations.

The principle of World overlap can also explain why, in the case of political speeches, delimiting communicative interpersonal functions (which associate with a DW) from political, non-communicative functions (which associate with a RW) has been found so hard (as discussed in the Introductory section above).

Achieving that is not a straightforward task as there are a multitude of possibilities pertaining to how conceptual metaphor and Worlds’ co-existence could function simultaneously in political speeches. As the dataset samples included demonstrate, there can be
delineated two mechanisms of World operation: World sequencing (in cases where there is no ambiguity as to which World is currently being evoked) and World overlapping (in cases where there is ambiguity as to which World is currently being evoked).

World sequencing, the speeches in the dataset reveal, can take place in one or more of the INITIAL STATE, STEPS, DESIRED STATE parts. For example, INITIAL STATE may concentrate on the current DW EVENT or SITUATION, then STEPS and DESIRED STATE may evoke the construction of hypothetical future TW EVENTS or SITUATIONS. However, as the dataset Samples included above also demonstrate, there exists World sequencing within the boundaries of a single one of the three parts (i.e. within an INITIAL STATE, within a STEP, or within a DESIRED STATE).

**Cognitive mechanisms: Gestalt psychology’s profiling shifts**

Profiling, as proposed by Rubin (1921), derives from gestalt perception principles (Koffka 1935; Wertheimer 1938); it is a very general feature of cognition (Langacker 2008: 58) and concerns mental operations performed in distinguishing between a figure and its background. The very label of ‘figure and background’ may be little else but a metaphorical expression (Langacker 2008: 58). Nevertheless, the mechanism itself should be emphasized as fundamentally experiential.

Another result from the human cognitive incapacity to work with uninterrupted information flow is the need to isolate and bring into focus one gestalt, while suppressing another or other gestalts to the background. The principle is probably best illustrated by the so-called Rubin’s vase seen in Fig. 2:
Such shifts in profiling can occur an unlimited number of times. As the next section will demonstrate, this principle of profile switching, or profile shifting, can operate from one text segment to another as well, and thus create a sense of MOVEMENT through a text.

As the main assumption here is that two types of World (e.g. a TW and a DW) not only can be seen as functioning through the cognitive mechanism of profiling shifts but they need to be seen that way, it seems also necessary to assume that no TW can exist without the background of a DW and vice versa. To verify these assumptions, I sought linguistic evidence in the political speeches in our dataset. While the mechanism of profiling functions dynamically through DW and TW consecutive switches, the process is signalled by linguistic items and structures. Simply put, linguistic expressions are taken here to be indicators of which World is currently being profiled and which World is being suppressed as background. Linguistic signals, thus, are taken to help a text receiver ‘figure out’ either what the text ‘is about’. As evident from the analysis of the samples in the previous sections, linguistic signals employed to indicate the profiling of a DW could be, for example, deictic items such as now and here. Clearly, when here is used, a DW is expected to be brought to the fore, and its corresponding TW is expected to be suppressed to the background.

In brief, Chapter II isolates the following co-functioning cognitive mechanisms, which are very strong candidates for inclusion in our multi-process set:

✓ Conceptual metaphor
✓ World construction
✓ World overlapping
✓ World profiling shifts

The next chapter in Part I – Chapter III – seeks verification of the presence of these mechanisms in the set.
CHAPTER III. VERIFYING THE MODEL

The point of departure in Chapter III is the fact that interest in text- and discourse use originated in Classical Rhetorical times as an interest in (political speech) text segments’ organization correlated with text segment functions. As any literature survey will reveal, present-day studies avoid returning directly to the thousands-of-years old concept of TEXT STRUCTURE, presumably because it tends to be considered a dated and already exhausted area of research. Instead, present-day studies tend to focus on notions such as NARRATIVE STRUCTURE or RHETORICAL STRUCTURE (see e.g. Fludernik 2002; Herman 2009, 2018; Herman et al. 2012; Krieken et al. 2016; Richardson 2019; Cohn 2019). The problem is that, as any literature survey will also reveal, there is a scarcity of scholarly works which overtly address the question of how precisely TEXT STRUCTURE, NARRATIVE STRUCTURE, RHETORICAL STRUCTURE, etc. compare and differ. As a consequence, scholars investigating TEXT STRUCTURE, NARRATIVE STRUCTURE, or RHETORICAL STRUCTURE may face difficulties when pinpointing the connection between their object of investigation and the correct term to express that specific object. Another consequence is the confusion they may experience concerning the specific theoretical background against which their object of investigation could be placed. The situation could be further aggravated by the existing calls for a much-needed integration of the studies on the structure of whole texts (Phelan 1996; Herman 2009, 2018; Fludernik 2010).

Thus, the present investigation focuses on the terminological and conceptual diversity surrounding what I will be calling here WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE. To provide a stepping stone for the theoretical generalizations in this chapter, first a dataset is compiled. Next, content analysis is conducted on the dataset. The results obtained from the analysis are then placed within the perspective of verifying or refuting the presence of the cognitive processes hypothesized to be part of our multi-process model.
As my aim in the present chapter is to establish how WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE is conceptualized and how TEXT STRUCTURE, NARRATIVE STRUCTURE, RHETORICAL STRUCTURE, etc. compare and differ, it seems apt that I first isolate and systematize WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE interpretations and the existing terms throughout the relevant literature. To achieve that, mapping out the scope and nature of the body of literature in the topic area seems a mandatory step. In identifying relevant works and sources, I conducted a scoping review, which followed the principles and procedural steps laid out in Khan et al. (2003) and Arksey and O’Malley (2005). These procedures resulted in a list of 317 works on the topic appearing up to October 2021, on which the content analysis was next carried out.

The content analysis located terms used to evoke any kind of structure which ‘runs across’ a whole text, or ‘holds’ a whole text ‘together’. Next, it traced correspondences in the use of the terms and objects of analysis across the dataset (i.e. it matched terms with the concepts the terms are used to evoke). To narrow the margin of error, I conducted a re-analysis of the dataset about five months later.

The analysis reveals that throughout the dataset there are 6 terms used to evoke a structure which ‘runs across’ a whole text, or ‘holds’ a whole text ‘together’: ‘rhetorical structure’, ‘narrative structure’, ‘text structure’, ‘overall structure’, ‘superstructure’ and ‘macrostructure’.

There are several lines of generalization that can be drawn about the uses of the terms throughout the dataset and about the conceptual structures those terms are used to evoke:

(a) The notion of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE can be evoked through the use of six terms: ‘rhetorical structure’, ‘text structure’, ‘narrative structure’, ‘overall structure’, ‘superstructure’ and ‘macrostructure’. The term ‘text structure’ tends to be used synonymously with ‘rhetorical structure’, ‘overall structure’ and ‘superstructure’. ‘Rhetorical structure’ and ‘narrative structure’ can also express the merger of aspects of
RHETORICAL STRUCTURE (such as those relating to interpersonal functions performed) with aspects of NARRATIVE STRUCTURE (such as narrative persona, plot, characters).

(b) ‘Rhetorical structure’, ‘text structure’, ‘narrative structure’, ‘overall structure’ tend be used to refer to the linguistic expression of the concept of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE. ‘Macrostructure’ and ‘superstructure’ tend to be used to refer to the concept of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE only and to aim to differentiate it from the linguistic expression of that concept.

(c) The notion of the linguistic expression of a structure ‘running through’ or ‘holding’ a whole text ‘together’ is either of two alternatives: (1) it is seen as a network-like progression running through a text (e.g. ‘narrative structure’), or (2) it is seen as a sequential arrangement of separate text segments (e.g. ‘rhetoric structure’ and ‘text structure’).

(d) The concept of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE also tends to be interpreted as either (1) a network-like progression running through a text (e.g. MACRO-STRUCTURE), or (2) a sequential arrangement of separate text segments (e.g. SUPERSTRUCTURE).

(e) Two of the terms listed in (a) can be found to be employed within the limits of one the same piece of research to express the difference between sequential segment arrangement and network-like progression, e.g. ‘text structure’ and ‘macrostructure’ in de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981). In the case of de Beaugrande and Dressler’s book specifically, the pair of terms simultaneously designates the difference between linguistic evidence of the presence of whole-text structure (‘text structure’) and the concept of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE (‘macrostructure’).
(f) Over time, one and the same scholar (e.g. van Dijk) can switch from one term designating WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE to another, as well as from one interpretation of what WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE is to another.

It has to be highlighted here that all the generalizations from (a) to (f) are revealed throughout the dataset to not represent strict rules or requirements.

The last point, connected to the generalization in (f), is, arguably, crucial to the present investigation. The dataset analysis reported here reveals dynamicity in the concept and the ensuing changes in the terms used to evoke that concept. That dynamicity is evident not only within the limits of a theoretical approach (e.g. in narratologists’ calls for rhetoric elements be introduced into narrative studies, see the introduction above). It is also evident within one and the same scholar’s works, and that fact should not be simply categorized as ‘scholarly evolution’.

To explain that evolution, we need to take into account the strong possibility that the dynamicity ensues from a scholar’s dealing with a single concept (i.e. WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE) and not with separate, clearly delimited concepts (i.e. RHETORIC STRUCTURE, NARRATIVE STRUCTURE, OVERALL STRUCTURE, etc.). In other words, we need to take into account the strong possibility that, throughout their career, the scholar can be, in fact, exploring different aspects of the same phenomenon.

Overall, the overlaps and merges evident in the dataset confirm that we are likely to be dealing with of a single concept, whose prototype effects (see section below) create the impression of there being different types of that concept. The summarized results and generalization presented in this section, basically, point to the possibility for different terms evoking WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE to actually evoke different elements (or combinations of elements) from the concept of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE. In other words, the overlaps
and merges evident throughout the dataset confirm the possibility for conceptual metonymy (see, e.g., Barcelona 2000, 2011; Dirven and Pörings 2002; Ruiz de Mendoza 2020, 2022) to be operational in the case of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE.

**Cognitive mechanisms: Conceptual metonymy**

In contrast to conceptual metaphor, which is a cross-domain mapping, conceptual metonymy has been defined throughout the literature as “an asymmetric mapping” in which source and target domains both belong within “the same overall domain and are linked by a pragmatic function, so that the target is mentally activated” (Barcelona 2000a, 2000b, 2011: 19; also Panther and Thornburg 2007; Ruiz de Mendoza 2020). What is more, Barcelona maintains that “every metaphorical mapping presupposes a conceptually prior metonymic mapping” and “the seeds for any metaphorical transfer are to be found in a metonymic projection” (2000: 31). Furthermore, as Ruiz de Mendoza (2020: 17) argues, both metaphor and metonymy function together pervasively due to (a) their widespread use, (b) their generally embodied nature as grounded in sensorimotor experience, and (c) their cognitive productivity.

Two other formulations extremely relevant to the present investigation are those of Littlemore (2015), who sees metonymy as evoking a concept by activating even one of the concept’s aspects, and the formulation put forward by Barsalou et al. (2008), according to which concepts are represented in the mind as bundles of elements which characterize different facets of the concept. As already argued above, the present investigation sees WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE as a conceptual complex, i.e. as a result of the simultaneous operation of conceptual metaphor and metonymy. That conceptual complex is also interpreted here as holding the potential to be activated metonymically through evoking some of its elements through the terms of ‘rhetoric structure’, ‘narrative structure’, ‘text structure’, ‘macrostructure’, etc.
The notion of ‘activation’ mentioned in the previous paragraph, according to Barcelona (2011), is intertwined with ‘attention shifts’, and it is believed to impose a perspective on a metonymic target domain. Clearly, such a view harmonizes easily with our conception of profile shifts, which have been included in our set of major text- and discourse-related cognitive mechanisms. The chapter, however, goes on to harmonize those with the scholarly notion of ‘scope’, which is yet another term from our list of metonymy-related and gestalt profiling-related concepts.

Next, the chapter provides and discusses evidence verifying the presence of (a) TW-DW overlaps and (b) TW-DW profiling shifts in scholarly perceptions of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE. The analysis focuses on the ways linguistic signals can be used for these purposes and studies scholar’s choices for text-structure-segment labels as evident in segment progression labels they propose, e.g. ‘Introduction’ – ‘Body’ – ‘Conclusion’. This chapter analyzes text structural progression labels as one of the existing access points to underlying cognitive processes.


In brief, the text segment progressions proposed in almost all of our data sources (with the single exception of Hoye’s ‘Problem – Solution’) display degrees of simultaneous TW-DW overlapping and/or World profiling shifts. Demands for cognitive processing economy can be
argued to produce rather ‘naturally’ such overlappings and shifts. The main point here is that the combined operation of TW-DW overlaps and TW-DW profiling shifts is what functions in parallel and simultaneously with conceptual metaphor to create the perception of MOVEMENT ‘through’ the conceptual complex of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE.

As far as the operation of conceptual metonymy in WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE is concerned, the assumption that WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE is a conceptual complex, which is fully triggered by none of the existing terms in the literature but which can account for any of the concepts behind the terms, is supported by the dataset analysis. The dataset analysis also traces correspondences in what content/conceptual area/combination of cognitive elements each term (e.g. ‘text structure’, ‘narrative structure’, ‘rhetorical structure’, ‘superstructure’) can evoke.

