Introduction
One of the oldest and most widespread notions of the origin of philosophy points to everyday life as its prime source. Indeed, all of us “begin” our life and consciousness on the basis of daily experience, where our first concepts are learned and shaped, where we encounter phenomena which capture our imagination and later on lead to our choice of career, be it physician, teacher, or engineer. The question, however, is how is it that we go from everyday practice to scientific institutions, philosophical encyclopedias and academies of art? Furthermore, where does this road end and is it possible to traverse it the other way around? Non-metaphorically speaking, the problem is how to describe the phenomenon “everyday life” and what are the mechanisms by which philosophy springs into existence out of everyday life. Is this springing into existence taking place in every generation or even with every individual, or, once arisen thousands of years ago, is philosophy nowadays a separate field that reproduces itself? Is philosophical thinking a more evolved and superior form of thinking when compared to the everyday one? Is the clearer meaning of philosophical terms in comparison with everyday ones advantageous or disadvantageous for philosophy and in which cases is it the former or the latter? Lastly, does philosophical thinking contribute to acquiring a better sense of adaptation or does it constrain and solidify perspective? Is there a conflict between philosophy and everyday life, as that proposed by Parmenides and his distinction between the way of truth and the way of opinion? If so, what are the manifestations of this conflict, which side in it is the right one, and by what means could the conflict be overcome?
The answers to all these questions depend on the way in which the difference between philosophy and everyday life is conceptualised. The 20th century has repeatedly and tenaciously placed everyday life in the centre of attentive philosophical reflection. We will remark only several to highlight the contrast to our own position on the importance of everyday life studies in philosophy.
One of the conceptualisations is product of phenomenology and leads to the concept of “life-world” as in its Husserlian version. Traditionally this concept is also associated with the works of Heidegger, Sartre, and Jaspers. Another focus on everyday life is found in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (although this tendency started as early as Wittgenstein’s return from Cambridge in 1929). Wittgenstein’s treatment on the problem is the immediate impetus for the rise of ordinary language philosophy with its main representatives J. Austin and H. P. Grice. Grice’s theory on communication and on intentional-pragmatic parameters of linguistic meaning continue to influence a great number of investigations in the field of philosophy of mind and language. In the late works of Rorty, however, the thesis is defended that philosophy as “conversation about culture” transcends everyday life. Are the upholders of the “continuity” thesis (i.e. that philosophical thinking is a continuation of the everyday one) justified in their claims?