What is revealed in the chapter is that, for example, a CHARACTER would typically activate NARRATIVE STRUCTURE, while A TEXT PRODUCER’S COMMUNICATIVE PURPOSE would typically activate RHETORICAL STRUCTURE. A TEXT PRODUCER’S COMMUNICATIVE PURPOSE, however, could alternatively activate A NARRATIVE PERSONA, and, through it, it could alternatively activate NARRATIVE STRUCTURE.

Viewed from the opposite perspective, NARRATIVE STRUCTURE itself could explicitly combine, let’s say, a CHARACTER and a NARRATIVE PERSONA, while RHETORICAL STRUCTURE could combine a CHARACTER and TEXT PRODUCER’S COMMUNICATIVE PURPOSE.

To make prototypicality effects in our particular example even worse, in parallel, a CHARACTER will prototypically associate with a TW, while TEXT PRODUCER’S COMMUNICATIVE PURPOSE will prototypically associate with a DW. Due to the possibility of TW-DW overlap, TEXT CHARACTER, TEXT PRODUCER’S COMMUNICATIVE PURPOSE, NARRATIVE PERSONA, etc. can all become integrated in
the area of overlap into a coherent cognitive emergent structure. That structure would be neither simply NARRATIVE STRUCTURE, nor only RHETORICAL STRUCTURE; it will integrate a combination of some particular WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE elements and it may not necessarily be conventionalized (yet). As our dataset analysis demonstrates, that happens frequently across scholars’ investigations.

Additionally, one and the same scholar can use one and the same term to evoke different combinations of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE elements. In other words, the same scholar can profile and investigate different metonymically-activated aspects/conceptual areas of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE. The same scholar can also postulate different terms for the same combination of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE elements.

Second, conceptual metonymy also operates in the cognitive processing of the text-structural segments discussed earlier in this section. For instance, a linguistic signal such as ‘Conclusion’ would profile the third segment out of the ‘Introduction – Body – Conclusion’ progression but, to do so, it would evoke (metonymically) the whole three-segment progression. Clearly, in parallel, the profiling mechanism will ‘push’ the other two segments (i.e. Introduction and Body) to the background. The profiled segment, above all, will be metonymized through a specific function (e.g. CONCLUDING, SUMMARIZING, EVALUATING) representing the whole of it.

In that, if the metonymy profiles an ACTION/FUNCTION connected to AN ANIMATE DOER, a nominal linguistic signal will be used for the textual segment. If it is just the ACTION/FUNCTION that is being profiled, a verbal linguistic signal will be chosen for the segment. In either case, a segment label will signal metonymically only part of the full internal conceptual organization of a text structural segment.

The inconsistencies in scholars’ labelling text structural segments within the same textual progression (e.g. combining ‘Setting’ and ‘Evaluation’ in ‘Setting – Complication –
Resolution – Evaluation – Moral’ discussed above) stem, arguably, from inconsistencies in scholars’ metonymizing different types of Worlds within the same text structural progression.

Crucially, as FUNCTIONS/ACTIVITIES from a World can be transferred (through World overlap) metonymically to a text segment’s structure, this gives us grounds to hypothesize that conceptual metonymy needs to be additionally investigated as simultaneously operating on Worlds. This contention, however, will need to find further support through analyses of more and different concepts than WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE. One of the objectives of the chapters in Part III will relate to that possibility.

Chapter III isolates the following co-functioning cognitive mechanisms, which are very strong candidates for inclusion in our multi-process set:

✓ Conceptual metaphor
✓ Conceptual metonymy
✓ World construction
✓ World overlapping
✓ World profiling shifts
PART TWO
CHAPTER IV. SITUATING THE MODEL: TEXT LINGUISTICS

What text linguistics (henceforth TL) is has been a question whose answer has changed over the last several decades. The question may have drawn a clearer response in the 1970s and early 1980s, when TL put forth its roots, but as of today there can be traced several alternative, and almost irreconcilable, views on the issue.

Halliday’s theoretical system, as any other theoretical system, rests on a number of basic premises, which themselves are determined by certain concepts and their interpretation. Perhaps understandably, acknowledging the fact that in *Cohesion in English* Halliday seeks to establish a new scholarly approach to language use, those concepts and premises are overtly defined by him in the first pages of the seminal book (Halliday and Hasan 1976: 1–9). This chapter, first, isolates key definitions from those pages, systematize them thematically, and then provides content analysis on them. The intent is for this systematization to serve as a stepping stone in my establishing the overall conceptual profile of Halliday’s approach. That allows me to further test in the chapter the multi-process model proposed in this thesis for compatibility with Halliday’s TL approach.

The chapter also, first, discusses and, then, applies our model, to de Beaugrande and Dressler’s (1981) cognitive TL approach. The cornerstone in that approach is found to be their repetitive insistence that their particular brand of TL be called the ‘procedural’ model. The reason they give for that preference is the viewpoint on ‘text’ they choose to adopt – de Beaugrande and Dressler view the text from the perspective of the individual text user’s mind and its cognitive capacities.

As the discussion in the chapter reveals, in contrast to Halliday and Hasan, who pay more attention to text as a product (although, as demonstrated in the previous section, they also acknowledge the importance of approaching text as a process), de Beaugrande and Dressler
focus exclusively on text as a process. In combination with the viewpoint they adopt, the processes de Beaugrande and Dressler describe in their *Introduction to Text Linguistics* (ibid.) are, rather understandably, cognitive. Furthermore, by definition, de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981: 3) treat a text as ‘a communicative occurrence which meets seven standards of textuality’ (i.e. cohesion, coherence, intentionality, acceptability, informativity, situationality, and intertextuality). Failure to satisfy any of the seven standards results in a non-communicative occurrence, i.e. in a non-text. The set of standards is generally considered to be far from homogenous, as cohesion and coherence are what de Beaugrande and Dressler themselves call ‘text-centered’, and the rest of the standards – ‘user-centered’.

Applying the multi-process model to the two major TL branches, the chapter first returns to an issue raised at its beginning (i.e. IV.1.), an issue regarding Crystal’s (2008) definition of TL: are de Beaugrande and Dressler’s ‘textuality’ and Halliday and Hasan’s ‘texture’ the same thing? On the basis of the extensive discussions already offered in the thesis, the chapter concludes that interpreting TEXTURE (to which *Cohesion in English* is dedicated) and TEXTUALITY (to which *Introduction to Text Linguistics* is dedicated) as synonyms would run counter to the conceptualizations employed by the respective authors. TEXTURE and TEXTUALITY are two distinct concepts and, importantly, they function against the backgrounds of two conceptually different theoretical systems.

In Hallidayan TL, the text is argued to be conceptualized metaphorically as an OBJECT (see Halliday and Matthiessen’s [2014] definition of it as an ARTEFACT above), or, principally, as a static ENTITY. To Halliday, the argument in the chapter runs, there are activities one can perform on the OBJECT such as ASSIGNING MEANINGS, where MEANINGS are themselves metaphorized as THINGS or ENTITIES. In contrast, de Beaugrande and Dressler’s metaphor of a TEXT sees it as a PROCESS, or, to be precise, as a multitude of simultaneous PROCESSES.
In Hallidayan TL, a text is an OBJECT between which and the TEXT USER there is – for lack of a better metaphorization – (EMPTY) SPACE. Arguably, in parallel to the multitude of theoretical views on LANGUAGE as to where language ‘resides’ (an issue de Beaugrande [1991: 17] called ‘The quest for the locus of language’), TEXT, too, can be taken to occupy a variety of positions within the TL cognitive frame. To Halliday and his followers in particular, as argued above, TEXT seems to be, principally, dissociated from the TEXT USER. The connection between the two is instantiated through a process of ASSIGNING MEANINGS, which, presumably, lies ‘somewhere between’ the TEXT and the TEXT USER, and ‘connects’ them. Where MEANINGS reside in the Hallidayan TL frame and in Hallidayan REALITY, and, how meanings are TAKEN from where they reside and then become ASSIGNED to text UNITS is also underspecified. What is repeatedly noted in Halliday’s works is that a TEXT USER is ‘somehow’ and ‘intuitively’ capable of conducting the ‘assigning meanings’ process.

To de Beaugrande and Dressler, a TEXT is not an OBJECT but a cluster of parallel COGNITIVE PROCESSES, which ‘run’ ‘through’ (i.e. they are LOCATED WITHIN) a TEXT USER’S MIND. Thus, first, within the de Beaugrandian TL frame, there is no (EMPTY) SPACE between the TEXT and the TEXT USER. Accordingly, MEANINGS do not ‘reside’ somewhere ‘out there’ but, instead, they emerge in the process of text processing. Therefore, they are not ‘collected’ from somewhere ‘outside’ the text and then ‘connected’ (i.e. assigned) to the textual units.

Another point of importance is that the general text user’s vantage point is not the main focus of Hallidayan TL but, instead, the TL scholar’s vantage point is. The scholar/analyst is the one with the ability to work with terms such as ‘determiners’, ‘meronymy’, ‘lexical collocation’, etc., and is thus capable of tracing cohesive devices. How a text user who is not a TL scholar works with a text ‘intuitively’ does not lie within the scope of interest in Hallidayan TL. In other words, the addressee of Cohesion and English is the linguist as the text’s user.
(clearly, the book aims to establish a new branch of Linguistics) but how any text user works with any text is not an object of discussion.

In stark contrast, the addressee of Introduction to Text Linguistics is also the TL analyst but the book focuses on the way any text user works with any text. As a result, in the latter book, the vantage point of the ANALYST lies considerably closer to that of the TEXT USER. There the TL scholar’s vantage point is similar to that of any text user in that it, too, exists through and is enabled by cognitive text-related processes.

Admittedly, the TL analyst is additionally expected to be able to operate professionally with such terms as ‘syntax’, ‘prosody’, ‘intertextuality’, etc. After all, Introduction to Text Linguistics is also targeted at a professional audience (in similarity to Cohesion in English). However, in Beaugrandian TL, the professional – non-professional audience difference exists solely in terms of scope of background knowledge accrued for ongoing text-processing purposes. Simply put, the background knowledge of a non-specialist text user and a linguistically schooled text user may differ but the vantage points from which they experience a text are not as different as in Hallidayan TL. Within the de Beaugrandian theoretical system, there is only one general perspective and that is the one from within a human – including a scholar’s – mind.

As a consequence, in de Beaugrandian TL, the scholar’s mind analyses a (general) text user’s mind, and both the object of the analysis (i.e. the TEXT in the MIND) as well as the activity of conducting the research (i.e. TL) belong within the general domain of, let us call it, the cognizing HUMAN MIND. In contrast, in Hallidayan TL, the TL analyst as if ‘watches from aside’ as other TEXT USERS work with a TEXT. In that, the TEXT and the TEXT USER are two separate PHYSICAL OBJECTS. To de Beaugrande, due to his belief the TEXT happens in/ through the TEXT USER’S MIND, the TEXT and the TEXT USER are
metonymically connected into one gestalt. Thus, de Beaugrande’s TL as if studies one ENTITY only.

Conceptual metonymy, which is another cognitive mechanism from our model, can also be detected in text linguists’ understanding of their field of research. In Hallidayan TL, a metonymy-controlled transfer suggests TEXT be understood through focusing on TEXTURE. In Beaugrandian TL, a metonymy-controlled transfer suggests TEXT be understood through TEXTUALITY. Moving ‘down’ those two metonymy chains to higher degrees of conceptual granularity, TEXTURE is further associated metonymically with COHESIVE DEVICES, and TEXTUALITY is further metonymically associated with COGNITIVE PROCESSES.

In Hallidayan TL, yet another metonymic transfer can be argued to hold between MEANING ASSIGNING and TEXT AS A PHYSICAL PRODUCT, with an emphasis on the PHYSICAL PRODUCT. In Beaugrandian TL, the corresponding metonymic transfer can be traced between COGNITIVE PROCESSES and TEXT AS A COGNITIVE PRODUCT, with an emphasis on the COGNITIVE PROCESSES. Clearly, in the previous, ‘emphasis’ suggests co-ordination between conceptual metonymy and yet another cognitive mechanism from our multi-process model – profiling.

Additionally, profiling is also present in scholars’ conceptualizations of TL as a mechanism operating on Worlds. Admittedly, despite Halliday’s insistence that context and textual functions are crucial to text understanding, Hallidayan TL includes little analysis of anything but linguistic structures, i.e. it stays ‘very close’ to linguistic expressions and does not include DW-related information into its analyses. In Hallidayan Functional Grammar/Functional Linguistics, interpersonal functions are postulated as a point of departure for any study, and, indeed, correlations between them and linguistic structures are traced. In Hallidayan TL, however, context-dependent functions remain permanently in the background and are not
brought into focus. Simply put, correlations between contextual elements/characteristics and cohesive devices are not an object of interest within Hallidayan TL.

In contrast, de Beaugrande and Dressler’s theoretical system lays heavy emphasis on the importance of context as constructed in a text user’s mind. Their very postulation of text-centered standards of textuality (i.e. cohesion and coherence) vs. user-centered standards (i.e. intentionality, acceptability, informativity, situationality and intertextuality), and the fact that the user-centered standards are their original contribution to TL (Halliday discusses only cohesion, coherence, and, to some extent, intertextuality) highlights the importance de Beaugrande and Dressler attach to the ‘user-centered’ aspects of textual communication. Their insistence throughout the book that all seven standards are correlated, interdependent and function jointly in itself suggests de Beaugrande and Dressler conceptualize TL as focused on the conflation between text-centered and user-centered textual factors.

In their discussion(s) of text-centered parameters, de Beaugrande and Dressler can be argued to profile TW-related textual factors, and, in their discussion(s) of user-centered parameters, de Beaugrande and Dressler can be argued to profile DWs. Thus, in discussing first text-centered parameters and then user-centered parameters, Introduction to Text Linguistics can be argued to enact the cognitive mechanism of TW-DW profile switches. Furthermore, as evident from our discussion in the previous section, two of the user-centered parameters – Informativity and Intertextuality – can be argued to exemplify TW-DW overlaps.

By way of a conclusion to Chapter IV., on the basis of the cognitive mechanisms proposed in the multi-process model, the following definition is formulated. TL is a scholarly domain characterized by:

a) (metaphoric) scholarly perceptions of TEXT as a PHYSICAL PRODUCT, as a COGNITIVE PRODUCT, or as a system of text-related COGNITIVE PROCESSES;
b) metonymy-driven analysis of linguistic expressions to which meanings can be assigned, or of cognitive processes from which language-expressed meanings can emerge;

c) conflation and profiling switches between text-centered textual aspects (cohesion, coherence) and user-centered textual aspects (intentionality, acceptability, informativity and situationality).

d) no rigorous methodology.
CHAPTER V. SITUATING THE MODEL: DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

As indicated in the introductory segment of Part II of the thesis, the multi-process model proposed is most likely to be found employable in two domains of scholarly activity – Text Linguistics (TL) and Discourse Analysis (DA). Chapter IV analyses the possibilities for employing the model in TL; as expected, the multi-process model is shown there to harmonize readily with the cognitive version/branch of TL. In analogy to Chapter IV, Chapter V analyses the possibilities for (a) employing the model within DA, and (b) applying the model to DA. Thus, Chapter V first demonstrates if and to what extent cognitive studies are a part of the DA theoretical and analytical paradigm.

In analogy to Chapter IV, Chapter V tries and clarifies how the broad and varied field of DA tends to be understood by the respective scholars. Next, in symmetry with Chapter IV, meta-analysis is conducted on the summarized data on ‘what DA is’, and the cognitive model proposed in the thesis is applied to the academic concept of DA with a view of formulating an alternative definition of the field.

As discussed in the thesis’s Introduction, the concepts of ‘text’ and ‘discourse’ are notoriously difficult to distinguish, which can lead to a difficulty in distinguishing between TL and Discourse Analysis (DA), too. Not that distinguishing between the two is a must – David Crystal (2008), for instance, maintains that TL and DA overlap almost completely and that a great number of linguists find little difference between the two. Virtanen (2022) even uses ‘text and discourse linguistics’ as a term covering both TL and DA, and argues some of the important fields of study of ‘text and discourse linguistics’ are cohesion and coherence. Similarly, another prominent scholar in the field, Paltridge (2021) merges DA with both Pragmatics and the Ethnography of communication in order to study what he terms ‘discourse structure’. However, he pursues that endeavor by applying all Hallidayan TL premises related to cohesive devices,
only adding to the list ‘homophoric reference’ (i.e. reference, in which an object’s identity is retrieved by recourse to general knowledge and not to the discourse setting/environment).

The chapter argues that, quite similarly to TL, the academic notion of DA presents some not insignificant challenges in itself. It claims that ‘Discourse Analysis’, although, evidently, quite different from ‘analyses of discourse’, has not been easy to define, especially in the last decade.

The first section of Chapter V systematizes data obtained through a meta-synthesis literature review (Atkins et al. 2008; Grant and Booth 2009), which was chosen as the most appropriate vehicle due to its (a) being of qualitative nature, and (b) being targeted at providing a new interpretation of an existing research field (Atkins et al. 2008). This type of literature review serves to build new theories, especially explanatory theories, and is best employed in re-interpreting high-quality studies. In other words, a meta-synthesis literature review does not aim for the broadest range – unlike the scoping review conducted for the purposes of Chapter III – but for ‘distilling’ information from primary sources of top value. While scoping reviews are most appropriate for clarifying existing scholarly stances on an issue or on a concept, meta-synthesis reviews are best employed in outlining research fields and approaches (ibid.).

Thus, the chapter systematizes data from top publishers such as Cambridge University Press, Oxford University Press, Routledge, John Benjamins, Wiley, de Gruyter. It is also influenced by a preference for more up-to-date publications. It encompasses research conducted by prominent scholars such as Johnstone (2002), Fairclough (2003), Schiffrin (2003), Wodak and Chilton (2005); Boxer (2010), Gee and Hanford (2012), Hanford and Gee (2013), Cap (2019), Hyland et al. (2021), Paltridge (2021), de Cleen et al. (2021), Schröder (2021), etc.

The information from all primary sources thus extracted is then cross-checked. The final results include only information that appears systematically in most sources. Thus, works such as Noveck’s (2018) volume on Cognitive Experimental Pragmatics published by Cambridge
University Press, however illuminating and up-to-date, remain outside the data summarized below. Step by step, the chapter tackles theoretical and methodological premises from Pragmatics, Applied linguistics, Conversation Analysis, Sociolinguistics, (Critical) Discourse Studies Socio-cognitive approach (SCA)/ Socio-cognitive Discourse Studies (SCDS).

Next, the chapter applies the multi-process model to the DA branches discussed previously. The multi-process cognitive model proposed in the thesis is argued to associate more readily with the cognitive (sub-)branches of DA, i.e. with Relevance Theory in Pragmatics, Cognitive Sociolinguistics, (Inter-)Cultural Linguistics, Socio-cognitive Discourse Studies, Critical Metaphor Analysis, etc.. However, the analysis demonstrates, the model is not equally readily employable by all of them as there are some significant differences in how each branch uses cognitive precepts for their (analytical) purposes.

While some approaches adopt a ‘from within the discourse participant’s mind’ perspective onto their object of analysis (e.g. Cognitive Pragmatics, Cognitive Sociolinguistics), others adopt a ‘from within the discourse scholar’s mind’ perspective onto their object of analysis exclusively (e.g. SCDS). In the first case, the viewpoint of the discourse participant and that of the discourse scholar lie much closer and can frequently shift between one or the other. In the second case, the two viewpoints diverge radically and do not converge on any occasion or for any purpose. Clearly, the first type of studies tend to be associated with ‘classical’ cognitivist principles, while the second type – with ‘broadly’ cognitive endeavors, which insist on the existence of ‘social cognition’ but do not specify its locus or cognitive nature. While the present thesis subscribes to the first type of studies, it also tries and contributes to a convergence of the two types, as advocated by, for instance, Geeraerts et al. (2010).

Adopting a vantage point ‘outside’ existing theoretical systems and approaches, and taking a step back for the purposes of meta-analysis, we could apply the multi-process model proposed here to the prototypology of DA as systematized in the previous section. One way to
achieve that is to parallel our meta-analysis in Chapter IV (dedicated to TL), and to try and re-
construct the cognitive frames or scenarios employed by DA scholars across the DA branches
and sub-branches. The figurativity underlying (a) scholars’ conceptualizations of their object
of analysis, i.e. of DISCOURSE, and (b) scholars’ conceptualizations of their scholarly field
(i.e., CDA, Pragmatics, CA, SCDS, etc.) are believed here to condition scholars’ choices of
method, research techniques and analytical procedures.

In this respect, as the previous section reveals, metaphorizations of DISCOURSE can
vary across DA ranging from perceptions of DISCOURSE as an OBJECT (similar to
perceptions of TEXT as an OBJECT) to seeing DISCOURSE as a DANCE or, more generally,
as a PERFORMANCE (see the discussion of this suggestion of Gee’s [2005] in VIII. 5.). No
matter how peripheral Gee’s metaphoric conceptualization may be claimed to be,
metaphorizations of DISCOURSE, clearly, vary widely along a dynamicity scale. Another non-
prototypical metaphor also confirms such a generalization: Stockwell’s (2008: 589) proposal
that “text branches off into discourse with its social and ideological implications” can be
interpreted as starting from a static OBJECT metaphorization (i.e. TEXT as a TREE) and then
highlighting a more dynamic aspect of it (i.e. DISCOURSE as the result of the ACTION of
BRANCHING).

In other words, each DISCOURSE metaphorization can be (metaphorically) positioned
along a scale, at one extreme of which there is an OBJECT point, and at the other extreme – an
ACTIVITY point. In this, out of the list of DA approaches above, Fairclough’s notion of
text/discourse can be argued to exemplify the most static end of the scale as there we can see
TEXT/DISCOURSE metaphorized as MATERIAL SOUNDS/RECORD, and
TEXT/DISCOURSE metaphorized as A PRODUCT. As we move away from the ‘static’ end
of the scale towards the ‘dynamic’ end, perceptions of DISCOURSE as a (STRUCTURED)
EXCHANGE, evident in, for instance, CA and in Sinclair and Coulthard’s DA, come next.
Another ‘step’ away from the ‘static’ end could be marked by approaches focusing on DISCOURSE as (interpersonal) ACTIONS (e.g. Pragmatics), and yet another – by approaches studying DISCOURSE as (socio-cultural) ACTIVITIES or as cognitive ACTIVITIES (e.g. SCDS, CMA, Intercultural linguistics). Near the ACTIVITY end of the DA scale we could position Cognitive pragmatics/Relevance Theory, and nearest that end – psycholinguistic DISCOURSE comprehension studies.

It is on rare occasions, however, that we encounter DA research exemplifying the truly dynamic end of the scale. Compared to TL, no DA approach is of such emphatically procedural character as de Beaugrande and Dressler’s. What is more, while TL employs the TEXT as a PROCESS metaphor (which entails a lesser degree of intentionality on the part of the text user), DA can be generalized to employ TEXT as an ACTIVITY (which entails a higher degree of intentionality on the part of the text user). Arguably, a PROCESS (in TL) is of more human-independent, involuntary character, and an ACTIVITY (in DA) suggests the presence of a DOER. Undoubtedly, while TL (in its de Beaugrandian version) stands very close to the ‘classic’ principles of Cognitive Linguistics and profiles psycholinguistic processes, DA lies much closer to social sciences and profiles the role of the discourse participant as a social actor.

Next, positioning a DA approach along the static-dynamic scale could not depend on a single parameter. As discussed in the Introduction, DISCOURSE tends to be defined as oral but that does not preclude it from also being accepted as written (as in, for example, van Dijk’s CDA). Clearly, the difference between an oral and a written version is considered to be significant: one needn’t go much further than CA’s heavy emphasis on elaborate notation system(s) used to turn conversation recordings (which are actual, physical entities but can be also perceived as being of relatively dynamic character) into written transcripts (which represent more static records of previous dynamically unfolding conversations). Another parameter associated with the static vs. dynamic character of various perceptions of
DISCOURSE is the monologic vs. dialogic distinction. Clearly, monologic discourses are metaphorized as more ‘static’ and dialogic ‘exchanges’ – as more dynamic due to the simultaneous operation of turn-taking procedures.

Overall, perceptions of what DISCOURSE is tend to correlate rigorously with the type of data a DA approach tends to analyse. At that, in comparison to TL, the correlation is more rigorous. Despite Hallidayan TL’s more static view of TEXT and the extremely procedural character of de Beaugrandian perceptions of TEXT, both TL branches study both dialogic and monologic texts as well as both written and oral texts. In contrast, few DA branches can be found to study both dialogic and monologic texts as well as both written and oral texts. CA and Sinclair and Coulthard’s DA, for instance, are unlikely to study a written monologue, and they investigate orally-unfolding dialogic instances almost exclusively.

Our discussion of metaphorizations of DISCOURSE and metaphorizations of DA could not but at least mention some metaphoric visualizations put forward by DA analysts themselves. Our literature survey reveals that the most frequently employed metaphorization is Fairclough’s concentric squares (1989, 1992a, 1992b, 1995/2014). In that visualization, a DISCOURSE ‘surrounds’, ‘envelops’ and/or ‘includes’ a TEXT (Fig. 1 below). In other words, DISCOURSE in it is not an alternative to TEXT; it is a ‘bigger’ and ‘broader’ ENTITY or a PLACE, at the center of which TEXT is situated:

![Fairclough's Concentric Squares](image)

**Fig. 1. Fairclough’s (1989) concentric squares**
This metaphorization calls for several comments. The central one concerns its stark contrast from TL’s understanding of context as a single SPACE/ AREA/ DOMAIN, etc. Here Fairclough outlines two concentric SPACES/ AREAS/ DOMAINS, both surrounding TEXT (this conceptualization will be paid special attention to later in this section and in Part III of this thesis): In de Beaugrandian TL, however, those PROCESSES lie at the center of attention and represent the main focus of research interest. Within Fairclough’s paradigm, communication-related text users’ cognitive PROCESSES are simply ‘added’ to his notion of ‘context’, i.e. they are ‘injected’ into an objectively existing immediate communicative environment.

Apart from conceptual metaphor, the other cognitive mechanisms from our multi-process model can also be found operating in scholars’ interpretations of DISCOURSE and ‘DA’. When Paltridge (2021), for instance, argues there are two types of DA – textually-oriented DA and socially-oriented DA, he can be seen as employing Fairclough’s concentric spaces metaphorization. The same holds true for Yus’s (2018) claim DA is either ‘narrower’, or text-centered (i.e. focusing on utterance comprehension), or ‘broader’ in focusing on social interactions (i.e. on social meanings as cognitive structures). Both perceptions, as already demonstrated above, derive from conceptual metaphor. However, the implied possibility for ‘switching’ between one or the other type, in parallel with transferring the rest of the DA properties from the ‘narrower’ to the ‘broader’ or from the ‘broader’ to the ‘narrower’ domain, profiling, scope variation involves, and conceptual metonymy.

Another DA-related aspect of the operation of conceptual metonymy can be detected in some scholars’ profiling conversation structure, or dialogue structure, over linguistic/conceptual content to stand for the whole structure-context conceptual complex. As evident in CA, for instance, or in Sinclair and Coulthard’s DA, turns, moves, acts and their organization into adjacency pairs, exchanges and transactions may be typically profiled in analyses, while social structures, roles, practices, etc. may function as background. As a variation to a ‘typically
profiled’ object of analysis, pragmatic studies can be argued to switch their attention dynamically between profiling turn-sequencing peculiarities and profiling interpersonal contextual functions. In contrast, CDA and SCDA tend to profile social structures, roles, practices, etc., while linguistic units (and not conversation structures) tend to function metonymically as background.

When the first space is profiled for analysis (i.e. the text-centered, or language-related, features of the TEXT are in focus), the second and third spaces can be conflated into one SPACE/CONTEXT (i.e. the ‘Interaction’ space and the ‘Social practice’ space). In other words, for many studies distinguishing between the two ‘broader’ spaces is – to use a Cognitive pragmatic term – irrelevant. For some studies, however, conflating them intentionally can have considerable socio-pragmatic consequences. To use Fairclough’s words (1992: 65), discursive practice “contributes to reproducing society (social identities, social relationships, systems of knowledge and belief) as it is, yet also contributes to transforming society”. Clearly, such a claim evokes ideas related to the notion of perlocution in pragmatics, and, as will be discussed in Part III below, it is also suggestive of the notion of performativity. However, from the perspective of the multi-process model proposed here, “conducting social action” (ibid.), regardless of whether it is supportable or not, reveals the scholar’s conflating the ‘Interaction’ space and the ‘Social practice’ space. In other words, communicating within the ACADEMIC DISCOURSE domain is figuratively related to acting within the REAL WORLD domain.

By way of a conclusion to Chapter V., on the basis of the cognitive mechanisms proposed in the multi-process model, the following definition of DA could be formulated. DA is a scholarly domain characterized by:

a) scholarly metaphorizations of TEXT as a PHYSICAL PRODUCT and DISCOURSE as a SPACE around the PRODUCT. Alternatively, DISCOURSE can be metaphorized as an interactional STRUCTURE consisting of smaller STRUCTURAL
ELEMENTS (i.e. turns or moves) profiled against background knowledge about INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES. Yet another alternative is for DISCOURSE to be seen as a conceptual area of conflation between COMMUNICATIVE PRACTICES/ATTITUDES/BIASES as SOCIAL PRACTICES/ATTITUDES/BIASES, where either can be profiled;

b) in all of the alternatives in (a), there can be observed a metonymic transfer of conceptual elements between the domains in each pair. Thus, scholarly interpretations of what DA is as an activity tend to frequently stipulate ‘correspondences’ between the two metonymically linked domains in the pair need to be traced (e.g. correspondences between social structure ELEMENTS/UNITS/ENTITIES and textual ELEMENTS/UNITS/ENTITIES need to be traced);

c) a variety of research techniques and methods, with a stronger preference for qualitative analysis.
PART THREE
CHAPTER VI. REAL WORLDS: OPERATION AND APPLICATIONS

As discussed above, Chapter II focuses on two major issues out of the general Worlds and World-creation topics: (a) the existence of TW-DW overlaps, and (b) the difference between ‘RW’ and ‘reality’. Chapter VI in its turn builds onto that and delves deeper into these topics by focusing on (a) TW-RW and TW-DW-RW overlaps, and (b) DW-RW overlaps and profiling.

In other words, Chapter VI demonstrates with what domains/structures/networks a RW can overlap and with what domains/structures/networks it cannot. Above all, the chapter demonstrates why the notion of ‘RW’ is indispensable for our multi-process model. Last but not least, the centrality of ‘RW’ is employed here to revisit several concepts which were mentioned or discussed in the previous chapters but whose interpretation has not been shown to cohere with the multi-process model.

To verify the assumption about the operation of conceptual metonymy in DW-RW overlaps and profiling, Chapter VI follows the cognitive mechanism’s peculiarities listed in Barcelona’s (2011) systematization, and selects two especially prominent points from it which call for special comment. The first point is that metonymic (re)conceptualization are seen in the literature as having the potential to be either temporary and transient or, alternatively, to become permanent and typical. The latter are termed by Lakoff (1987) ‘metonymic models’ and represent, in Barcelona’s (2011) term ‘default’ metonymizations. To Lakoff (ibid.), whether a metonymization will be transient or it will become conventionalized can depend on the cognitive principle of GOOD GESTALT OVER POOR GESTALT (see also Radden and Kövecses 2007; Ioannou 2019). In the case of a DW and a RW, the argument can hold of their representing a GOOD GESTALT (i.e. one which does not include too many differences across the internal structures in the two domains), and, consequently, of their co-functioning as a
conventionalized ‘metonymic model’ (in which a DW is typically metonymically profiled against a RW).

Last but not least, this metonymic model coheres well, i.e. functions as a GOOD GESTALT, with some conceptual metaphorizations of special social salience. The LIFE AS A JOURNEY complex structure, as discussed earlier here (II. 3. 1.), is especially prominent in governing both social and individual perceptions of LIFE and of INDIVIDUAL LIVES. In accordance with that metaphor, any segment of experience can be conceptualized as a SITUATION, and a SITUATION would, normally, be metaphorized as A PLACE. LIFE, thus, becomes metaphorized as a PATH consisting of a series of PLACES, some of those ‘places’ representing (COMMUNICATIVE) SITUATIONS.

In other words, against the background of such a cognitive framework, a DW can be seen as a SITUATION, i.e. as A PLACE along the PATH OF LIFE. Moreover, a DW can be seen as ‘embedded in’ and representing a ‘part of’ the RW PATH OF LIFE. Simultaneously, due to the operation of conceptual metonymy, a DW can be seen as a ‘smaller’ PLACE embedded in the ‘bigger’ PLACE that LIFE can be perceived to be.

These generalizations are supported by, for example, analyses of the genre of political speeches (discussed in Chapter II). As I have also argued (Tincheva 2015, 2022), political speeches can be distinguished from other genres precisely on the basis of their atypically high degree of TW-DW-RW overlap and conflation: a political speech displays a coincidence of RW roles (POLITICIAN, CITIZENS/MEMBERS OF SOCIETY), DW participants (SPEAKER, HEARER) and TW characters (POLITICAL LEADER, FOLLOWERS).

To conclude, the simultaneous operation of several conceptual metaphor mappings plus conceptual metonymy would be difficult to explain without the presence of the notion of ‘RW’ as a separate domain of operation of the cognitive mechanisms in question. Without it,
World profiling mechanism, also operating simultaneously, would be even more difficult to trace.

‘Context’ revisited

Chapter VI also pays special attention to the scholarly concept of CONTEXT. It argues that research on ‘context’ typically:

(a) uses synonymously ‘context of situation’ and ‘immediate environment’ to refer to a segment of a physical, objectively existing reality, and not to cognitive spaces,
(b) metaphorizes CONTEXT OF SITUATION as a ‘narrower’ segment WITHIN the ‘broader’ CONTEXT OF CULTURE,
(c) metaphrtonymizes CONTEXT OF CULTURE as background against which CONTEXT OF SITUATION can be profiled, and
(d) interprets ‘context’ as a ‘package’ of ‘things’ that ‘go together’.

In general, scholarly conceptualizations of CONTEXT are revealed in the chapter to no dependent on conceptual metaphrtonymy only. As evident from the classifications summarized, the World-creation and profiling-shift mechanisms in the multi-process model proposed in the thesis also play a part in CONTEXT conceptualizations. The classifications systematized in the chapter reveal the creation of:

(a) RWs, which transpires in the systematic attempts at inclusion of physical/material contextual elements such as participants and surrounding objects (i.e. in the absence of a ‘RW’ - ‘reality’ distinction),
(b) DWs, as evident in the systematic postulation of the importance of abstract contextual elements such as participants’ (non-)verbal actions, effects of the verbal action(s), social events, mutual cognitive environments,
(c) TWs, displayed, for instance, through the frequent inclusion of language-related units/structures (e.g. demonstratives, adverbials, tenses) in the analyses.

However, despite the operation of all three types of Worlds evident in the general scholarly understanding of CONTEXT, to many scholars (e.g. Werth 1999; Gavins 2002, 2007), ‘context’ is revealed to be, in all effect, equal to ‘DW’ only.

Thus, the chapter next draws on these generalizations and turns to the question of how one should to distinguish among ‘DW’, ‘context’, ‘communicative situation’, ‘user-centered parameters’, etc. To achieve its purpose, the chapter reiterates that human cognitive processes/structures do not exist independently of the human mind, and, consequently, human cognitive processes/structures are not stand-alone entities that could be added or not added to scholarly analyses of physical contexts/situational environments. As a consequence, Worlds could not be mixtures or intersections between human cognition and a possibly objectively existing reality which is ‘out there’ and exists independently of human cognition. Worlds are ‘located’, to use a common metaphor, within the human mind’s eye only and are best seen as simulations (of situational environments) that happen in humans’ minds. Thus, Worlds should not be analytically ‘added to’ or ‘injected into’ real-life contexts/situations, although, as the chapters in Part II and the previous section here extensively demonstrate, that seems to be the scholarly norm.

With that caveat in mind, against the general theoretical background against which they tend to be used, ‘reality’, ‘setting’, ‘communicative environment’ and ‘communicative situation’ are taken here to refer to (the possibly objective) physical reality. The chapter concludes that, if a generalization of the scholarly notion of ‘context’ could be made, it would need to take into consideration the following peculiarities:
In the literature, ‘context’ tends to concern the relationship between two different and separate entities – a unit and its surroundings. From the perspective of the multi-process model, CONTEXT is a conceptual area seen as RELEVANT to a UNIT;

In the literature, ‘context’ serves to understand better a unit under analysis (e.g. ‘context’ is used to understand better a text). From the perspective of the multi-process model, CONTEXT exists as a notion due to the cognitive necessity for any ENTITY/UNIT to be profiled against a BACKGROUND. In this, CONTEXT could function similarly to a BACKGROUND, and it would not necessarily donate structure or involve projections to its corresponding FIGURE (e.g. DISCOURSE structures prototypically would not occur as TEXT structures);

In the literature, more frequently ‘context’ would be seen as part of an objectively existing reality, and, as a consequence, it would be treated as a static entity which includes an unvarying set of consistently important elements. From the perspective of the multi-process model, CONTEXT is a dynamically constructed and ongoingly adapted network of concepts, the elements of which co-function prototypically.

In the literature, the ‘size’ of a context is fixed and pre-determined. From the perspective of the multi-process model, CONTEXT can involve significant scope variations.

Overall, CONTEXT results from the need for the cognitive mechanism of figure-ground profiling to be enacted for information processing optimality. CONTEXT tends to be theoretically metaphorized as SURROUNDINGS which do not include and never merge with the UNIT they SURROUND. Similarly to a BACKGROUND, which stands apart from its FIGURE, a CONTEXT stands different from its corresponding UNIT. Rather tellingly, in the
case of text- and discourse studies, CONTEXT is not used synonymously with DISCOURSE, which could merge with TEXT. In the literature, ‘context’ and ‘text’ are two interrelated but separate entities. It is correspondences between contextual elements and unit elements that are sought and traced by scholars, and not resemblances.

Inherent in such a definition is the answer of whether a CONTEXT and a WORLD can be used synonymously. As already demonstrated in this thesis, Worlds can provide for each other the basis for the operation of figure-background profiling. However, simultaneously, they overlap, coincide, and provide internal-structure projections for each other. In other words, in contrast to a context or a background, a World can function metonymically with its profiled unit. What is more, the role of such a profiled unit can be performed by another World.

Thus, a CONTEXT can ‘cut across’ two or more Worlds, and accrue from there conceptual elements which are dynamically perceived as relevant to the understanding of a UNIT. A WORLD, then, could function as a CONTEXT if it stands in contrast to a UNIT. This can happen, as demonstrated by examples in our Chapter II, where some of the political speeches are shown to keep a TW and a DW separate, i.e. without overlaps between them.
CHAPTER VII. REAL WORLDS AND SOCIO-POLITICAL THOUGHT: BREXIT

Brexit, i.e. the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU), has kept many an analyst absorbed for quite some time. The impact of Brexit has been debated from a multitude of angles – financial, political, ethnic, religious, etc. The present chapter, however, does not focus on linguistic aspects of ‘Brexit’; it offers a cognitive-linguistic perspective on BREXIT, i.e. it investigates the ways in which BREXIT is conceptualized by applying the multi-process model to it. Beyond doubt, Brexit represents a socio-cultural event of global significance.

Overall, the historical background behind BREXIT suggests any dataset used for the purpose of our investigation needs to reflect:

(a) the presence of all-European metaphorizations of Brexit,

(b) differences between conceptualizations in the UK and continental EU,

(c) the evaluative nature and attitudinal bias of the public discourse on BREXIT in the UK.

Alternatively, three sub-datasets could be delineated to separately serve each purpose.

The choice of online media specifically is prompted by the spike in ‘Brexit’ Google searches reported in VI. 1. above, which strongly supports reports claiming that, on the issue of Brexit, most UK citizens and non-UK citizens resorted to online-supplied information. In this, it should be borne in mind that online media use demonstrates not only the fastest growing general spread but also the fastest slump in trust (e.g. Kalogeropoulos et al. 2019). Therefore, our dataset needs to locate a meeting point between online media of greatest reach and most trusted online media in the UK and in continental EU. Crucially, a third variable would also require inclusion: the one concerning media trust on political issues specifically.
Thus, the selection of media for our dataset rests on the 2016 Reuters Institute Digital News Report, which also incorporates findings by YouGov, Ofcom, etc. (Newman et al. 2017). It is a report that covers three major parameters: general circulation, overall trust, and trust on political issues. Four separate sources of different social background were selected and correlated for the purpose (internet sources 3, 4, 5 and 6) in order to avoid possible biases in the reports themselves.

The second type of information source I employ for the purposes of this chapter is a survey I conducted within the first two weeks after the Brexit referendum. That survey probes 60 respondents (Tincheva 2019a) on the online media outlets they used most frequently around the time of the referendum specifically on the topic of Brexit. The survey was meant to trace the main characteristics of a broader European perspective on the Brexit process, which embraces both UK viewpoints and continental ones.

That survey focuses on English-language online media and their influence. It includes 40 EU respondents. In terms of nationality, 20 of the respondents are British and 20 (non-native speakers) represent various EU cultural backgrounds (4 are German, 4 – Austrian, 3 – French, 3 – Slovenian, 3 – Bulgarian, 2 – Swedish, 1 – Greek). In terms of educational status, 20 of the respondents hold higher education degrees (3 of them are holders of Ph.D. degrees, and 18 – of Master’s degrees) and 20 have no higher education degree. 4 of the Master’s degrees are in engineering, 5 – in economics, 11 – in the humanities. In terms of gender, 20 respondents are female and 20 are male. In terms of age, the youngest respondent is 21 and the oldest one is 63. As far as the decision to include 20 British and 20 non-British EU respondents is concerned, that decision was prompted by the fact that Brexit is not a purely domestic issue relating to one EU country only. On the contrary, Brexit could be argued to be especially salient precisely due to its all-EU significance. Nevertheless, not the whole EU population had a legal political say on the matter of Brexit, as only British citizens had the right to vote on it. Hence our survey
includes equal numbers of EU citizens who had the right to vote on Brexit and EU citizens who
did not have the right to vote on Brexit.

In that survey, each respondent was asked to name the top English-language online
source he or she preferred in acquiring information about Brexit during the first 4 days after the
referendum. The objective was to rank the top 10 English-language online sources which served
to shape public opinions on those milestone days. However, the respondents were also invited
to provide comments or additional information they perceived as relevant. The majority of the
respondents did not restrict their input only to answering the main question. Out of the 40
respondents, 29 reported they checked more than two sources every day. 17 respondents
reported they deliberately tried to acquaint themselves with opposing perspectives and
arguments. 4 participants reported they did not deliberately look for multiple sources but read
several random pieces a day. Those were pieces they could access most quickly and easily.
Only 3 participants proved settled and unvarying in their media choices (all 3 were
representatives of the older generation). None of the respondents reported they used more than
5 outlets on the topic over the period. In sum, in ranking the top 10 English-language EU online
sources, all respondents’ preferences and not just their first choices were registered as equally
valid. Two of the media sources, however, had to be excluded later on account of the second
main consideration in our dataset material selection.

Eight media were thus selected out of the original top 10: The Guardian and The Times;
the BBC and Deutsche Welle; Euronews and The Independent; The Telegraph and The Daily
Mail (rated here from predominantly pro-Remain to predominantly pro-Leave). Those
constitute the online media sources for our first sub-dataset.

The online media sources in the second sub-dataset were separated into two groups. The
UK sources include: the BBC, The Daily Mail, The Guardian, The Telegraph. The English-
language online media sources in the continental group are: the BBC, Reuters, Deutsche Welle,
Euronews. The number of media draws on the respondents’ declaring (ibid.) they would typically use more than a single but fewer than 5 outlets a day to keep informed on Brexit. The inclusion of the BBC in both groups reflects the increasing global impact of both national and international media. (For the last decade, the BBC has been even reported as the most trusted network in the USA [see e.g. Internet source 5]).

The third sub-dataset is abstracted from five major UK online media. The outcome of the classification procedure led to the selection of the online editions of the following media outlets: The Guardian; the BBC; The Independent; The Daily Telegraph and The Daily Mail (rated here from predominantly pro-Remain to predominantly pro-Leave).

To extract all relevant samples from the sources, first, general searches for texts and videos containing the word Brexit were conducted on each of the sites selected for inclusion in the study. The only query was the word Brexit since the study tries to encompass all source domains on which BREXIT might be drawing and does not aim at testing the presence of any specific source domain.

The texts retrieved for the first sub-dataset (which is aimed at accounting for all-EU metaphorizations of BREXIT) were of a total size of 55,000 words roughly. The texts retrieved for the second sub-dataset (aimed at accounting for UK vs. non-UK EU metaphorizations of BREXIT) were of a total size of 42,500 words roughly. The texts retrieved for the third sub-dataset (aimed at accounting for UK metaphorizations of BREXIT) were of a total size of 23,000 words roughly.

The dataset texts were then analyzed for content individually with a view of isolating all linguistic structures referring to BREXIT. The analysis was conducted manually, following previous studies (e.g., Deignan 2005; Stefanowitsch 2006), where the search term is taken to stand for the target domain, while a subsequent manual search in the texts locates metaphoric linguistic expressions or ones occurring in proximity to any non-literal uses. Linguistic
expressions were isolated for subsequent analysis as long as they (1) referred to BREXIT, and (2) characterized one or more aspects of it (as in Musolff 2006, 2017). The size and type of the linguistic structures were not considered of significance, i.e. words, phrases, clauses, etc. were seen as equally qualified for analysis as long as their referent was BREXIT and their function was to characterize at least one aspect of the concept.

The next step was to test each extracted text segment for metaphorization. The testing procedure applied to any of those types of (potentially) metaphoric segments followed basic analysis principles of the Metaphor Identification Procedure (proposed by the Pragglejaz Group in 2007), or MIP, and, more specifically, its advanced version of MIPVU (Steen et al. 2010 a, b). Thus, the analytical steps opted for here bear considerable resemblance to yet another alternative of the MIP procedure, namely PIMS (Procedure for Identifying Metaphorical Scenes). Developed by Johansson Falck (2018), and Johansson Falck and Okonski (2022), the PIMS procedure builds upon what Johansson Falck (2018) calls ‘lexico-encyclopedic conceptual [LEC] metaphors’ by integrating them with Barsalou’s (e.g. 2006, 2008) simulational viewpoint on language use.

Overall, the data support the assumption that there exists a pluralistic set of BREXIT metaphors. That set contains 14 mappings. The following list presents the source domains salience in conceptualizations of BREXIT in terms of net totals of uses of each source domain throughout the dataset:

1. DIVORCE (76)
2. NATURAL DISASTER (53)
3. PART OF A JOURNEY (52)
4. NUCLEAR DISASTER (37)
5. (KILLING) BLOW TO EUROPE (27)
6. MECHANICAL FAILURE (19)
7. REASON FOR WAR (13)
8. EXAMINATION/ TEST (7)
9. RUIN OF THE UK’S HOUSE (2)
10. WAKE-UP CALL TO THE (SLEEPING) EU (2)
11. ENEMY (2)
12. DESTRUCTIVE ACCIDENT (INVOLVING A PLANE, SHIP, BUILDING, ETC.) (1)
13. DIVIDING LINE (1)
14. (HARD TO DIGEST) FOOD (1)

Thus, the analysis of English-language EU online media texts appearing on the first 4 post-referendum days can be concluded to reveal that the most prominent source domains in the metaphoric conceptualization of BREXIT are DIVORCE, A NATURAL DISASTER and PART OF A JOURNEY. These three metaphorizations are present either on all of the days analyzed (DIVORCE and PART OF A JOURNEY) or on all of the days but one (A NATURAL DISASTER). Moreover, these three source domains account for the highest total numbers of metaphoric structures throughout the four-day period.

In sum, the non-UK sub-dataset can be argued to reveal a better structured and broader BREXIT conceptual periphery. The UK sub-dataset can be argued to represent a more pronounced conceptual BREXIT prototypical center; its periphery is revealed to be narrower and less frequently employed.

Several conclusions could be drawn from these facts. First, at times of uncertainty (i.e. times of ambiguous or difficult processing of ongoing events), people minimize their figurativity and, if they use non-literal thinking at all, they resort to the most basic metaphorizations such as the JOURNEY OF LIFE. Perhaps contrary to logic, figurativity actually makes a concept ‘real’, i.e. it verifies the concept’s status as part of the RW. Figurativity, therefore, could be employed as a measure of the degree of transition from conceptualization to categorization.
Generally, without the notion of ‘RW’, it would be impossible for us to explain how a concept without a real-world referent such as BREXIT gradually ‘enters reality’.
CHAPTER VIII. REAL WORLDS AND SOCIO-POLITICAL ACTION: FACEBOOK POSTS

Facebook statuses and comments (subsumed under the cover term of ‘Facebook posts’) are seen in the thesis as a relatively new and socially transformative genre. In choosing to treat Facebook posts as a separate genre, Chapter VIII specially upholds the theoretical view expounded in, for instance, Page (2010), Lomborg (2013), Whitworth (2014), Fuchs (2016), Virtanen (2017); Yus (2014, 2022), Page et al. (2022) The prevailing modern view on the topic can be summarized as what Abercrombie anticipated to be a “steady dismantling of genre” (1996: 45). Xie and Yus maintain that it is the Internet which “shatters traditional dividing lines among offline genres, mixes qualities of several genres” and even creates new genres (2018: 4).

The chapter reports on two studies, which aim to and obtain socio-linguistic information on political discourse. Both studies are questionnaire-based; they employ a quantitative method and techniques of research. The questions in neither study are open-ended. The questionnaire in the first study offers several possible genre options as answers to each question. The options are selected on the basis of the genres appearing with the highest frequency throughout research on political discourse (e.g. Gamson 1992; Chilton 2003; Lomborg 2013; Paltridge 2021). The set of alternative options targets prototypical political discourse genres but also tests two (relatively newly-emergent) Internet-related political ones: Facebook statuses and Twitter messages. In the questionnaires, all genres were listed alphabetically to avoid priming effects.

Study 1 involves 16 questions grouped into 2 sets. The first set (containing 6 questions) places each respondent in the position of a text receiver; the second set (containing 8 questions) places each respondent in the position of a text producer. There are 2 additional questions included at the end to obtain information specifically on the Internet genres involved. The expectation was that, due to the relevantly recent emergence of the two genres, some participants’ responses might need to be specially elicited. The organization and progression of
the questions covers DW variations along the parameters of text users’ status, text producers’ status, text user’s intentions, text functions.

The 2 additional questions in Study 1 yielded results of special significance and were, for that reason, set apart in what was later called Probe 1 (which is part of Study 1). The reason was that the quarantine period and the heightened use of social media suggested the relevance of re-probing for updated information. Two subsequent re-probes were thus conducted; the two are set apart here into a common study, Study 2 (which contains Probe 2 and Probe 3).

The 3 probes (across the 2 studies) had 120 respondents fill the same questionnaire three times: first – in Bulgaria’s pre-pandemic period, second – in the spring quarantine period, and third – in Bulgaria’s social-distancing and mass-protests period. The three probes were conducted during the following periods:

- Probe 1 took place from April 1st 2018 to July 30th 2018;
- Probe 2 took place from March 23rd 2020 to May 3rd 2020 (spring quarantine period);
- Probe 2 took place from July 1st 2020 to August 15th 2020 (social-distancing and mass-protests period).

Each probe involves a two-item questionnaire. The second and the third probe repeat exactly the two questions’ formulations from the original probe. The questions are targeted at establishing why and how people use Facebook for socio-political reasons. The questions are so formulated as to follow a communicative-function-based type of progression. The progression rests on the premise that communicative functions operate prototypically, i.e. they may overlap.

In both Study 1 and Study 2, while filling the questionnaire, the respondents are asked to:
• Provide only their immediate responses,
• Provide information drawing only on their own personal experience (i.e. they were expected not to generalize about others’ socio-political views and/or behavior).

After answering, the respondents were also strongly encouraged to provide additional comments or information they perceived as relevant.

Both Probe 2 and Probe 3 in Study two repeat the two questions from Probe 1 in Study 1. Four options are offered as possible answers to either question; they involve the following interpersonal functions:

- exchange socio-political information
- debate a socio-political issue
- motivate others into socio-political (in)action
- act socio-politically

The respondents were asked to arrange those four options in terms of how truthfully each option applies to the specific participant’s Facebook experience and habits. The top option would be the one that best represents the participant’s experience; the bottom option would be the one that is least representative of their experience. If necessary, the participants were allowed to place two options in the same ranking position. The ranking of each answer was multiplied by the number of respondents who chose it, and thus an overall point score was calculated for each answer option.

The participants’ responses are summarized as follows:

**Probe 1.**

**Question 1.** *Do you use Facebook with regard to socio-political issues and, if you do, why?*
1. to debate a socio-political issue – 64 points

(20 respondents rank it in 1st place; 13 respondents rank it in 2nd place; 6 respondents rank it in 3rd)

2. to exchange socio-political information – 66 points

(13 respondents rank it in 1st place; 25 respondents rank it in 2nd place; 1 respondent ranks it in 4th place)

3. to motivate others into socio-political (in)action – 105 points

(6 respondents rank it in 1st place; 33 respondents rank it in 3rd place)

4. to act socio-politically – 154 points

(1 respondent ranks it in 2nd place; 38 respondents rank it in 4th place)

The remaining 58 respondents answer they do not use Facebook on socio-political topics.

Probe 1.

Question 2. If you post on Facebook with regard to a socio-political issue, you would be...

1. debating a socio-political issue – 129 points

(65 respondents rank it in 1st place; 32 respondents rank it in 2nd place)

2. exchanging socio-political information – 171 points

(28 respondents rank it in 1st place; 64 respondents rank it in 2nd place; 5 respondents rank it in 3rd place)

3. motivating others into socio-political (in)action – 289 points

(4 respondents rank it in 1st place; 87 respondents rank it in 3rd place; 6 respondents rank it in 4th place)

4. acting socio-politically – 381 points
Probe 2.

**Question 1.** Do you use Facebook with regard to socio-political issues and, if you do, why?

1. *to exchange socio-political information* – 93 points
   (42 respondents rank it in 1st place; 9 respondents rank it in 2nd place; 11 respondents rank it in 3rd place)
2. *to motivate others into socio-political (in)action* – 129 points
   (7 respondents rank it in 1st place; 43 respondents rank it in 2nd place; 12 respondents rank it in 3rd place)
3. *to debate a socio-political issue* – 157 points
   (13 respondents rank it in 1st place; 7 respondents rank it in 2nd place; 38 respondents rank it in 3rd; 4 respondents rank it in 4th place)
4. *to act socio-politically* – 241 points
   (3 respondents rank it in 2nd place; 1 respondent ranks it in 3rd place; 58 rank in 4th place)

The remaining 35 respondents answer they do not use Facebook on socio-political topics.

The respondents provided the following additional comments to this question:

- Roughly 40% maintain that they choose ‘exchanging information’ as their answer but, in doing that, they, strictly speaking, mean ‘sharing information’; roughly 28% suggest the information they exchange/share concerns their emotional experience of being quarantined but as they share it with others likely to be experiencing the same, that can be seen as ‘exchanging social information’.
• Roughly 5% explain they choose ‘acting socially’ as their answer as, due to their being quarantined into a confined space, Facebook posting is the only socially-directed action they are physically allowed.

Probe 2.

**Question 2. If you post on Facebook with regard to a socio-political issue, you would be…**

1. *debating a socio-political issue* – 181 points
   (46 respondents rank it in 1st place; 22 respondents rank it in 2nd place; 25 respondents rank it in 3rd place; 4 respondents rank it in 4th place)
2. *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* – 215 points
   (33 respondents rank it in 1st place; 29 respondents rank it in 2nd place; 16 respondents rank it in 3rd place; 19 respondents rank it in 4th place)
3. *exchanging socio-political information* – 277 points
   (8 respondents rank it in 1st place; 30 respondents rank it in 2nd place; 27 respondent ranks it in 3rd place; 32 respondents rank it in 4th place)
4. *acting socio-politically* – 297 points
   (10 respondents rank it in 1st place; 16 respondents rank it in 2nd place; 29 respondent ranks it in 3rd place; 42 respondents rank it in 4th place)

Probe 3.

**Question 1. Do you use Facebook with regard to socio-political issues and, if you do, why?**

1. *to motivate others into socio-political (in)action* – 147 points
   (15 respondents rank it in 1st place; 25 respondents rank it in 2nd place; 26 respondents rank it in 3rd; 1 respondents rank it in 4th place)
2. *to debate a socio-political issue* – 163 points

(23 respondents rank it in 1\textsuperscript{st} place; 11 respondents rank it in 2\textsuperscript{nd} place; 14 respondents rank it in 3\textsuperscript{rd}; 19 respondents rank it in 4\textsuperscript{th} place)

3. *to act socio-politically* – 175 points

(18 respondents rank it in 1\textsuperscript{st} place; 10 respondents rank it in 2\textsuperscript{nd} place; 19 respondents rank it in 3\textsuperscript{rd}; 20 respondents rank it in 4\textsuperscript{th} place)

4. *to exchange socio-political information* – 185 points

(11 respondents rank it in 1\textsuperscript{st} place; 21 respondents rank it in 2\textsuperscript{nd} place; 8 respondents rank it in 3\textsuperscript{rd}; 27 respondents rank it in 4\textsuperscript{th} place)

The remaining 30 respondents answer they do not use Facebook on socio-political topics.

**Probe 3.**

**Question 2. If you post on Facebook with regard to a socio-political issue, you would be…**

1. *debating a socio-political issue* – 213 points

(29 respondents rank it in 1\textsuperscript{st} place; 30 respondents rank it in 2\textsuperscript{nd} place; 28 respondents rank it in 3\textsuperscript{rd}; 10 respondents rank it in 4\textsuperscript{th} place)

2. *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* – 233 points

(20 respondents rank it in 1\textsuperscript{st} place; 36 respondents rank it in 2\textsuperscript{nd} place; 23 respondents rank it in 3\textsuperscript{rd}; 18 respondents rank it in 4\textsuperscript{th} place)

3. *acting socio-politically* – 260 points

(27 respondents rank it in 1\textsuperscript{st} place; 9 respondents rank it in 2\textsuperscript{nd} place; 29 respondents rank it in 3\textsuperscript{rd}; 32 respondents rank it in 4\textsuperscript{th} place)

4. *exchanging socio-political information* – 264 points
(21 respondents rank it in 1\textsuperscript{st} place; 22 respondents rank it in 2\textsuperscript{nd} place; 17 respondents rank it in 3\textsuperscript{rd}; 37 respondents rank it in 4\textsuperscript{th} place)

The generalized overall data across the three probes reveal the following tendencies:

- In the responses to question 1, moving from Probe 1, through Probe 2 and to Probe 3, exchanging socio-political information ranks in 2\textsuperscript{nd} place, then in 1\textsuperscript{st} place, then in 4\textsuperscript{th} place. Thus, in terms of its overall ranking as to question 1 in all three probes, exchanging socio-political information lies in 2\textsuperscript{nd} place. However, its overall points as to question 1 in all three Probes amount to a total of 344, and, in terms of those points, exchanging socio-political information is the top function chosen by the participants. For those combined reasons, exchanging socio-political information is arguably the prototypical function as far as actual Facebook socio-political uses in general are concerned.

- In the responses to question 1, moving from Probe 1, through Probe 2 and to Probe 3, motivating others into socio-political (in)action ranks in 3\textsuperscript{rd} place, then in 2\textsuperscript{nd} place, then in 1\textsuperscript{st} place. Thus, in terms of its ranking as to question 1 in all three probes, motivating others into socio-political (in)action shares the 1\textsuperscript{st} place with debating a socio-political issue. However, the overall points of motivating others into socio-political (in)action as to question 1 in all three Probes amount to a total of 381, and, in terms of those points, motivating others into socio-political (in)action ranks 2\textsuperscript{nd} (although it registers only 3 points better than debating a socio-political issue). Importantly, the line of progression of motivating others in socio-political (in)action across the probes displays a steady upward tendency, while debating a socio-political issue rates inconsistently. For those combined reasons, prototypically, motivating others into socio-political (in)action can be seen as the function lying along the periphery, but still lying closest to the central function as far as actual Facebook socio-political uses in general are concerned.
In the responses to question 1, moving from Probe 1, through Probe 2 and to Probe 3, *debating a socio-political issue* ranks in 1st place, then in 3rd place, then in 2nd place. Thus, in terms of its ranking as to question 1 in all three probes, *debating a socio-political issue* shares the 1st place with *motivating others into socio-political (in)action*. However, the overall points of *debating a socio-political issue* as to question 1 in all three Probes amount to a total of 384, and, in terms of those points, *debating a socio-political issue* ranks 3rd (although it registers only 3 points worse than *motivating others in socio-political (in)action*). Moreover, as argued above, the line of progression of *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* across the probes displays a steady upward tendency, while *debating a socio-political issue* rates rather inconsistently. For those combined reasons, prototypically, *debating a socio-political issue* is a function lying along the periphery, which, although lying very close to second best rated function of *motivating others into socio-political (in)action*, still exemplifies the periphery of actual Facebook socio-political uses.

In the responses to question 1, moving from Probe 1, through Probe 2 and to Probe 3, *acting socio-politically* ranks in 4th place, then in 4th place, then in 3rd place. Thus, in terms of its ranking as to question 1 in all three probes, *acting socio-politically* ranks last, i.e. in 4th position. The overall points of *acting socio-politically* as to question 1 in all three Probes amount to a total of 570, and, in terms of those points, it also ranks 4th. For those reasons combined, prototypically, *acting socio-politically* is a function lying farthest from the prototype center and along the fuzzy boundary of the category. Still, it does exemplifies the category of actual Facebook socio-political uses. Moreover, it needs to be highlighted that the line of progression of *acting socio-politically* across the three probes displays the steadiest and most significant upward tendency in comparison with all other functions.

In the responses to question 2, moving from Probe 1, through Probe 2 and to Probe 3, *debating a socio-political issue* ranks in 1st place, then 1st place, and then again in 1st place.
Thus, in terms of its overall ranking as to question 2 in all three probes, *debating a socio-political issue* lies in 1\textsuperscript{st} position. Importantly, this is the only instance of such consistent ranking throughout the three probes. Moreover, the overall points of *debating a socio-political issue* as to question 2 in all three probes amount to a total of 523, and, in terms of those points, *debating a socio-political issue* is also the top function chosen by the participants. For those combined reasons, *debating a socio-political issue* is unambiguously the prototypical function as far as question 2 is concerned.

- In the responses to question 2, moving from Probe 1, through Probe 2 and to Probe 3, *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* ranks in 3\textsuperscript{rd} place, then in 2\textsuperscript{nd} place, then again in 2\textsuperscript{nd} place. Thus, in terms of its ranking as to question 2 in all three probes, *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* lies in 2\textsuperscript{nd} place. The overall points of *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* in question 2 in all three Probes amount to a total of 737, and, in terms of those points, *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* also ranks 3\textsuperscript{rd}. However, in that respect, *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* registers only several points worse than *exchanging socio-political information*, which lies in 2\textsuperscript{nd} place. For those combined reasons, prototypically, *motivating others into socio-political (in)action* can be seen as ranking 2\textsuperscript{nd} as to question 2, and, although lying close to the central function of *debating a socio-political issue*, as still lying along the periphery.

- In the responses to question 1, moving from Probe 1, through Probe 2 and to Probe 3, *exchanging socio-political information* ranks in 2\textsuperscript{nd} place, then in 3\textsuperscript{rd} place, then in 4\textsuperscript{th} place. Thus, in terms of its ranking as to question 2 in all three probes, *exchanging socio-political information* lies in 3\textsuperscript{rd} position. The overall points of *exchanging socio-political information* as to question 2 in all three Probes amount to a total of 712, and, in terms of those points, *exchanging socio-political information* ranks 2\textsuperscript{nd}. However, the line of progression of *exchanging socio-political information* across the probes displays a steady downward tendency.
For those combined reasons, prototypically, *exchanging socio-political information* is seen here as a function lying along the periphery, which, although lying close to the second best rated function of *motivating others into socio-political (in)action*, it still exemplifies the farther periphery of Facebook socio-political uses.

- In the responses to question 2, moving from Probe 1, through Probe 2 and to Probe 3, *acting socio-politically* ranks in 4th place, then 4th place, then 3rd place. Thus, in terms of its ranking as to question 2 in all three probes, *acting socio-politically* ranks last, i.e. in 4th position. The overall points of *acting socio-politically* as to question 2 in all three Probes amount to a total of 938, and, in terms of those points, it also ranks 4th. For those reasons combined, prototypically, *acting socio-politically* is seen here as a function lying farthest from the prototype center and along the fuzzy boundary of the category. Still, the respondents shows *acting socio-politically* does exemplify the category of Facebook socio-political uses. Moreover, the line of progression of *acting socio-politically* across the three probes displays the steadiest and most significant upward tendency in comparison to all other functions.

- No single function is revealed by the respondents as a top function in both question 1 and question 2 and across the three different probes. Three of the functions rate similarly. There is not clear overall prototypological center. Arguably, people’s attitudes toward the use of Facebook for socio-political communication and activity are in a process of considerable fluctuation and change during the pandemic period.

**Contextualizing the investigation: ‘performing’, ‘acting’, ‘Internet role-playing’**

A theoretical precept which finds its confirmation through the two studies is Mey’s assertion (2018) that mass Internet usage has brought about a new interpretation of ‘sociality’ – a ‘sociality’ that relies simultaneously on participants’ traditional, obligatorily bodily presence in a communicative exchange as well as on modern-day participants’ bodily remoteness. In
tackling the difference between the two types of communication, Mey relies on what he calls ‘linguistic avatarism’ (2018: 16) and ‘Internet role-playing’ (2018: 17). Importantly, to Mey, ‘linguistic avatarism’ and ‘Internet role-playing’ lead to the existence of two types of identities employed by the same person in the two types of communication. As others do (e.g. Ellison et al. 2006; Tagg and Seargeant 2016; Matley 2018), Mey distinguishes between a real-life identity and an online/virtual identity. In a similar vein, drawing on Goffman’s pioneering work (1959) on selective self-presentation, Dayter (2018) discusses what he calls real-life vs. social-media ‘self-presentation’. Positioned within the theoretical framework adopted in this thesis, ‘acting’ can be interpreted as one’s supporting two overlapping IDENTITIES: one IDENTITY in a RW and another – in the overlapping TW-DW evident, in our case, in a Facebook post. Either IDENTITY, prototypically, functions as a cluster of (sub-)identities which can be dynamically actualized in accordance with the DW.

From the perspective adopted in this thesis, all the different approaches mentioned above choose whether to profile elements from a TW (i.e. linguistic structures), to profile elements from a DW (i.e. communicative functions), or to profile elements from a RW (i.e. participants’ actions). Due to existing TW-DW-RW overlaps, however, each theoretical approach may not only profile a single World or elements from a single World (e.g. PARTICIPANTS’ IDENTITIES, ACTIONS), but may choose to profile two overlapping Worlds together (against the background of the third World), or to profile some element(s) which are simultaneously present in two Worlds.

Due to the conflated, simultaneous and metaphonymized presence of elements in more than one World, it is possible for both scholars and laypeople to interpret VERBAL COMMUNICATION in a DW as ACTION in a RW. Hence also scholars’ long-standing, cross-discipline conceptualizations of PERFORMING as COMMUNICATING VERBALLY (in what this thesis sees as a DW) and ACTING (in what this thesis sees as a RW) simultaneously.
Hence the more general possibility for the Pragmaticists notion of perlocution to exist: it conflates VERBAL COMMUNICATION in a DW with ACTION in a RW. Hence also our respondents’ beliefs (discussed in VIII. 4.) that Facebook posting (which, generally, exists as TW-DW overlap) can constitute RW action.

**Contextualizing the investigation: ‘text types’**

The conclusions and suggestions formulated above could associate not only with the notions of ‘action’ and ‘performativity’. Through highlighting the significance of functions in TWs and DWs, they also associate with the text linguistic notion of ‘text type’ discussed in Chapter V.

As far as the interconnection between ‘text type’ and ‘genre’ is concerned, there can be found studies (e.g. Bowie et al. 2014), which use the terms synonymously. As Biber writes, text types and genres are “clearly to be distinguished, as linguistically distinct texts within a genre may represent different text types, while linguistically similar texts from different genres may represent a single text type” (1989: 6). Genres, viewed from a text type analyst’s perspective, can be also generalized to be something text types “cut across” (Trosborg 1997; Virtanen 2020).

In contrast, our discussions in this chapter can be summarized to view TEXT TYPE as a concept typically profiling a conceptual region of TW-DW overlap, and GENRE – as a concept typically profiling a conceptual region of TW-RW overlap. While TEXT TYPE prototypically conflates rhetoric functions and communicative intent, GENRE prototypically conflates textual organization and real-life action. Undoubtedly, these conclusions are supportable as far as only the present-day stage of the notions’ evolution is concerned.
CHAPTER IX. CONCLUSION

The thesis addresses issues pertaining to the complexity of text and discourse analysis. It seeks to harmonize perspectives on TEXT, DISCOURSE, and the way(s) they could be studied. In most general terms, the thesis associates with two main domains and it does so to varying degrees. The first domain is the one of TEXT, DISCOURSE and related notions; the second domain is the one of existing theoretical approaches to the concepts in question. Those theoretical approaches are believed here not only to reflect (figuratively) scholarly interpretations of TEXT and DISCOURSE, but also to result from the operation of the same cognitive mechanisms that enable the operation of TEXT and DISCOURSE themselves.

Part I is dedicated to the isolation of candidates for inclusion in our hypothesized set of cognitive mechanisms, mechanisms which, in most general terms, operate while people process text- and discourse-related information.

To achieve that, the analysis is conducted with a view of isolating cognitive mechanisms from actual conceptual TEXT- and DISCOURSE-related uses. As a consequence, Part I works inductively towards its goal, isolating one cognitive mechanism after another in a step-by-step procedure.

The inductive procedure, however, does not allow for an advance literature review to be first provided and then applied to the hypothesis. To compensate for that structural peculiarity, the literature review is also provided in a step-by-step procedure, and it is included in the same chapter(s) that conduct the mechanism extraction analysis. Each theoretical literature review segment then follows the analytical isolation of a specific cognitive mechanism. Thus, Part I blends the mechanism isolation procedure with the literature review required.

Two chapters are included in Part I. Chapter II focuses on perceptions of multi-functionality typically attached to a POLITICAL SPEECH. Chapter III studies the notion of TEXT STRUCTURE and its numerous scholarly interpretations. Both those phenomena are
approached as holding a strong revealing potential as far as underlying cognitive mechanisms are concerned: historically, the very notions of POLITICAL SPEECH and TEXT STRUCTURE attracted the earliest pre-linguistic interest in language-use analyses, which, in itself, is confirmation of their salience against other TEXT- and DISCOURSE-related concepts.

Two chapters, and not one, are dedicated to the extraction of the cognitive mechanisms in our hypothesized set as it seems more than feasible to have one chapter (i.e. Chapter II) isolate the mechanisms and another (i.e. Chapter III) verify or refute the findings from the first chapter. Thus, Chapter III in Part I is dedicated to confirming the operation of the cognitive mechanisms identified as part of our hypothesized multi-process model in Chapter II.

The two chapters differ along another parameter as well. Chapter II’s point of departure are the results from two sociolinguistic studies I conducted; drawing on those results, the chapter proceeds to analysis of a dataset of political speeches compiled for the purposes of the thesis. In other words, Chapter II relies both on data provided by real language users and on dataset analysis. Chapter III provides dataset analysis only. The analyses in both chapters, however, are essentially qualitative.

Part I isolates the following cognitive mechanisms for inclusion in the multi-process model proposed here: conceptual metaphor, conceptual metonymy, World overlapping and World profiling. Each mechanism has been argued to function through the amalgamation of component cognitive operations. All the mechanisms are argued to co-function procedurally and prototypically.

However, due to the specificities of the human mind, the analysis presented here could not account aptly for the simultaneity in the presence and operation of the cognitive mechanisms constituting our model. The analysis, by necessity, can only take them one after the other.

What is proposed in the thesis, it should be highlighted, is a model without an approach. Where the model could be applied and for what purposes are the main issues addressed in Part
II. As the multi-process cognitive model is meant to be employed in analyses of text(s) and discourse(s), Text Linguistics and Discourse Analysis seem to be the evident domains where the model could be aptly situated. Therefore, Chapter IV discusses the scholarly domain of Text Linguistics, then Chapter V turns to the scholarly domain of Discourse Analysis. Clearly, each chapter displays features typical of a literature review (to which no separate chapter is dedicated in this thesis) but the discussion is not intended to stop there. The progression within the chapters is the following:

First, each chapter clarifies and systematizes the fundamentals of the approaches typically associated with the scholarly domain it investigates.

Second, each chapter compares and contrasts the fundamental principles sustaining those approaches.

Third, each chapter pinpoints concepts and research areas the model proposed in this thesis could be applied to (the later chapters in this thesis turn to some of those concepts).

Fourth, each chapter applies the multi-process model to the scholarly domain it investigates.

As far as the last point above – applying the multi-process model to the theoretical approaches within the domains of Text Linguistics and Discourse analysis – is concerned, it is my conviction that each theory can be argued to represent a conceptual metaphorization of its object of analysis (i.e. TEXT and/or DISCOURSE). In that, each approach selects a facet or a cluster of elements relating to TEXT and DISCOURSE that it chooses to profile in its studies. Overall, each approach is seen here as conditioned by the same set of cognitive mechanisms that allow scholars (as humans) to reason about TEXT and DISCOURSE. It is, however, the ‘meta’ principles and cognitive processes that I target investigatively in the chapters in Part II.
Therefore, what the chapters also attempt is to provide cognitive accounts of how and why the approaches exist in the form they do.

Part III follows the conceptual metaphorization demonstrated in Part II to dominate studies on text(s) and discourse(s): the conceptualization of TEXT, DISCOURSE and SOCIETY/ CULTURE as representing a progression in terms of concentric geometric spaces of increasing scope.

The two main objectives in Part III are (a) to contribute to studies of cognitive phenomena in context, especially to “enaction” studies, which emphasize the interdependence between thought and action (as in Hutchins 2010) and (b) to stress the importance of the notion of ‘RW’ as a major contribution of the multi-process model prosed in this thesis. The two are seen as interconnected.

To achieve those objectives, this part returns to and then further clarifies the interconnectedness among several notions which appear in Part I or Part II: ‘DW’, ‘context’, ‘user-centered parameters’, ‘communicative environment’, ‘discourse setting’, ‘context of situation’, ‘immediate environment’, etc. The chapters in Part III, as a consequence, progress spirally by accruing new data and new viewpoints on those concepts.

In parallel, the chapters in Part III build on findings in Part I which discuss the earliest concepts of interest to (pre-)linguistic studies (i.e. POLITICAL SPEECH and TEXT STRUCTURE). In contrast, Chapter VII and Chapter VIII in Part III turn to some of the latest concepts of language-related interest: online communication, virtual action, identity acting, performativity.

In similarity to the chapters in Part I, the chapters in Part III investigate both ‘offline’ uses of cognitive mechanisms and processes as well as ‘online’ (i.e. situated) cognitive mechanisms and processes (terms as in Vereza 2021).
In terms of research techniques, in Part III, Chapter VI provides qualitative data analysis, while Chapters VII and VIII provide quantitative data analysis. The quantitative data reported are obtained through analysis of datasets specifically compiled for the purposes of this study.

In thus applying the multi-process cognitive model to a variety of text- and discourse-related concepts, Part III also verifies that, in analysis of different phenomena, different cognitive mechanisms from the set display different salience. In other words, Part III confirms (a) the prototypical effects in the operation of the cognitive mechanisms within the model, and, (b) the presence of context-dependent profiling within the model.

As the multi-process model’s cognitive mechanisms, which themselves are used to study conceptual structure(s) and cognitive mechanisms, are perceived here as different from research techniques for studying conceptual structure(s) and cognitive mechanisms, the successful isolation of the cognitive mechanisms constituting the multi-process model proposed in this thesis can be seen as a prerequisite for further research establishing correspondences between the cognitive mechanisms systematized here and specific research techniques via which the mechanisms could be studied. In other words, this theoretical model could be also viewed as a step towards determining research techniques and procedures to be used in tracing the cognitive mechanisms and their co-functioning in text(s) and discourse(s). Thus, the multi-process model can be also viewed as applicable to Applied Linguistics research.

A second area of research which comes to mind when future applications of the model are in question is research on visual narratives and multimodality. Tracing the amalgamated operation of the cognitive mechanisms from the model in visual and multimodal texts/discourses could further be harmonized with virtual communication studies.

To conclude, this thesis only verifies a hypothesis of the simultaneous functioning of a set of cognitive mechanisms, which has the potential to (a) enable future theoretical investigations of text(s) and discourse(s), and (b) sustain hands-on analyses of text(s) and
discourse(s). Many of the assumptions formulated here, clearly, are open to both confirmation and refutation from future studies.
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CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THESIS

The first contribution of the thesis is the theoretical framework it employs: the framework co-ordinates premises from several cognitive fields of research. The thesis argues in favour of harmonizing principles from studies on conceptual figurativity, gestalt psychology, text-world theory, and cognitive text and discourse studies. In this way, the thesis tries and provides a step towards achieving greater cross-fertilization in text- and discourse-oriented cognitive research.

The investigative progression employed in the thesis leads to the formulation of a multi-process cognitive model intended as a multi-purpose instrument, which has the potential to be applicable in research on various aspects of text and discourse use. The model is intended as applicable to both single aspects of text and discourse use as well as to any possible combinations of such aspects. In other words, the model reflects the theoretical and analytical need to integrate different aspects of the object of investigation, which makes the model applicable to various research goals and sets of research goals.

‘Model’ is the word used in the thesis for a multi-process set of simultaneously functioning cognitive mechanisms; it is preferred due to its evoking a (scholarly) interpretation of actual cognitive processes and mechanisms. The model, basically, represents a theoretical hypothesis that those cognitive mechanisms co-function. It also represents the hypothesis that their co-functioning can be studied through various – qualitative and quantitative – research techniques, and for various text- and discourse-related research purposes.

Importantly, the multi-process model does not represent a new approach. The model stands for a contention that anything – from analysis of a single notion to the meta-analysis of whole theoretical approaches – can be studied as resulting from the same basic cognitive operations.

The thesis has isolated the following cognitive mechanisms as components of the multi-process model proposed here: conceptual metaphor, conceptual metonymy, World overlapping
and World profiling. Each mechanism itself is believed to function through the amalgamation of component cognitive operations. The mechanisms are argued to function simultaneously and through overlaps to the point of creating significant impediments before the analytical isolation of separate mechanisms.

Last but not least, the list of mechanisms is far from exhaustive. Each component mechanism, prototypologically, could potentially accrue further cognitive operations and/or cognitive mechanisms into the model. Viewpoint and stance, for instance, have been mentioned in the thesis as potential candidates for such accrual. Thus, future research on operations and mechanisms could, potentially, introduce significant changes into the multi-process model. What the basic premises here hold is that (a) conceptual metaphor, conceptual metonymy, World overlapping and World profiling are key to any understanding of TEXT and DISCOURSE, and that (b) those mechanisms should be studied together as a gestalt.

Indeed, the operation of each of the component cognitive mechanisms in the set has been known to have been investigated: at that, some of the mechanisms have been investigated very extensively. However, those investigations have almost exclusively aimed at isolating and distinguishing one mechanism from the others. The present thesis suggests the opposite: it tables a proposal according to which it is the four mechanisms’ co-functioning which needs to find its proper place in the literature.

Thus, a contribution of the thesis is the first-time harmonization of research on Worlds with research on gestalt perception. Another contribution is the introduction of the notion of ‘Real World’ as a cognitive phenomenon. Yet another – the proposed coherence in the co-operation of conceptual metonymy with World creation, and the ensuing claim that whole Worlds (and not only general domains) can be profiled metonymically through either World expansion or World reduction.
The thesis also demonstrates that the same multi-process set of cognitive mechanisms functions in both ‘online’ and ‘offline’ processing of text- and discourse-related information. In that, the mechanisms are revealed to function prototypically, one or more mechanisms looming larger in dependence on the object studied. Within the limitations of the thesis, concepts of ‘narrower’ scope such as text elements (e.g. TEXT STRUCTURE) have been shown to be more metaphor- and metaphtonymy-dependent. ‘Broader’ scope notions (e.g. a whole genre such as POLITICAL SPEECH, FACEBOOK POST) appear more dependent on World-related mechanisms and metonymy.

In this way, the thesis also demonstrates how the multi-process model can be actually used in hands-on analysis. Moreover, the analysis has been conducted on both academics’/scholars’ interpretations of text- and discourse-related notions as well as on general populations’ conceptualizations of them.

The thesis only seeks to verify the simultaneous presence and co-operation of the set of cognitive mechanisms, and it could not investigate here all its applications. Moreover, the very purpose of systematizing the cognitive mechanisms into a coherent model is to give grounds and an original impetus for, hopefully, numerous and varied future investigations.
CONTRIBUTIONS OF EACH CHAPTER

Chapter II offers a principled theoretical suggestion on the basis of which political speeches could be (re-)defined and the multiple simultaneous functions performed by a political speech could be analyzed.

Another contribution of the chapter is the confirmation that, in the case of POLITICAL SPEECHES, the metaphoric transfer from the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL image schema is triple and evident in all three types of Worlds. In TW, it controls the unfolding of ‘the story’. In the RW, it metaphorizes LIFE as A JOURNEY. Together with conceptual metonymy, it serves to profile a DW as a STEP along the PATH of LIFE.

Third, in addition to introducing the notion of World overlaps, the chapter supports a view of TW-DW profiling shifts as holding a potential to trigger a lasting ambiguity as to which World is currently profiled. Examples (included in the chapter) such as What I want the American people to know, what I want the Congress to know is that I am profoundly sorry are revealed to signal (a) the RW (as would, e.g., I was sorry for quite some time), (b) a DW (as would, e.g., I feel sorry as I am speaking right now), or (c) a TW (i.e. the PROTAGONIST in the story feels sorry). Such examples, the chapter argues, confirm that choosing which type of World (i.e. a TW or a DW) is currently being profiled is not a one-correct-answer activity but rather a matter of individual perceptual specificities. Such a view, to the best of my knowledge, has not been supported yet in the literature.

Chapter III focuses on the terminological and conceptual diversity surrounding the notion of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE. The chapter re-examines WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE and demonstrates how it functions as a category through prototypicality effects. The investigation, first, isolates six major terms used throughout the literature to refer to a structure which ‘runs
across’ a whole text, or which ‘holds’ a whole text ‘together’: ‘rhetorical structure’, ‘narrative structure’, ‘text structure’, ‘overall structure’, ‘superstructure’ and ‘macrostructure’.

The analysis illustrates how TEXT STRUCTURE, RHETORICAL STRUCTURE, NARRATIVE STRUCTURE, MACROSTRUCTURE, OVERALL STRUCTURE, SUPERSTRUCTURE, etc. function as realizations of the same multi-faceted conceptual complex due to the amalgamated operation of the cognitive mechanisms in the multi-process set. In other words, each of the concepts of RHETORIC STRUCTURE, NARRATIVE STRUCTURE, TEXT STRUCTURE, OVERALL STRUCTURE, SUPERSTRUCTURE and MACROSTRUCTURE is demonstrated to function metonymically by evoking different facets of WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE.

The chapter also provides an explanation of how the ‘sense’ of MOVEMENT through WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE, created on the basis of a metaphoric transfer from the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL structure, is enacted. The analysis also provides support for the possibility for MOVEMENT through WHOLE-TEXT STRUCTURE to be created through the mechanism of profiling shifts. Those profiling shifts, analysis of the dataset verifies, are enacted on the simultaneously operating TWs and DWs.

Another contribution is the generalization that a whole text’s structure can employ either principles of World sequencing, principles of World conflation, or any mixture of the two. More simply put, Chapter III verifies that either of the two cognitive mechanisms (i.e. World sequencing and World overlapping) can co-function with conceptual metaphor to create the impression of step-by-step MOVEMENT through a TEXT. Sequences of World sequencing and World overlapping can also co-function with conceptual metaphor to create the impression of step-by-step MOVEMENT through a TEXT.
Chapters IV and V answer the question of which theories can function as background to the application of the multi-process model proposed in the thesis. In other words, the chapters answer the question of which approaches to TEXT and DISCOURSE could cohere with, sustain and be advanced by employing the multi-process model. In doing that, the chapters provide meta-analysis of academic works/discourses.

On the basis of the cognitive mechanisms in the multi-process model, Chapter IV provides a re-definition of the field of Text Linguistics. It argues that, in addition to metaphrntonymizations of TEXT as a PHYSICAL PRODUCT, as a COGNITIVE PRODUCT, or as a system of text-related COGNITIVE PROCESSES, Text Linguistics is characterized by conflation and profiling switches enacted on text-centered textual aspects (cohesion, coherence) and user-centered textual aspects (intentionality, acceptability, informativity and situationality).

Chapter V, in its turn, provides a prototypology of approaches dedicated to analyses of discourse(s). Above all, it supports the generalization that, in Discourse Analysis, the predominant underlying metaphrntonymyzation of TEXT, DISCOURSE and SOCIETY/CULTURE as representing a progression in terms of concentric geometric spaces of increasing scope. The metaphrntonymyzation is demonstrated to operate simultaneously through World profiling shifts.

Chapter VI employs the multi-process model and distinguishes theoretically between ‘context’, ‘DW’, ‘user-centered parameters’, ‘communicative environment’, etc.

The chapter also contributes by advancing our understanding of the multi-process model by providing evidence for the operation of TW-DW-RW overlapping and coincidence. Moreover, it provides evidence for the overlapping and coincidence of more than one World
of a type, for example, overlapping of two TWs with a RW. The possibility is explained to exist due to profiling and scope variation specifics.

Importantly, the chapter defends the position that a DW and a RW co-operate through conceptual metonymy.

**Chapter VII** advances the understandings that (a) a ‘RW’ and ‘reality’ are different notions, and (b) that a DW and a RW co-operate through conceptual metonymy.

In verifying the latter premise, the chapter offers analysis of BREXIT, and generalizes that, at times of socio-political changes, people tend to minimize their use of figurativity. Moreover, it non-literal thinking is used in such times, people tend to employ fundamental metaphorizations such as LIFE as a JOURNEY. The chapter also argues that the use of figurativity in mediated discourse can be used a measure of the degree to which a concept is interpreted as ‘real’, i.e. as part of a RW.

As far as BREXIT in particular is concerned, Chapter VI contributes by verifying that, within the limits of the time period analyzed:

✓ BREXIT is most often metaphorized as a DIVORCE, A NATURAL DISASTER and PART OF A JOURNEY.

✓ In UK media, the JOURNEY, DISASTER and WAR metaphorical conceptualizations prevail. In non-UK EU media, MECHANICAL FAILURE is more prominent.

✓ Overall, a preference for inanimate source domains characterizes both UK and non-UK EU media uses.

Through the notion of ‘RW’, Chapter VII provides an explanation as to how a concept without a real-world referent (such as BREXIT) gradually ‘enters reality’.
Chapter VIII advances the theoretical contribution of Chapter VII by offering an explanation of how another (relatively) newly-emergent concept – Facebook posts – gradually ‘enters’ RWs. In this manner, the chapter contributes to studies of cognitive phenomena in context, and especially to studies of discourse as (social) action, thus positioning the present investigation close to research on human cognitive ecologies.

Another contribution of the chapter is its applying the notion of intra-domain activation as intra-World profiling and metonymy. The results and conclusions from the discussion included support the possibility for conceptual metonymic overlap and the ensuing conceptual coincidence between a DW and a RW to be so extensive that the DW and the RW become integrated into a conceptual gestalt.

As far as Facebook posting in particular is concerned, the data obtained and discussed in Chapter VIII support the assumption that the 2020 pandemic has heightened the socio-political role of Facebook. The chapter further contributes by establishing that the Facebook post is seen in present-day Bulgarian society as a separate genre and as a social instrument through which Bulgarians do not simply communicate but believe they actually act politically.

Moreover, Chapter VIII provides and discusses sociolinguistic data on the functions and efficiency of other major genres in political discourse. The data obtained reveal the Facebook post and the debate are the only two genres which are seen as so communicatively efficient as to represent actual political action(s).

At that, the Facebook posting tends to be increasingly seen as a pro-active and real-life-directed activity: in the pre-pandemic period, people primarily used Facebook socio-politically to debate a socio-political issue and exchange socio-political information. In the quarantine period, people used Facebook primarily to debate a socio-political issue and motivate others into socio-political (in)action. In the social-distancing period, people used Facebook primarily to motivate others into socio-political (in)action and debate a socio-political issue. Overall, the
data obtained reveal that the tendency across the three periods is for people increasingly to perceive Facebook use as a non-virtual-world activity.

Another contribution of Chapter VIII is its employing the multi-process model to provide re-definitions of ‘text type’ and ‘genre’. TEXT TYPE is argued to typically profile a conceptual region of TW-DW overlap, while GENRE typically profiles a conceptual region of TW-RW overlap. As a consequence, while TEXT TYPE prototypically conflates rhetoric functions and communicative intent, GENRE prototypically conflates textual organization and real-life action.
PUBLICATIONS ON THE TOPIC OF THE THESIS


